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ARTICLE
I GAvE MY EMPLOYER A CHICKEN
THAT HAD No BONE: JOINT FIRM-
STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LINE-
SPEED-RELATED OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES
Marc Lindert
"We're not trying to make shit palatable. But under the
new system, we'll be able to tell you how much shit you'll
be eating."
'1
I. "PAGE UPTON SINCLAIR!" 2
The insanitary conditions in which the laborers work
and the feverish pace which they are forced to maintain
inevitably affect their health ....
... The whole situation ... in these huge establish-
ments tends necessarily ... to the moral degradation of
thousands of workers, who are forced to spend their work-
t © Professor of Law, University of Iowa. Please direct all individual reprint requests
to Professor Marc Linder, University of Iowa-College of Law, Iowa City, Iowa 52242.
Dianne Avery, Gail Hollander, Herb Hovenkamp, Andy Morriss, Larry Norton, and Larry
Zacharias brought the full weight of their chickenological expertise to bear on the drafts.
1. George Anthan, Inspectors Tell Fears for Safe Poultry, DES MOINS REG., Jan. 14,
1989, at IA, 1lA (quoting David Carney, president of the North Central Council of Food
and Inspection Locals, AFL-CIO, quoting Dr. John Prucha, Assistant Deputy Administrator,
USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service, who was responding to Carney's charge that
the agency would soon be requiring inspectors to "eat contamination away"). Refusing to
publish the actual quotation verbatim, the newspaper substituted the word "excrement" in
square brackets. Telephone Interview with George Anthan (Feb. 20, 1995).
2. Page Upton Sinclair!, BUTctiE WORKMAN, Jan.-Feb. 1944, at 1.
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ing hours under conditions that are entirely unnecessary
and unpardonable, and which are a constant menace not
only to their own health, but to the health of those who
use the food prepared by them
Who sets the speed of the disassembly line for 200,000 pro-
duction workers in poultry processing,4 the fastest growing factory
employment in the United States 5-the workers themselves, their
employers, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) of the Department of Labor (DOL), or the Food Safety
and Inspection Service (FSIS) of the United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA)? Although presumably no one is naive enough
to imagine that U.S. workers have the right to co-determine the
rate at which the life is sucked out of them, even cynics may be
mildly surprised to learn that this basic working condition of U.S.
poultry workers has never been controlled by the agency charged
with protecting the safety and health of workers. Rather, the agen-
cy charged with certifying the healthiness of (dead) chickens-in
collusion with the firms it is supposed to be policing-is responsi-
ble for regulating their working conditions. How did this regulatory
perversion come about?
Poultry workers' lack of control over such a basic condition of
their work, lives, and existence is not new. Nor is the state's fail-
ure to intervene to protect workers from overreaching employers
unique. Nor, finally, is the connection between unsafe working
conditions and unsafe consumer products unprecedented. This entire
conflict played itself out almost a century ago in the meat packing
plants of Chicago. Indeed, the epigraph to this section, which is
taken from a report that President Theodore Roosevelt commis-
sioned and transmitted to Congress in 19066 in the wake of Upton
Sinclair's galvanizing novel, The Jungle, could just as well describe
the "Animal Auschwitz" that is today's chicken processing plants.7
3. JAMES BRONSON & CHARLES NEILL, CONDITIONS IN CHICAGO STOCK YARDS, H.R.
Doc. No. 873, 59th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-10 (1906).
4. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS,
Jan. 1995, at 75.
5. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Lab., Employment performance since 1983,
4-digit level manufacturing industries, seasonally adjusted, sorted by change in level of
employment (unpublished data, on file with author).
6. BRONSON & NEILL, supra note 3.
7. JOHN F. STEINER, INDUSTRY, SOCIETY, AND CHANGE: A CASEBOOK 93 (1991)
(quoting animal rights activists); see also C. DAVID COATS, OLD MACDONALD'S FACTORY
FARMS 81-96 (1989); JIM MASON & PETER SINGER, ANIMAL FACTORIES 1-5 (rev. ed.
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Although Sinclair was motivated by a concern for the workers'
safety rather than meat safety, the legislation that Congress enacted
that year ignored the workers.' The state's current neglect of the
quasi-penal9 conditions to which the unremitting drive for low
costs and high profits has subjected poultry workers is so systemat-
ic that the late-twentieth-century version may not even rise to the
level of farcical repetition of the tragic process ninety years earlier.
One of the principal reasons that the speed of the production
line has become crucially important for workers' health and safety
lies in its impact on the incidence of cumulative trauma disorder.
Between 1980 and 1993, repetitive trauma disorders, as a propor-
tion of all newly reported occupational illnesses, rose from 18% to
about 60%.o The poultry processing industry recorded the second
highest incidence of repetitive trauma disorders in 1990-696 per
10,000 full-time workers." The highest incidence was recorded in
the related meat packing industry. Together, these two industries
also recorded the highest number of such newly reported illness-
es-35,000.'2 In part as a result of these extraordinary rates, poul-
try processing and meat packing also ranked sixth and second
among all industries in total case incidence rates for injuries and
illnesses-42.4 and 26.9 per 100 workers respectively.' 3 The situa-
tion in 1992, the latest year for which data have been published,
was similar. Meat packing and poultry slaughtering and processing
plants ranked first and third in incidence rates of disorders associ-
ated with repeated trauma-1395.6 and 693.4 per 10,000 full-time
workers respectively.' 4 This combined industry group accounted
1990) (describing the conditions of chickens on factory farms); PErER SINGER, ANIMAL
LIBERATION 95-119 (1990) (detailing chicken factory farming methods).
8. Act effective October 1, 1906, ch. 3913, 34 Stat. 672 (requiring inspection of meat
products prior to shipment).
9. BARRY BLUESTONE & IRVING BLUESTONE, NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE A LABOR
PERSPECTIVE ON AMERICAN BuSINESS 17 (1993).
10. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BULLETIN 2399, OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN THE UNITED STATES BY INDUSTRY, 1990, at 5 (1990) [herein-
after Occ. INJ. BY IND.] (citing figures for 1980); U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., USDL-94-600,
WORKPLACE INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN 1993, at 2 (Dec. 21, 1994) (citing figures for
1993).
11. OCC. INJ. BY IND., supra note 10, at 6.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2.
14. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BULLETIN 2455, OCCUPATIONAL
INJURIES AND ILLNESSES: COUNTS, RATES, AND CHARACTERSTICS, 1992, at 7 (1995).
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for 36,500 new recorded cases of such occupational related disor-
ders, the second highest industry group figure for 1992."
A health hazard evaluation of the large Perdue Farms process-
ing plant in Lewiston, North Carolina, which the National Institute
for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) carried out in 1989,
illustrates these dangers. 6 The agency found that 36% of the em-
ployees had work-related cumulative trauma disorders during the
previous year, while 20% had current work-related disorders. 7
Those working in high-exposure departments such as eviscerating
and deboning were four times as likely to have experienced disor-
ders as those in low-exposure jobs such as maintenance, sanitation,
and clerical. 8 More than 99% of participants in high-exposure
positions were black and 86% were women, compared with 44%
and 63% respectively of the low-exposure participants. 9 In an
industry staffed largely by unskilled and unorganized workers,
many of whom are women and minorities, social-psychological
factors may also explain the incidence of musculoskeletal disorders.
In particular, "whe[n] the influence over the work process is limit-
ed [and when] the work is performed under time pressure . . . the
tolerance to repetitive work can be further reduced."'
The National Broiler Council, the companies' trade association,
and others claimed that production is so automated that chickens
arrive in stores "'almost untouched by human hands.""'2 If these
claims were true, they would imply that only inhuman hands could
withstand the pain caused by as many as 40,000 daily repetitions
of a single defined movement. In fact, it is human hands that must
make the same knife or scissors cut to slit open carcasses from
15. Id. at 9.
16. NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (NIOSH), HETA 89-
307-2009, HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT: PERDUE FARMs, INc. (1990) [hereinafter
NIOSH: PERDUE].
17. Id. at 27.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Asa Kilbom, Repetitive Work of the Upper Extremity: Part l-The Scientific Basis
(Knowledge Base) for the Guide, 14 INT'L J. OF INDus. ERGONOMICs 59, 60 (1994).
21. Barbara Goldoftas, Inside the Slaughterhouse, S. EXrOsuRE, Summer 1989, at 25,
27-28 (quoting Bill Roenigk); see also Glenn E. Bugos, Intellectual Property Protection in
the American Chicken-Breeding Industry, 66 Bus. HIsT. REV. 127, 155 (1992) ("Every
day of 1968 . . . Perdue ran eighteen birds per minute . . . down three eviscerating lines,
seldom touched by human hands."); Ben A. Franklin, From Womb to Tomb on the Chick-
en Farm, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1979, at C3. ("[C]hickens . . . are eviscerated, inspected
and chilled . . . before they are touched by human hands.").
22. Goldoftas, supra note 21, at 26.
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anus to breast or the same twist of the hand to yank out viscera at
a grueling pace, set by a relentless conveyor belt and reinforced by
circulating foremen, while workers are standing in pools of water
and grease in temperatures that range from freezing to ninety-five
degrees and being pelted by flying fat globules or dripping blood.
The painful damage to tendons and nerves can permanently cripple
fingers, hands, wrists, arms, and shoulders. It has required thou-
sands of poultry workers to undergo corrective surgery and made it
difficult or impossible for them to perform such simple motions or
tasks as raising their arms above their heads, holding things,
sweeping, washing dishes, or removing clothes from a washing
machine.'
Business Week's characterization of these epidemically spread-
ing injuries as "the first major postindustrial illness"24 must surely
have been meant tongue-in-cheek. Not even Karl Marx himself
could have wished for more fitting material for an update of his
analysis of classical industrial capitalist exploitation than the meth-
ods of speed-up and intensification that prevail in chicken process-
ing factories.' The annual rate of increase in output and output
per employee between 1963 and 1991 amounted to 6.2% and 2.7%
respectively; during the eighteen-year period from 1973 to 1991 the
corresponding figures were a far above-average 7.4% and 3.9%
23. A.W. BRANT Er AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., GuDELINEs FOR ESTABLSHING AND
OPERATING BROIIER PROCESSING PLANTS 26 (Agricultural Handbook No. 581, 1982); see
also Malone v. ConAgra Poultry, Inc., 595 So. 2d 897 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (awarding
workers' compensation benefits to an employee of a poultry processing plant who was
required to undergo surgery as a result of her work as a cutter on a production line);
Gold Kist, Inc. v. Casey, 495 So. 2d 1129 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986) (awarding a poultry
processing plant employee permanent and total disability benefits for repetitive motion
disorders resulting directly from her work as a deboner); Linda Cromer, Plucking Cargill:
The RWDSU in Georgia, LAB. RES. REV., Fall 1990, at 15, 15-16 (discussing labor rela-
tions in chicken processing plants and the disabilities of workers); Scott Bronstein, Women
on the Line, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., Nov. 17, 1991, at Ml; Scott Bronstein, Chicken:
At What Cost?, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., June 2, 1991, at C1 [hereinafter Bronstein,
Chicken]; Jane Fullerton, Risky Business: Arkansas' Poultry Empire: Processing Takes
Painful Toll, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 23, 1991, at 1A, 8A; Tony Horwitz, 9 to Nowhere:
These Six Growth Jobs Are Dull, Dead-End, Sometimes Dangerous, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1,
1994, at Al (discussing the working conditions in poultry plants).
24. Maria Mallory & Hazel Bradford, An Invisible Workplace Hazard Gets Harder to
Ignore, BUS. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 92, 93.
25. 1 KARL MARX, DAS KAPITAL (1867), reprinted in 23 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH
ENGELS,. WERKE 431-40 (1962) [hereinafter MARX, DAS KArrAL]; see also I KARL
MARx, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLmCAL ECONOMY 409-17 (Frederick Engels ed. &
Samuel Moore & Edward Aveling, trans., International Publishers 1967) (1867).
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respectively. 6 Not surprisingly, however, "[fincreased mechaniza-
tion did not lead to safer, more healthful poultry plants."
Efforts by workers or the state to regulate the speed of factory
conveyor belts meet with massive resistance by the owners and
managers of U.S. industrial firms. The speed and volume of flow,
or as Alfred Chandler, the dean of United States business histori-
ans, calls it, "throughput," lies at the basis of the modem regime
of mass production:
Mass production industries can then be defined as those
in which technological and organizational innovation creat-
ed a high rate of throughput and therefore permitted a
small working force to produce a massive output.
In modem mass production . . economies resulted
more from speed than from size. It was not the size of a
manufacturing establishment in terms of numbers of work-
ers and the amount of value of productive equipment but
the velocity of throughput and the resulting increase in
volume that permitted economies that lowered costs and
increased output per worker and per machine.'
Individual firms and the class of owners and investors will
seek to mobilize their considerable structural power to prevail upon
the state to refrain from regulatory intervention that would deprive
them of what are deemed prerogatives to invest their capital and
manage their businesses with as little interference from workers or
the state as possible. The USDA and its subdepartments have his-
torically proven themselves to be extraordinarily compliant or cap-
tured agencies devoted to serving the interests of agribusiness.
From the perspective of the poultry processing oligopolies, lodging
regulation of line-speed with the USDA would therefore be opti-
mal. In contrast, OSHA has always been a beleaguered agency,
unable to serve effectively the class interests of the workers, whom
it is mandated to protect.29 Capital was, for example, extraordi-
26. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BULLETIN 2440, PRODUCTIVITY
MEASURES FOR SELECTED INDUSTRIES AND GovERNMENT SERvICES 6, 14 (1994).
27. Martin E. Personick, Safety and Health Conditions in Poultry Plants, COMPENSA-
TION AND WORKING CONDITIONS, OcL 1992, at 1, 1.
28. ALFRED CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BusINESS 241, 244 (1978).
29. See generally CHARLES NOBLE, LIBERALISM AT WORK: THE RISE AND FALL OF
OSHA (1986) (explaining how and why OSHA has been unable to protect workers in the
[Vol. 46:33
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narily successful during the 1970s in using its political-economic
power to defang the radical potential inherent in the broad mandate
that Congress conferred on the agency, and transformed it into a
virtual captured agency during the Reagan and Bush administra-
tions." Nevertheless, for capital, OSHA remains an untrustworthy
agency to be circumvented wherever possible. With regard to line-
speed, the large poultry corporations have thus far succeeded in
avoiding intervention that would interrupt the maximum flow of
chickens and the profit they embody.
Interest-group liberalism is not a useful approach to understand-
ing the state's structurally biased accommodation of one class in
direct clash with its antagonistic class over one of the most critical
issues-the speed at which surplus is extracted and health under-
mined. Abandoning neutrality and the legitimation of the social
order, the state recedes into its role as a facilitator of capital accu-
mulation scarcely less ruthless than individual capitalists them-
selves. Relying on hard times to convince workers that capital
accumulation is a worker's best and only friend in a world in
which only consumption gives meaning to life, the state recreates
instrumentalist class rule.'
At a time when a market-knows-best congressional majority
threatens to dismantle what little workplace safety and health pro-
tection workers have been able to wring from the national state,
this Article, using the example of a particularly brutal industry,
analyzes in depth how, in the absence of worker control of the
process of production, government regulation has either expressly
adopted (the USDA) or failed to transcend (OSHA) capital's agen-
da. The study begins with an overview of the origins, development,
and structure of the chicken processing industry. The focus
throughout is on broilers--"young chicken[s] ... of either sex,
that [are] tender-meated" 32 -production of which bulks three to
four times larger than that of turkeys; though the production pro-
cesses are similar, the rate of throughput is lower in turkey plants
because the larger size and greater physical variability of turkeys
have impeded mechanization and automation.33 Following an ac-
way Congress intended).
30. Id.
31. But see FRED BLOCK, REVISING STATE THEORY: ESSAYS IN POLmCS AND
POTINDUTRIALSM (1987).
32. United States Classes of Ready-to-Cook Poultry, 7 C.F.R. § 70.201(c) (1995).
33. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES:
19951
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count of the legislative history of national poultry plant regulation,
this Article proceeds to a detailed analysis of the evolution and
consequences for workers and consumers of the USDA's capital-
biased policy of elevating throughput fiber alles. After exploring
the lawfulness of the USDA's line-speed regulations from the per-
spective of administrative law, the Article focuses on OSHA's
failure to assert its power to control line-speeds in order to hold
employers to their duty to provide workers with safe employment.
In the final section, conclusions are presented linking the specific
case of chicken processors to the broader issues of the division of
labor and the relationship between producers and consumers in an
undemocratic political economy.
II. OF PULLULATING PULLETS AND POULTRYCIDE: THE RISE OF
THE BROILER INDUSTRY
New technologies in poultry production made it possible to
segregate out the routine, repetitive jobs so they could be
centrally supervised and efficiently performed by relatively
unskilled labor.34
Two decades passed between the rise of the broiler industry
and Congress's action in 1957 introducing in poultry plants the
mandatory inspection that it had imposed on meat plants a half-
century earlier. During this period, "[h]istorically speaking, the
broiler industry . . . spr[alng up from nothing to a gigantic busi-
ness almost overnight."35 The industry underwent an initial process
of vertical integration that made large-scale operations possible by
means of manifold scientific and technical advances and the merger
of feed manufacturing and poultry raising, processing, and market-
ing in a form that left farmers who had sought to make a living in
this new business extraordinarily dependent on processors.36 In the
1994, at 687 tbls. 1127-28 (1994); 9 C.F.R. §§ 381.68, 381.76 (1995).
34. NATIONAL COMM'N ON FOOD MARKETING, ORGANIZATION AND COMPETI'rION IN
THE POULTRY AND EGG INDUSTRIES 10 (1966) [hereinafter POULTRY AND EGG].
35. Problems in the Poultry Industry Part 11: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 6 of the
Select Comm. on Small Business, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1957) [hereinafter Problems in
the Poultry Industry] (testimony of J.D. Sykes, Vice President, Ralston Purina).
36. DONN REIMUND ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN AGRICUL-
TURE: THE EXPERIENCE FOR BROILERS, FED CATrLE, AND PROCESSING VEGETABLES 4
(Economics and Statistics Service Technical Bulletin No. 1648, 1981); Ziaul Ahmed &
Mark Sieling, Two Decades of Productivity Growth in Poultry Dressing and Processing,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Apr. 1987, at 34, 36.
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area of mechanical and engineering technology, broiler housing
design and high-volume mechanized killing and evisceration were
particularly important. European firms have even developed broiler
harvesters, large tractor-like machines with foam-rubber paddles
that "gently sweep" broiler-house birds on to a conveyor belt at the
rate of 5,000 per hour-five to eight times as many as two work-
ers can catch manually.37 By the mid-1950s, one dissertation writ-
er found it questionable whether broiler producers were farmers be-
cause the production process was "really a sort of rural manufac-
tural activity in which purchased raw materials-feed and
chicks-are converted into broilers."'38 Two decades later the
USDA could boast that "broiler production [wa]s industrialized in
much the same way as the production of cars."'39
As the young chicken arguably became "the most researched
animal in this much-researched world,"' the development of fast-
growing strains of chickens bred for meat and a new understanding
of poultry nutritional requirements pushed the industry towards
higher levels of production. By the early post-World War Id period,
the USDA characterized the industry's genetic engineering cam-
paign ("The Chicken of Tomorrow") as "'the first real demonstra-
tion of production aimed at marketing."''4 This integrated system
succeeded in reducing the amount of feed required to produce one
pound of liveweight broiler meat (the feed conversion rate) by
more than half from 4 pounds in 1940 to 1.9 pounds in the early
1990s.42 During the same period, the time required to raise a
broiler chicken and take it to market was reduced from 10 weeks
to 6.5 weeks.43 Similarly, market weight rose from 3.1 to 4.5
pounds." Less touted by the industry, however, are the unintended
37. R.T. Parry, Technological Developments in Pre-Slaughter Handling and Processing,
in PROCESSING OF POULTRY 65, 73 (G.C. Mead ed., 1989).
38. Kenneth R. Martin, An Analysis of the Broiler Chicken Industry of the Delnarva
Peninsula 5 (1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin).
39. Robert E. Cook et al., How Chicken on Sunday Became an Anyday Treat, in U.S.
DEP'T AGRIC., THAT WE MAY EAT: THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 1975, at 125, 125
(1975) [hereinafter 1975 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE].
40. H.R. Bird, Chicken in Every Pot--the Broiler Bonanza, in SCIENCE FOR BETrER
LIVING: THE YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE 1968, at 37 (1968).
41. Arnold Nicholson, More White Meat for You, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Aug. 9,
1947, at 12 (quoting Dewey Termohlen, Director, Federal Department of Agriculture,
Poultry Branch).
42. William P. Roenigk, Increased Efficiency Basic to Global Poultry Production
Gains, AVIAN NEWS (SmithKline Beecham Animal Health, Exton, Pa.), Sept. 1993, at 4.
43. Id.
44. Id.; see also ROBERT BISHOP Er AL., USDA, THE WORLD POULTRY MAR-
1995]
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consequences of the subtherapeutic doses of antibiotics that are
added to chicken feed to neutralize or minimize the stresses and
economically ruinous contagions of confinement that exist in broil-
er houses with 40,000 other chickens: the bacteria that have be-
come resistant to the antibiotics, such as salmonella, E. coli, and
campylobacter jejuni, cause thousands of cases of diarrheal disease
and deaths annually.45
In many ways the new broiler industry has mirrored the devel-
opment of the meat packing industry, which preceded it by a cen-
tury. At the turn of the century the fledgling meat packing industry
prompted the comment that "it would be difficult to find another
industry where division of labor has been so ingeniously and mi-
croscopically worked out."' This extreme subdivision of labor
enabled the oligopolies to deskill the labor force, gain control over
and speed up the production process, and reconstitute the labor
market. Since the late 1960s, the large meatpacking firms have set
in motion yet another wave of mechanization and subdivision of
labor, resulting in yet higher conveyor belt speeds and speeds at
which individual workers must complete their increasingly nar-
rowed tasks. The concomitant rise in injuries, especially of repeti-
tive trauma disorders, has been startling. Relocation of plants to
rural areas in the Great Plains and the hiring of workers exposed
to low wages and high unemployment rates have enabled a dimin-
ishing number of oligopolies to weaken a once powerful union.47
KET-GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION AND MULTILATERAL POLICY REFORM 9-10 (Economic
Research Service Staff Report No. AGES-9019, 1990).
45. See NATIONAL BROILER COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE 49-50 (1989);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION: THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS
OF THE NATION'S PROGRAM 27 (1985) [hereinafter MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION]
(describing various strains of bacteria resistant to antibiotics); NATIONAL BROILER COUN-
CIL, POULTRY INSPECTION: THE BASIS FOR A RISK-ASsESSMENT APPROACH 140, 142
(1987) [hereinafter POULTRY INSPECTION]; Cook et al., supra note 39, at 130 (describing
the effects of adding antibiotics to broiler feed); Robert H. White-Stevens, Antibiotics
Curb Diseases in Livestock, Boost Growth, in 1975 YEARBOOK OF AGRICULTURE, supra
note 39, at 85, 93-94 (explaining the need for antibiotics in large flocks); George Anthan,
Carnivore Beware: The Risks of Disease, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 25, 1994, at 3; Mar-
jorie Sun, Use of Antibiotics in Animal Feed Challenged, SCI., Oct. 12, 1984, at 144
(linking the use of antibiotics in animal feed to human illness).
46. John Commons, Labor Conditions in Slaughtering and Meat Packing, in TRADE
UNIONISM AND LABOR PROBLEMS 222, 224 (John Commons ed., 1905).
47. 1989 THE PRESIDENT'S COMPREHENSIVE TRIENNIAL REPORT ON IMMIGRATION 127-
28 [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TRIENNIAL REPORT ON IMMIGRATION]; Tom Robbins, Leaving
the Jungle: A Union Response to Questionable Medical Treatment in Repetitive Trauma
Disorders, in UNION VOICES: LABOR'S RESPONSES TO CRISIS 21, 21-24 (Glenn Adler &
Doris Suarez eds., 1993). For an excellent journalistic overview of the recent transforma-
[Vol. 46:33
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Large poultry firms have faced few obstacles in their
transformative project. The broiler industry (and the widespread
custom of eating chicken) did not-apart from small-scale sporadic
and seasonal efforts in New Jersey and New Hampshire-even
exist before the mid-1920s, when Mrs. Wilmer Steele of Ocean
View, Delaware, began selling whole broods.' Prior to the 1930s,
chicken as meat was either an incidental by-product of egg produc-
tion49 or derived from small "backyard" flocks. From 1923 to
1934 broiler production in Delaware expanded from 1,000 to
7,000,000.0 By the beginning of World War II, Delaware alone
accounted for more than a quarter of total U.S. production, while
the Delmarva peninsula produced 43%.51 As underscored by the
famous Schechter Poultry case,52 New York City in the early
1930s was the destination of almost three-fourths of all live poultry
shipments in the United States;53 four-fifths of that amount, in
turn, was sold to Jewish consumers after having been slaughtered
in accordance with Jewish religious dietary prescriptions 4 New
York City, whose "poultry racket ha[d] become one of the most
outrageously ... corrupt and vile industries known to the criminal
world,"' was also the overwhelmingly dominant site of consump-
tion of dressed poultry. 6 It was only a decade later that process-
tion of the industry, see Christopher Drew, Meat Packers Pay the Price, CHI. TRIB., Oct.
23, 1988, § 1, at 1, Christopher Drew, Illness Is Taboo for Meatpackers, CH. TRIB., Oct.
24, 1988, § 1, at 1 Christopher Drew, A Chain of Setbacks for Meat Workers, Ci-.
TRIB., Oct. 25, 1988, § 1, at 1, Christopher Drew, Regulators Slow Down as Packers
Speed Up, CIi. TRIB., Oct. 26, 1988, § 1, at 1, and Christopher Drew, Easing the
Slaughter, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30, 1988, § 1, at 1.
48. HUGH A. JOHNSON, UNIV. OF DEL., BULLETIN No. 250, THE BROILER INDUSTRY IN
DELAWARE 7-9 (1944).
49. Problems in the Poultry Industry, supra note 35, at 3 (testimony of Hermon I.
Miller, Director, Poultry Division, Agricultural Marketing Service, U.S. Dep't of Agric.).
50. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 6.
51. Id. at 12.
52. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (holding the
National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutional).
53. See Local 167, International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 291 U.S. 293,
295 (1934) ("Live poultry for sale and consumption in the New York metropolitan area
continuously moves in great volume from points in distant States.").
54. Brief for Respondent at 30-31, A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495 (1935) (No. 854); see also John H. White, Jr., Home to Roost: The Story
of Live Poultry Transit by Rail, AGRIC. HIST., Summer 1989, at 81, 87 (detailing how
and where poultry is shipped by rail).
55. 78 CONG. REc. 451-52 (1934) (statement of Sen. Copeland).
56. ROBERT SLOCUM, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MARKETING POULTRY 1-5 (Farmers'
Bulletin No. 1377, 1927).
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ing plants were first established. 7 Since chickens were sold
uneviscerated until after World War II, the technology was primi-
tive. 8 Not until 1941 was processing automation introduced in the
form of manually operated mechanical poultry pickers to rough off
feathers. 9
The history of Perdue Farms, the third largest poultry producer
in the United States, illustrates this development. Perdue Farms was
founded on the Delmarva peninsulae in 1920 as a "backyard
flock of table-egg layers.' Three decades later, the company was
still merely selling chickens to large meat companies such as Swift
and Armour. Not until 1968, when it bought a poultry processing
plant in Maryland from Swift, did Perdue complete its initial inte-
gration of poultry operations. 2
The processing industry was initiated at a more advanced tech-
nological level than was the case in late-nineteenth-century meat
slaughtering. Consequently, poultry firms did not need to struggle
for control over production with an entrenched group of skilled
butchers. Indeed, by the 1950s, processors, operating in markets
increasingly dominated by retail chain stores, began to offer chick-
en parts cut by low-wage factory workers in order to accommodate
retailers' strategy of deskilling their in-store high-wage butcher
force.63 As early as 1951, at a time when workers on conveyor-
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. CJ. Tower & Sons of Niagra, Inc. v. United States, 52 Cust. Ct. 14 (1964); R.O.
BAUSMAN, UNIV. OF DEL., AN ECONOMIC SURVEY OF THE BROILER INDUSTRY IN DELA-
wARE 14-15 (Agriculture Experiment Station Bulletin No. 242, 1943); JOHNSON supra note
48, at 49-50; GORDON SAWYER, THE AGRIBUSINESS POULTRY INDUSTRY: A HISTORY OF
ITS DEVELOPMENT 37, 45-46, 48, 165 (1971); GEORGE SOULE, VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN
THE BROILER INDUSTRY ON THE DELMARVA PENINSULA AND ITS EFFECTS ON SMALL
BUStNESS (1960); W. TERMOHLEN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AN ECONOMIC SURVEY
OF THE COMMERCIAL BROILER INDUSTRY 3, 25-28, 41-42 (1936); R.C. Baker & C.A.
Bruce, Further Processing of Poultry, in PROCESSING OF POULTRY,.supra note 37, at 251.
60. The Delmarva peninsula incorporates portions of Delaware, Maryland, and Virginia.
By the late 1950s, the Delmarva Peninsula had become "[a] chicken house that produces
150,000,000 processed broilers a year." James Nagle, Efficiency's the Word in Broiler
Factories, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1957, at 27; see also COLLEGE OF AGRIC., UNIV. OF DEL.
& UNIV. OF MD., DELMARVA'S POSITION IN THE BROILER INDUSTRY: COMPARISON AND
GUIDES FOR PROGRESS (1961) [hereinafter DELMARVA'S POSITION].
61. PERDUE FARMS INC., FACTS ABOUT PERDUE (Oct. 1994).
62. CORPORATE COMMUNICATIONS, PERDUE FARMS INC., PERDUE FARM INCORPORATED:
HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHrS 2 (1994) [hereinafter HISTORICAL HIGHLIGHTS]; PERDUE FARMS,
INC., PERDUE & CHICKEN: A TRADITION OF QUALITY 5-6 (1994) [hereinafter PERDUE &
CHICKEN]; Here and There in the Broiler Industry, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Apr. 1968, at
19.
63. HAROLD SMITH & JOHN STILES, UNIV. OF MD., COMPARATIVE COSTS OF CUTTING
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belts in modem processing plants still performed most of the work
by hand," the Amalgamated Meat Cutters union conceded that
"[t]he retail meat cutter is seldom required to draw a chicken any-
more." ' Because many butchers deemed it "beneath their dignity"
to cut chicken, the union did not even resist the new division of
labor.' Finally, because broiler chickens are much smaller and
have been much more amenable to physical standardization through
genetic engineering than cattle or hogs, the disassembly process,
early on, attained much higher speeds than meat packing has ever
achieved. 7
During the early post-World War II years, a dual geographic
shift from small urban poultry slaughter plants to large rural plants
and from Delmarva and the Midwest to the South occurred. This
shift was made possible by the lower wages, lower feed costs, and
improvements in transportation and refrigeration available in these
areas.68 By concentrating their plants in rural southern areas beset
by depressed farms and high rates of unemployment, and hiring
largely impoverished women and minority workers, companies have
had to confront much less resistance to progressive deskilling from
atomized workers or unions.
The existence of alternative production areas strongly af-
fected the structural development of the broiler subsector
by allowing technological and organizational innovations to
occur at a faster rate than would have been possible in
traditional production areas. Producers in the new areas
were not hampered by capital investment based on prior
production methods or existing institutions governing the--
AND PACKAGING CHICKEN IN THE RETAIL STORE VERSUS THE PROCESSING PLANT (Agri-
cultural Experiment Station Misc. Pub. No. 331, 1958); BARTON WESTERLUND, BROILER
MARKET PROSPECTS FOR THE INDEPENDENT PROCESSOR, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO
ARKANSAS 58-62, 82 (1963).
64. See The Dawn of a Drumstick, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Mar. 1960, at 2.
65. Progress in Arkansas, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Aug. 1951, at 3.
66. Telephone Interview with Bill Bums, former Assistant Research Director, Amalgam-
ated Meat Cutters (Apr. 20, 1995).
67. JAMES BARRETT, WORK AND COMMUNITY IN THE JUNGLE: CHICAGO'S PACKING-
HOUSE WORKERS, 1894-1922, at 13-35 (2d ed. 1990); LEWIS COREY, MEAT AND MAN: A
STUDY OF MONOPOLY, UNIONISM, AND FOOD POLICY 36-45 (1950).
68. FRED FABER, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., COMMERCIAL POULTRY SLAUGHTER PLANTS
IN THE UNITED STATES: NUMBER, SIZE, LOCATION, OUTPUT 5-11 (Agricultural Marketing
Service 379, 1960). See generally DELMARVA'S POSITION supra note 60 (analyzing the
factors contributing to the broiler industry's decline in growth in this area).
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production, financing, and marketing of broilers. 9
Even where workers have managed to overcome the obstacles
erected by employers70 and the law, and elected a union to bar-
gain on their behalf, the largest poultry producers have not been
above engaging in blatantly illegal union-busting, such as interfer-
ing with elections or having employees arrested for distributing
union literature or firing employees for asking co-workers to sup-
port the union.7'
The initial target of vertical integration was not the working
class but formally independent farmers. Production contracts were
the pivotal points that enabled the feed grain oligopolies such as
Ralston Purina, Cargill, Continental Grain, and Pillsbury to take
control of chicken production in the late 1950s and early 1960s.'
Broiler production contracts between processors and farmers, as a
USDA study notes, "basically are devices used by contractors to
lease production facilities and hire labor owned by the contract
producers. Contractors retain title to the birds and their ownership
of other production inputs is so complete as to make the contractor
rather than the farmer the real producer."'73 Under this contract
production system, the integrators are relieved of much of the
investment cost whereas the farmers' income often sinks below the
equivalent of the minimum wage. From 1950 to 1965, for example,
according to USDA calculations, returns to operators and family
labor on broiler farms in the key state of Georgia ranged between
54 cents and 1 cent per hour. 4 Recent figures stating that growers
still receive only about 59 cents per hour could be written off as
an advocate's massaging of the data since they are calculated on
the basis that "[t]he grower is expected to care for the flock 24
hours a day, 7 days a week."'  Yet, Perdue Farms proudly boasts
69. REiMUND ET AL., supra note 36, at 8.
70. Local 425 Strikes Tyson's, Wages Consumer Boycott, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Nov.-
Dec. 1965, at 2, 2-3.
71. Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 48 F.3d 1360 (4th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed,
64 U.S.L.W. 3103 (U.S. Aug. 4, 1995) (No. 95-210).
72. HARRISON WELLFORD, SOWING THE WIND: A REPORT FROM RALPH NADER'S CEN-
TER FOR STUDY OF RESPONSIVE LAW ON FOOD SAFETY AND THE CHEMICAL HARVEST
104 (1972); FRANCES MOORE LAPPt ET AL., FOOD FIRST: BEYOND THE MYTH OF SCAR-
CITY 304-07 (1981).
73. REIMUND Er AL., supra note 36, at 15.
74. PACKERS AND STOCKYARDS ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., THE BROILER INDUS-
TRY: AN ECONOMIC STUDY OF STRUCTURE, PRACTICES AND PROBLEMS, 21 tbl. 18 (1967)
[hereinafter THE BROILER INDUSTRY].
75. Mary Clouse, Farmer Net Income from Broiler Contracts (Rural Advancement
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that "[flamilies who commit to raising Perdue chickens wear beep-
ers to warn them even in their sleep if the temperature begins to
go too high or too low for sensitive birds."76
Such low effective wages explain in part why predictions
proved incorrect that it would be impossible to compete with the
old system of poultry raising in which the farmer's wife supplied
almost all the labor "free." Getting the worst of both worlds, the
farmers, though they may view themselves as "little more than
low-paid employees"'78 and "hired hands," are treated by the com-
panies as independent contractors and thus "robb[ed]" of their
entitlement to workers' compensation, health insurance, or paid
vacations.79 The National Commission on Food Marketing soberly
described the calculus that made "contract farming" a more profit-
able mode of coordination for processors than formal ownership:
"many underemployed farmers with facilities available were willing
to sell their labor at very low rates because they had few or no
alternatives. Also, contracts were attractive to integrators because
they involved no social security, workman's compensation, and
other similar employee costs."8 In addition to these cost-cutting
measures, outright cheating, in the form of purposely
underweighing the broilers raised by the farmers, is also available
to integrators."
One of the chief economic advantages that favored the shift of
the center of the broiler industry during the 1950s to the
South-which increased its share of output from 42% to 70%
during that decade 82-was the "availability of large amounts of
low wage labor which has been employed in the highly labor in-
tensive broiler processing industry."83 The South had an "abundant
Foundation International - USA), Jan. 1995, at 5.
76. PERDUE & CHICKEN, supra note 62, at 9.
77. SAWYER, supra note 59, at 36.
78. Ronald Smothers, Slopping the Hogs, the Assembly-Line Way, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 30,
1995, at A1O.
79. Jane Fullerton, Risky Business: Arkansas' Poultry Empire: Day 4: Risk to Farmers,
AmK. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 24, 1991, at IA, 10A (quoting attorney familiar with chicken
industry).
80. POULTRY AND EGG, supra note 34, at 6; see also Bunting v. Perdue, Inc., 611 F.
Supp. 682, 683 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (describing contractual relations between Perdue and its
independent contract farmers).
81. See, e.g., Braswell v. ConAgra, Inc., 936 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1991) (affirming the
trial court's decision in favor of the grower when a buyer had misweighed the broilers
over an eight-year period).
82. WESERLUND, supra note 63, at 37.
83. Herbert J. Milgrim, Productivity and Growth of the Broiler Chicken Industry 129
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labor surplus"84 and a lack of "alternative opportunities for la-
bor,"85 and consequently wage rates were less than two-thirds of
those prevailing in the North. As a result, particularly in the
South, "[t]he problem ... [wa]s the weak bargaining position of
the grower."87 The farmers' vulnerability was exacerbated once
they had committed $10,000 to an investment in buildings, equip-
ment, and land that "ha[d] scarcely any value in alternative uses in
the absence of a broiler contract. A return on this investment de-
pend[ed] upon having a broiler contract."88 Yet farmers faced a
lack of "effective competition" for broiler contracts. In the big
producing states of Alabama, Georgia, and Arkansas, for example,
the four largest firms accounted for one-quarter of all federally
inspected slaughter.' Under these circumstances, a grower was
"reluctant to complain about what he consider[ed] to be unfair or
offensive trade practices" for fear of being "labeled a 'problem'
producer.""' The oppressiveness of the contracting system is illus-
trated by the fact that a "problem grower" included anyone who
even "attempted to obtain a written copy of his contract. ''" In
many localities the presence of only a single integrator made resis-
tance, in the face of a thin market, financially suicidal.
Emblematic of the lopsided power structure in the industry was
the USDA Packers and Stockyards Administration's issuance of a
complaint in 1965 against Tyson Foods, Inc. and Ralston Purina
Company for boycotting and blacklisting broiler growers known to
be or suspected of being members of an organization seeking to
promote the farmers' interests.93 Even a cooperative farming com-
pany, Gold Kist Inc., the second or third largest poultry producer,
(1968) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University).
84. WESTERLUND, supra note 63, at 6.
85. William R. Henry, Broiler Production Regions of the Future, 39 J. FARM ECON.
1188, 1197 (1957).
86. Thirty Years Behind Our Time, BUrCHER WoRKMAN, Jan. 1960, at 18 (citing hour-
ly wage rates of about $1.00 in the South and $1.50 and above in the North).
87. TiE BROILER INDUSTRY, supra note 74, at 63.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 34.
91. Id. at v.
92. THE BROILER INDUSTRY, supra note 74, at 26 n.29.
93. Arkansas Valley Indus., Inc. v. Freeman, 415 F.2d 713, 713-14 (8th Cir. 1969)
(summarizing the complaint); Tim BROILER INDUSTRY, supra note 74, at 3; see also Mar-
shall Durbin Farms, Inc. v. National Farmers Org., Inc., 446 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971)
(granting preliminary injunction in favor of broiler processors in suit that alleged they had
violated the Sherman Act).
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has been suspected by the USDA of "locking poultry growers into
a 'feudal-serf production system' in which farmers are just piece-
rate workers." 94 Having formed a consciousness appropriate to
their new conditions, more than 99% of the member-growers of the
Texas Broiler Association voted in 1958 to affiliate with the Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America,95
thus heralding, in the words of the Association's President, "'the
emancipation of broiler growers from the bonds forged by cruel
exploitation of the Big Rich under a system of peonage far more
galling and cruel than anything under the old sharecropper sys-tem.,,,6
In the typical vertically integrated broiler production, all steps,
with the exception of the primary breeding of parent stock chicks,
are combined into one efficient operation. . . . [he cycle
has only one major input (feed ingredients) and one major
output (product sold). In a modem, vertically integrated
broiler production complex, these are the only transactions
that actually occur and all other steps involve merely an
internal transfer of resources. The entire operation thus
relies on only one profit center. This process is highly
efficient and is analogous to a single, large factory convert-
ing raw materials (feed ingredients) into finished product
for the consumer (poultry products).'
For example, with the acquisition of Cobb-Vantress, Inc., one of
the world's largest producers of breeding stock, Tyson Foods com-
pleted the cycle of vertical integration." It is this all-embracing
vertical integration that has enabled firms to develop genetically
94. David Henry, Capitalist in the Henhouse, FORBES, Jan. 26, 1987, at 37, 37 (quot-
ing an unidentified USDA official).
95. W.R. Henry & Robert Raunikar, Integration in Practice-the Broiler Case, 42 J.
FARM EcoN. 1265, 1271 n.5 (1960); Poultry Growers on the March, BUTCHER WORK-
MAN, Nov. 1958, at 12.
96. Texas Broiler Association Affiliated with Amalgamated, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Feb.-
Mar. 1959, at 14 (quoting Joe B. McMillan, President, Texas Broiler Association).
97. Charles F. Strong, Jr., Vertical Integration in the Poultry Industry 3 (footnote omit-
ted) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
98. Although Tyson does not juridically own the broiler farms, in the 1950s and 1960s
some firms, such as Armour in Delmarva, also owned the farms. TYSON FOODS, INC.,
1994 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (1994); Dan McGraw, The Birdman of Arkansas, U.S. NEws &
WORLD REPORT, July 18, 1994, at 42, 44; Martin, supra note 38, at 26; Milgrim, supra
note 83, at 134-38; Ewell P. Roy, Economic Integration in the Broiler Industry 105
(1955) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Louisiana State University).
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uniform "products" that can be processed by automated equipment
and thus reduce costs in ways that meat producers have thus far
been unable to imitate.99
This type of integration was exemplified by such large feed
companies as Pillsbury and Ralston-Purina, which were among the
four largest broiler producers by the mid-1960s."r Pillsbury,
which had produced no broilers before 1960, integrated through
acquisitions to protect its feed mills in the South whose sales were
threatened by a constriction of the market as integrated broiler
producers began manufacturing their own feed.'0  By 1970,
Pillsbury was the second largest broiler processor in the United
States. Ralston-Purina, the largest integrator by the early 1960s and
still the largest at the end of the decade, had undergone the same
process of integration five years earlier." Both firms divested
their poultry divisions in the early 1970s, in part because the
industry's cyclical character was inconsistent with an entrepreneur-
ial strategy of a consistent flow of profits." 3 ConAgra, which ul-
timately acquired the poultry operations of Swift and Armour," 4
which abandoned poultry production in the wake of their own
conglomeratization, °5 also vertically integrated into the broiler in-
dustry; after having been a feed manufacturer for two decades, the
then Nebraska Consolidated Mills bought a broiler operation in 1961'
99. Marcia Berss, The Adam Smith Factor, FORBES, July 17, 1995, at 54, 54.
100. POULTRY AND EGG, supra note 34, at 14.
101. WILLIAM POWELL, PILLSBURY'S BEST: A COMPANY HISTORY FROM 1869, at 169,
176, 185, 187 (1985); GEOFFREY SYKES, POULTRY: A MODERN AGRIBUSINESS 67 (1963);
Fifty Companies Produce 75% of the Broilers in the United States, BUTCHER WORKMAN,
Oct. 1969, at 55; Purina-Pillsbury-Whose [sic] Next?, BUTCHER WORKMAN, June 1962,
at 44; Joe Western, Overproduction, Price Declines, Tariff Woes Hurt Chicken Industry,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 1963, at 1.
102. See SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESs, SMALL BUSINESS PROBLEMS IN THE
POULTRY INDUSTRY, H. R. REP. No. 2566, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1963) (discussing
the forces driving large feed companies to integrate and the integration process that
Ralston-Purina began in 1955).
103. POWELL, supra note 101, at 198; Pillsbury Agrees to Sell Its Chicken Operations
for About $20 Million, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1974, at 36; Ralston Discloses Buyers of
Poultry Operations that Are Being Divested, WALL ST. J., Jan 28, 1972, at 17; Ralston
Purina Says Divestiture Will Cost About 15 Cents a Share, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1971, at
21.
104. Pamela Hollie, Greyhound Selling Armour, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1983, at D5;
Carol Jouzaitis, ConAgra Fills Bare Shelves with Beatrice, CHI. TRIB., June 10, 1990, at
B1.
105. Telephone Interview with Bill Bums, former Assistant Research Director, Amalgam-
ated Meat Cutters (Apr. 20, 1995).
106. CONAGRA, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1994 (inside front cover) (1994) (marking
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In one of the most interesting backward integration processes,
Heublein, Inc., used its subsidiary, Spring Valley Foods, the tenth
largest broiler processor in 1975,"°7 to supply 25% of the poultry
for the 900 Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurants that it owned.'08
When broiler prices fell and feed prices rose in the mid-1970s,
however, Heublein sold its broiler operations.'" By the mid-
1980s, the capital requirements for a million-bird-per-week broiler
complex including processing plant, feed mill, hatchery, rolling
stock, and broiler, breed, and pullet houses amounted to $75 mil-
lion, of which the processing plant alone cost $25 million."'
In the course of this transformation of producers from a quasi-
home industry into a multibillion dollar business engaged in mo-
nopolistic practices and exposed to antitrust liability,' the broiler
industry experienced explosive growth in total production and per
capita consumption. Table 1 and Figure 1 depict this development
from the Great Depression to the present:
ConAgra's entry into the chicken business in 1961 with the purchase of a broiler opera-
tion).
107. The 20 Big Ones!, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May 1976, at 27 (listing Kentucky Fried
Chicken as the tenth largest broiler processor).
108. Id.
109. MOODY'S INVESTORS SERVICE, MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL 1750 (1978);
Heublein Quits Poultry, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1976, at 54.
110. T. LIONEL BARTON, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. & UNIV. OF ARK., TIE INTEGRATED
POULTRY INDUSTRY 4 (n.d.).
111. SELECT COMM. ON SMALL BusINEss, PROBLEMS IN THE POULTRY INDusTRY, H.R.
REP. No. 2717, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959); see, e.g., United States v. Perdue Farms,
Inc., 680 F.2d 277 (2d Cir. 1982) (affirming denial of Perdue's motion for summary
judgment against a complaint alleging unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or deceptive practices
in violation of the Packers and Stockyards Act); In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 407 F.
Supp. 1285 (N.D. Ga. 1975) (ordering several poultry companies to comply with venue
interrogatories submitted in three consolidated antitrust actions).
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Table 1: UNITED STATES BROILER PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION, 1934-93112
Year Production Consumption
(000,000 lbs.) (lbs. per capita)
1934 97 0.5
1935 123 0.7
1936 152 0.8
1937 196 1.1
1938 239 1.3
1939 306 1.6
1940 413 2.0
1941 559 2.8
1942 674 3.2
1943 833 4.1
1944 818 3.9
1945 1,107 5.0
1946 884 4.1
1947 936 4.3
1948 1,127 5.5
1949 1,570 7.1
1950 1,945 8.7
1951 2,415 10.4
1952 2,624 11.7
1953 2,904 12.3
1954 3,236 13.7
1955 3,350 13.8
1956 4,270 17.3
1957 4,683 19.1
1958 5,431 22.0
1959 5,763 22.8
1960 6,017 23.4
1961 6,832 26.0
1962 6,907 25.7
1963 7,276 27.1
Year Production
(000,000 lbs.)
1964 7,521
1965 8,111
1966 8,989
1967 9,183
1968 9,326
1969 10,048
1970 10,819
1971 10,818
1972 11,480
1973 11,220
1974 11,320
1975 11,096
1976 12,481
1977 12,962
1978 14,000
1979 15,522
1980 15,539
1981 16,520
1982 16,760
1983 17,038
1984 17,863
1985 18,851
1986 19,651
1987 21,523
1988 22,464
1989 23,979
1990 25,631
1991 27,203
1992 28,829
1993 30,592
Consumption
(lbs. per capita)
27.6
29.6
31.9
32.3
32.6
34.6
36.5
36.3
37.9
36.9
36.1
36.5
39.6
40.8
43.5
47.4
46.7
48.2
49.6
50.4
52.6
55.1
56.3
56.2
56.6
58.5
61.0
63.6
66.6
68.3
112. FLOYD A. LASLEY Er AL, U.S. DEP'T oF AGRIC., AGRICULTURAL ECONOMIC RE-
PORT No. 591, THE U.S. BROILER INDUSTRY, 8, 9 (1988) (containing the data for 1934-
86); National Broiler Council, Per Capita Consumption of Poultry and Livestock, 1960 to
Projected 1996 (Oct. 25, 1994) (unpublished data on file with author). The data for pro-
duction refer to live weight. National Broiler Council, Chicken (Broiler & Other) Produc-
tion (May 5, 1994) (unpublished data, on file with author).
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Figure 1:
U.S. Broiler Production & Consumption, 1934-93
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During these six decades, broiler production in live weight in-
creased 315-fold while per capita consumption rose 137-fold. If the
chicken that Herbert Hoover had wanted to put in every pot shortly
before the great crash of 1929 was still a luxury,"' and 90% of
housewives surveyed in the early 1950s still served chicken only
on Sunday,"4 predictions made in the 1960s that per capita con-
sumption was approaching its human limits"5 were manifestly
premature. The number of broilers produced during this period rose
almost 200-fold-from 34 million to 6.7 billion. In 1992, for the
first time, per capita consumption of broilers surpassed that of
beef."6 In more recent years, this growth was spurred in part by
113. See JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 46 (stating that broilers are a luxury for most
people).
114. Raymond C. Smith, Factors Affecting Consumer Purchases of Frying Chickens 105
(1954) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois).
115. See, e.g., George Soule, The Chicken Explosion, HARPER'S MAG., Apr. 1961, at
77-79.
116. LASLEY, supra note 112, at 4, 8-9; National Broiler Council, Per Capita Consump-
.Consumption
I - Producton I
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the proliferation of chicken-using fast-food restaurants where, by
the end of the 1980s, one-third of chicken production was destined
for consumption."7
Despite labor-saving capital investment and productivity, this
unusual growth in consumption and output brought about a strong
increase in employment. In the broader poultry industry, the num-
ber of employees rose from 22,000 in 1947 and 60,000 in 1958 to
226,000 in 1994, while the number of production workers in-
creased from 19,000 and 55,000 to 200,000."' For the years be-
tween 1983 and 1993, the last decade for which comparative data
are available, poultry slaughtering and processing exhibited the
greatest relative increase in employment of all four digit SIC man-
ufacturing industries-66%;"9  the absolute increase of 86,000
ranked second.'20 For the twenty years ending in 1993, the abso-
lute increase of 110,000 employees ranked second, and the 103%
relative increase fourth.12'
The United States has become by far the world's largest con-
sumer, producer, (aggregate and per capita), as well as the leading
exporter, of broilers. By the mid-1980s, U.S. per capita consump-
tion was about two-thirds higher than that in Western Europe.'"
The United States accounts for 30% of the world's broilers, which
make up three-fourths of world poultry production.'"
tion of Poultry and Livestock, 1960 to Projected 1996, Oct. 25, 1994 (on file with au-
thor).
117. Janet Key, Chicken's Salad Days in Fast Foods, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 3, 1989, at 1;
see also Agnes Perez et al., Introducing a Broiler Retail Weight Consumption Series,
LIVESTOCK & POULTRY: SITUATION & OUTLOOK REPORT, May 1992, at 28 (indicating a
general increase in consumption, in addition to a shift in sales from whole to cut up
chickens, with a spike of 22.1% in 1987).
118. BUREAU OF LAB. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS,
Jan. 1995, at 75; POULTRY AND EGG, supra note 34, at 14. tbl. 3-2; U.S. BUREAU OF
LAB. STATISTICS, BULLETIN No. 1312-9, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1909-72, at 344-45 (1973).
119. Bureau of Lab. Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Lab., Employment performance since 1983,
4-digit level manufacturing industries, seasonally adjusted, sorted by change in level of
employment (unpublished data on file with author).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. See R.T. Parry, Technological Developments in Pre-Slaughter Handling and Pro-
cessing, in PROCESSING OF POULTRY at 65, 66 (G.C. Mead ed., 1989) (stating that per
capita consumption of poultry for the EEC is about 33 pounds per person in the mid
1980s); see also supra note 112 and accompanying Table 1 (stating that per capita con-
sumption of broilers in the United States was 55.1 pounds in 1985).
123. OFFICE OF INDUSTRIES, U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, USITC PUBLICATION 2520
(AG-6), INDUSTRY & TRADE SUMMARY: POULTRY, B-8 to B-9 (1992) [hereinafter INDUS-
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The first major U.S. broiler export push occurred in the latter
half of the 1950s, in large part as a means of overcoming the first
serious overproduction crisis, which had surfaced in 1954 as "the
broiler industry reached that point all industries do, where produc-
tion... surpassed consumer demand at a profitable price." While
"[ilnefficient operators [we]re falling by the wayside [t]he promise
of profit [was] in volume, so operations [weire becoming larger
and more efficient."' 24 In other words, processors and other links
in the integrated production chain faced falling prices that could
not be accommodated by means of lowering costs because produc-
tivity had reached a temporary plateau. Consequently, processors
sought to "maintain a high rate of activity in order to meet the
needs of their expanded facilities."'" While the USDA secured an
informal agreement with governmental lending agencies and banks
to exercise caution in making loans for further expansion of pro-
duction facilities,'2 firms turned to external markets to purchase
the surplus. Exports were concentrated in Western Europe, especial-
ly West Germany, to which United States shipments rose from four
million pounds in 1956 to 152 million pounds six years later. 27
The newly formed European Economic Community made efforts to
protect its members', especially France's, fledgling broiler industry
by imposing levies on U.S. exports, triggering the so-called Chick-
en War." Although U.S. exports during this brief period amount-
ed to only 3% of total production, they were seen at the time as
absorbing "an important increment to the market for producers in
many areas.' 29 In order to overcome the increased tariffs, Swift
and Wilson opened poultry plants in England and Spain.'30
TRY & TRADE SUMMARY] (showing U.S. and world poultry production for 1986-90);
William P. Roenigk et al., World Poultry Sector Continues Dramatic Expansion, AvLAN
NEWS, September 1993, at 1, 1-3.
124. Problems in the Poultry Industry, supra note 35, at 39 (statement of J. D. Sykes,
Vice President, Ralston Purina).
125. H. REP. No. 2566, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1963).
126. Lenders Agree to Curb Credit for Expansion in Poultry Industry, WALL ST. J.,
July 12, 1957, at 12.
127. POULTRY AND EGG, supra note 34, at 81; Ross TALBOT, TIE CHICKEN WAR 9-11
(1978).
128. TALBOT, supra note 127, at 12.
129. BERNARD TOBIN & HENRY ARTHUR, DYNAMICS OF ADJUSTMENT IN THE BROILER
INDUSTRY 29 (1964).
130. Swift and Wilson Open Poultry Plants in Europe, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Oct. 1962,
at 20.
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Exports, which had averaged little more than 1% of total U.S.
production from 1960 to the mid-1970s, rose almost 20-fold by
1993, and were estimated at 2.7 billion pounds or more than 11%
of production by 1994.'13 U.S. producers export almost twice as
much in weight as their nearest competitors, French firms,
32
which are, however, much more export dependent. 33 Since 1985,
U.S. broiler firms have benefited from direct subsidies for exports
under the USDA's Export Enhancement Program, which was de-
signed to subsidize exporters competing with European firms in
third-country markets and to pressure the European Community to
reduce the level of its agricultural subsidies. The State also protects
U.S. producers almost completely from imports, which account for
less than one-half of one percent of the U.S. poultry market, by
means of prohibitively expensive non-tariff health and sanitary
measures. The low broiler production costs of U.S. firms, which in
part reflect low wages vis-a-vis those among their Western Europe-
an competitors, already make invasion of the U.S. market diffi-
cult.'34 Finally, the industry has followed the typical trajectory of
exporting manufacturing enterprises by establishing production fa-
cilities abroad. For example, in 1994, Tyson gained control over a
vertically integrated Mexican poultry firm, enabling it to produce
poultry for sale there.'35
The poultry industry has become increasingly concentrated and
oligopolized as firm and plant sizes have increased. In 1964, 201
firms operated 320 slaughter plants. 36 By 1984, 134 firms operat-
ed 238 such plants; 3 7 the average slaughter per plant almost qua-
drupled during these two decades. 3 From 1960 to 1987, the four
largest firms increased their share of total broilers slaughtered from
131. National Broiler Council, Broiler Exports, Jan. 9, 1995 (unpublished material, on
file with author).
132. Roenigk et al, supra note 123, at 3 (data for 1990-94).
133. See Top Companies, POULTRY INT'L, Jan. 1995, at 26.
134. See BISHOP ET AL., supra note 42, at 10 (noting that, at 29.9 cents per pound,
U.S. tied with Thailand for the world's lowest costs in 1986); ECONOMIC RESEARCH SER-
VICE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEASURING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE EXPORT EN-
HANCEMENT PROGRAM FOR POULTRY (Staff Report No. AGES-9016, 1990) (discussing the
effectiveness of export subsidies designed to meet competition from the European commu-
nity); INDUSTRY & TRADE SUMMARY, supra note 123, at 8-11; U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, 1993 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 31-6 (1993).
135. TYSON FOODS, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 14 (1994).
136. LASLEY, supra note 112, at 20.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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12% to 38%. 9 By another reckoning, of the 127 firms that pro-
duced and sold chicken in 1982, only 45 remained in 1989, most
of which were small, regional, private companies. According to the
1987 Census of Manufacturers, the four largest companies in the
poultry slaughtering and processing industry, which encompasses
less concentrated branches such as turkey processing and egg pro-
cessing, accounted for 28% of the value of shipments-three times
the ratio for all manufacturing industries.'" By the same year, the
average young chicken slaughtering and processing plant employed
538 employees.' 4' In 1989, the four largest firms, Tyson,
ConAgra Poultry, Gold Kist, and Perdue Farms, controlled almost
half (48%) of total production.'42 Tyson alone accounted for one-
quarter of all production in 1994.'" The extraordinarily com-
pressed centralization in the industry can be gauged by the fact
that just three decades earlier, two Harvard Business School ana-
lysts, both keen observers of the concentration dynamic of the peri-
od, had asserted that "[it seems altogether doubtful that the three
largest entities in the business could account for as much as 50%
of industry volume in the future." Even the possibility that twenty-
five firms might eventually produce 75% of total output appeared
to them "an ultimate limit rather than an early prospect."'"
A somewhat different pattern emerges from Table 2, which is
based on data published by a leading trade magazine.
139. Id. at 22.
140. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1987 CENSUS OF MANUFAC-
TURERS: CONCENTRATION RATES IN MANUFACTURING 6-4 (1992).
141. Calculated with figures from BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
1987 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURERS: MEAT PRODUCTS 20A-13 (1990).
142. U.S. DFP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 34-4 (1990).
143. Broiler Production, Mid-1994, FEEDSTUFFS, July 20, 1994, at 21; Lisa Collins,
Chicken's Hot: Poultry Firms Scramble to Cash In, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 1989, at 1B;
Douglas Frantz, How Tyson Became the Chicken King, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1994, at 1.
144. TOBIN & ARTHUR, supra note 129, at 108.
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Table 2: LARGEST INTEGRATED BROILER FIRMS, 199414
Rank Firm Average Weekly
Ready-to-Cook
Production
(000,000 lbs.)
1. Tyson Foods 88
2. Gold Kist 44
3. ConAgra Poultry 38
4. Perdue Farms 31
5. Pilgrims' Pride 25
6. Wayne Poultry/Continental Grain 20
7. Hudson Foods 18
8. Seaboard Farms 14
9. Foster Farms 12
10. Townsends 12
The scale of recent growth is indicated by the fact that Tyson
slaughtered about 35 million broilers weekly in 1995-a volume
quadruple that of the largest firm a dozen years earlier.'4 Ac-
cording to this set of figures, the proportion of total industry vol-
ume accounted for by the three and five largest firms rose from
1980 to 1989 from 20% to 36% and 30% to 48% respectively.
Mergers and acquisitions accounted for 80% of the increase in the
four firm concentration ratio between 1977 and 1988."4 Perdue's
1995 acquisition of the twelfth largest producer, Showell Farms,
Inc. further increased concentration as Perdue became the third
largest producer.' Other large producers include Cargill (twenty-
first), which integrated forward from grain and whose chicken op-
erations were sold to Tyson in 1995, and Campbell Soup (twenty-
second), which uses all its Herider Farms production internally.'49
As a result of this vertical integration and centralization of capital,
a number of firms have become "enormous commodity conglomer-
ates .... ConAgra, for example, in addition to being the nation's
145. Gary Thornton, Nation's Broiler Industry, BROILER INDUSTRY, Jan. 1995, at 27, 27.
146. Charles Connor, Tyson Completes Acquisitions, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL,
Sept. 8, 1995, at 7B; see Hope Shand, Billions of Chickens: The Business of the South,
S. ExposuRE, Nov.-Dec. 1993, at 76, 77 (stating that in 1982 the nation's largest produc-
er slaughtered an average of 8.9 million broilers every week).
147. Bruce W. Marion & Dongwhan Kim, Concentration Change in Selected Food
Manufacturing Industries: The Influence of Mergers vs. Internal Growth, AGRIBUSINESS,
Sept. 1991, at 415, 425.
148. Perdue Farms Buys Showell, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 1995, at 47.
149. Connor, supra note 146; Gary Thornton, U.S. Broiler Companies: A to Z Profiles,
BROILER INDUSTRY, Jan. 1995, at 32, 46, 50 [hereinafter U.S. Broiler Companies].
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number one flour miller and number two broiler processor and beef
packer, is also the number one slaughterer of lambs and turkeys,
the number two hog slaughterer.' 5  Industry observers remain
convinced that further consolidation will occur regardless of wheth-
er the vehicle is internal expansion or acquisitions.'
As the world's largest producer, Tyson's annual output exceeds
that of all countries except Brazil and China' and equals that of
the eight largest European firms combined; Tyson is also the lead-
ing United States exporter, accounting for more than 60% of total
exports of the five largest firms."53 That market position in an in-
dustry facing uninterrupted growth in demand-the market has
grown by 5% annually over the last two decades' 54-enabled
Tyson to be the number-one-ranked Fortune 500 firm, in terms of
the growth rate in total returns to investors for the period 1976 to
1986, while ConAgra ranked fourth. 55 For every ten-year period
during the last decade, Tyson has ranked between first and seventh
among the Fortune 500 largest industrial firmns in total return to
investors, and first or second within the food industry.'56 For the
decade ending 1993, Tyson ranked fourth in total return to inves-
tors and seventh in earnings per share growth.'57 That ConAgra
has made achieving at least a 15-20% after-tax cash earnings return
on stockholders' equity its "most important financial objective"'58
suggests the pressures to which it subjects its employees.
The location of poultry plants in small rural southern towns
depressed by high unemployment' 9 and the hiring of large num-
150. Marion & Kim, supra note 147, at 427-28.
151. Gary Thornton, Rabbit Out of the Hat, BROIL ER INDUSTRY, Jan. 1995, at 102, 102
(editorial).
152. TYSON FOODS, INC., TYSON FOODS: CONSERVING TODAY FOR TOMORROW'S
WORLD (n.d.); TYSON FOODS, INC., TYSON FOODS TODAY (1994) (declaring that Tyson is
the largest producer of chicken in the world).
153. J.A.G. VERHEIIEN & R. KOK, THE WORLD POULTRY MARKEr 23, 62-63 (1993).
154. Chicken Is the New National Bird and Some Rich Nests Are Feathered with Poul-
try Industry Products, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws (Denver), Jan. 12, 1995, at 40A.
155. The Fortune 500, FORTuNE, Apr. 27, 1987, at 355, 384; see also The Year's 25
Most Fascinating Business People, FORTUNE, Jan. 1, 1990, at 62, 72 (Don Tyson suc-
ceeded in building Tyson Foods "into the biggest U.S. chicken producer" and making
moves to ensure its "dominance in the . . .industry.").
156. TYsON FOODS, INC., 1994 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (1994).
157. The Fortune 500, FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 209, 252.
158. CONAGRA, INC., ANNUAL REPORT 1994, at 4 (1994).
159. B.C. Rogers, for example, the 24th largest poultry producer, Thornton, supra note
145, at 27, boasts that it is about to open a processing plant in an area of Mississippi
with 20% unemployment. Broiler Production, Mid-1994, FEESTUs, July 20, 1994, at
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bers of minority women, especially single mothers without other
options, have fostered conditions under which "poultry's Pashas"
could profit from the gap between productivity and prices on the
one hand and wages on the other. Whereas output per worker near-
ly tripled between 1960 and 1987, wages rose only half as quickly
as chicken prices." ° The industry also has a long tradition of
paying wages within the penumbra of the mandatory minimum. In
1964, for example, when the federal minimum wage was $1.25 per
hour, hourly wages in southern broiler processing plants averaged
$1.29 and ranged as low as 55 cents.' 6' Processing firms paying
such low wages generated lower labor costs (per unit of output)
than firms with average wage rates and twice the productivity (in
terms of birds per worker-hour). 62 The wage level was so low
that industry consultants (erroneously) warned firms that a failure
to raise it would trigger a "severe manpower shortage" and union-
ization. A decade later, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters com-
plained that "the vast majority of... poultry workers . . . receive
incomes that are below the poverty level."" 6 Even a dissertation
writer whose mission was to help processing firms lower labor
costs in an industry where "less than ideal" working conditions
were associated with turnover rates as high as 245%, conceded that
wages were "among the lowest for industrial labor."'65 By the
1990s, with almost half of poultry processing workers concentrated
in the low-wage and antiunion states of Alabama, Arkansas, Geor-
gia, and North Carolina," 6 average annual payroll per employee
21, 21; Chris Gilmer, B.C. Rogers to Market 230 Million Pounds of Chicken this Year,
MISS. Bus. J., June 7, 1993, at 19, 19; Telephone Interview with Jack Rogers, B.C. Rog-
ers General Counsel (Feb. 6, 1995); see also Jennifer Toth, Meanwhile in the Other
South, Bus. WK., Sept. 27, 1993, at 104 (describing how a rural North Carolina town
relies on a poultry plant to keep unemployment rate low).
160. Richard Behar, Arkansas Pecking Order, TIME, Oct. 26, 1992, at 52, 53 (according
to a report made by the Institute for Southern Studies in 1989); Jane Fullerton, Risky
Business: Arkansas' Poultry Empire: Day 3: Risk to Workers, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 23,
1991, at IA, 8A.
161. B.D. RASKOPF & J.F. MtEs, LABOR EFFICIENCY IN BROILER PROCESSING PLANTS
IN THE SOUTH 18 (Southern Coop. Series Bulletin No. 112, 1966).
162. See id.
163. Poultry Industry Told to Raise Wages, BUTCHER WoRKMAN, Mar. 1968, at 7.
164. Union Strives for More Progress, BUTCHER WoRKMAN, Feb. 1973, at 22.
165. Jesse W. Goble, Relationships Between Job Satisfaction, Demographic Factors,
Absenteeism and Tenure of Workers in a Delmarva Broiler Processing Plant 3-6 (1976)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland).
166. Personick, supra note 27, at 1.
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in the industry amounted to $14,858--only slightly more than half
of the $27,812 paid to the average manufacturing employee.
III. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF POULTRY PLANT REGULATION
[SIlavery time isn't over for many of the people who make
it possible for the rest of us to buy cheap chickens....
It's not the kind of slavery that ended with the Civil
War. No one is dragged in chains to produce those chick-
ens and to process them.
But it is a system of virtual economic peonage....
Let's acknowledge that some of the food products we ex-
pect to be delivered to us at ever-lower prices are being
paid for dearly by others in both economic and ... human
terms.
16
Not until 1959 did Congress require the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to inspect the carcass of each bird processed as human food.
Congress's chief objective was, to be sure, the protection of the
health and welfare of consumers, not a few of whom had in recent
years been made ill or even killed by diseased birds that "chisel-
ers, in the absence of independent state inspection, had been
able to place in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, consumer well-
being was not Congress's only concern. As several of the chief
legislative sponsors of the bills that ultimately became the Poultry
Products Inspection Act repeatedly stressed, the federal
government's intervention, sparked in part by deaths among poultry
processing workers who had handled diseased birds,7 ' was also
designed "[t]o protect the health of persons engaged in the pro-
cessing and distribution of poultry and poultry products.'' In-
deed, one of the chief movers of the legislation, Representative
167. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1991 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MANUFAcruRERS:
STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRY GROUPS AND INDUSTRiES 1-28 (1992) (calculated from Table
3).
168. George Anthan, Shameful Exploitation of Poultry Workers, Gannett News Service,
Sept. 6, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, GNS file.
169. Poultry Inspection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Poultry and Eggs of the
House Comm. on Agric., 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1957) [hereinafter Poultry Inspection:
Hearings] (statement of Shirley Barker, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen)
(defining chiselers as "operators who seek a quick and easy profit no matter what dangers
or consequences result to the public or industry").
170. 103 CONG. REC. 2744 (1957) (Rep. Leonor Sullivan).
171. Id. at 2745 (quoting from H.R. 12, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) that Rep. Sullivan
had introduced earlier).
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Sullivan, noted that the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher
Workmen of North America had first called her attention to the
problem.' Similarly, Senator Murray, one of the most vocal ad-
vocates of the legislation, and the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare underscored that the union had rendered a great service to
the health of the American people by taking the initiative in alert-
ing Congress to the need for the legislation."
Indeed, the Meat Cutters, which had begun an intensive drive
to organize poultry workers around 1940," 4 urged federal legisla-
tion as early as 1947 to deal with problems of sanitation and dis-
ease. The campaign accelerated in 1954 when the union created a
poultry department. 7  Under such titles as Congress Should
Probe Poultry'76 and Poultry Fraud and Filth Flow On,'77 the
organization's monthly magazine proclaimed poultry cleanup and
inspection its highest priority.' With circumspection, the union
president launched the crusade with the disclaimer that it was not
intended to "damage the reputation of the poultry industry, which
has literally mushroomed into a mammoth industry overnight and
in a sense may still be experiencing 'growing pains.' 17 9 Yet a
decade earlier, when the union newspaper in a banner headline had
sought to "Page Upton Sinclair!" so that The Jungle could be
rewritten to focus attention on the "appalling" conditions in poultry
plants, it had not only singled out the large meatpackers, but
"urge[d] the poultry workers of the nation to throw off their shack-
les."'80
172. Id. at 11,127.
173. Mandatory Poultry Inspection: Hearings on S. 3176 Before the Subcomm. on Legis-
lation Affecting the Food and Drug Admin. of the Senate Comm. on Lab. and Pub. Wel-
fare, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 67 (1956) [hereinafter Mandatory Poultry Inspection];
SUBCOMM. ON LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., SENATE COMM.
ON LAB. AND PUBLIC WELFARE, COMPULSORY INSPECTION OF POULTRY, S. DoC. NO.
129, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1956).
174. Earl W. Jimerson, The Chicken on the Cover, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Oct. 1949, at
2.
175. Labor Scores Again, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Oct. 1957, at 2, 3.
176. Hilton E. Hanna, Congress Should Probe Poultry, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May 1954,
at 5.
177. Hilton E. Hanna, Poultry Fraud and Filth Flow On, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Oct.
1954, at 1.
178. Hilton E. Hanna, Poultry Cleanup and Inspection Voted No. 1 Amalgamated Pro-
ject, BUTCHER WORKMAN, June 1954, at 8.
179. Patrick E. Gorman, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May, 1954, at 5 (introducing Hanna,
supra note 176, at 5).
180. Page Upton Sinclair!, supra note 2, at 2.
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Just as the meat packing oligopolies had actually supported
mandatory inspection at the turn of the century both to eliminate
smaller companies' advantages and to induce European countries to
lift their bans on the importation of United States meats,"' poul-
try companies had their own reasons for supporting mandatory
inspection. In 1926, the Federal Poultry Inspection Service was
created to help local government agencies carry out their food
safety programs.' Some localities' requirement of USDA certifi-
cation stimulated producers' interest in a federal system. The sig-
nificant growth in demand for poultry during and immediately after
World War II transformed the industry "from one with primarily
local markets to one with nationwide markets that could be effec-
tively served only by uniform national inspection procedures and
standards."'' 3 As early as 1952, the Institute of American Poultry
Industries had begun urging a uniform sanitation code in preference
to the proliferation of myriad state and local laws and ordinances
regulating poultry wholesomeness subject to voluntary inspection
by the USDA.' 4 Had this proliferation continued, processors
"wishing to sell poultry across the country would find it practically
impossible because of all the differences in poultry codes.' ' l
When the Institute of American Poultry Industries polled its mem-
bers representing 1,800 plants in 1956, fewer than 5% opposed the
organization's resolution requesting mandatory federal inspec-
tion."
Representative Johnson, a majority member of the small Sub-
committee on Poultry and Eggs of the House Committee on Agri-
culture, in discussing a compromise bill before the full House of
Representatives, observed that all interested parties, including con-
sumers, public health officials, USDA, poultry worker unions, and
181. GABRiEL KOLKO, THE TRIUmH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF
AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 98-108 (Quandrangle Books 1967) (1963); MEAT AND
POULTRY INSPECtION, supra note 45, at 14.
182. Nancy L. Smith, Meat and Poultry Inspection Programs, in SENATE COMM. ON
AGRIC., NUTRRnON, AND FORESTRY, 96TH CONG., lsT SESS., FOOD SAFETY: WHERE ARE
WE? 25 (Comm. Print 1979) (discussing the legislative and regulatory history of meat and
poultry inspection programs).
183. MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION, supra note 45, at 14.
184. SAWYER, supra note 59, at 189. See generally James A. Libby, History, in MEAT
HYGIENE 1, 9 (James A. Libby ed., 4th ed. 1975) (noting "a marked increase in the
public interest in a mandatory national poultry inspection program," during the early
1950s).
185. SAWYER, supra note 59, at 189.
186. Id.
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poultry industry groups, "agreed on the need for adequate inspec-
tion to protect consumers and laborers in the processing plants,
while at the same time not burdening the processor with extraordi-
nary expense and redtape."'' 7 Consequently, "[t]he objective of
the poultry inspection bill [wa]s to protect the consumer and the
worker in the plant from unfit and diseased poultry and to protect
the producer and processor from an unworkable inspection program
that might [have driven] them out of business."'88
According to John Harvey, the Deputy Commissioner of the
Food and Drug Administration, who testified before the Senate
Labor & Public Welfare Committee, one of the principal reasons
that the legislation provided for ante mortem (in addition to post
mortem) inspection of poultry,"9 was "to guard against infection
of plant workers."'" While rebuking the USDA for "assign[ing]
little, if any, importance to the occupational hazard to workers in
the industry which may be lessened by ante mortem inspec-
tion,"'' the committee itself insisted that there was "a serious
problem of hazards to workers in processing plants where no ante
mortem inspection is required."'" Senator Humphrey echoed this
view in arguing that inspection was "a major protection for poultry
workers against industrial hazards. Any diseased birds which are
prevented from coming on the processing line obviously cannot
infect the workers."'93
What is especially instructive about all these legislators' state-
ments is their timing. Representative Sullivan worked closely with
the Meat Cutters Union, which strongly supported mandatory poul-
try inspection. She included in the preamble of two early bills the
following phrase: "To protect the general consuming public, to
protect the health of persons engaged in the processing and distri-
bution of poultry and poultry products."'9 4 Less than two months
after she had filed the latter of these two bills, she introduced H.R.
5398, which no longer contained the reference to workers'
187. 103 CONG. REc. 11,122 (1957).
188. Id.
189. Poultry Products Inspection Act, § 6(a), 71 Stat. 441, 443 (1957).
190. Mandatory Poultry Inspection, supra note 173, at 10.
191. S. Doc. No. 129, supra note 173, at 6.
192. Id. at 10.
193. 103 CONG. REc. 2746.
194. See 102 CONG. REc. 10,529 (1956) (text of Rep. Sullivan's first bill, H.R. 11,800,
84th Cong., 2d sess. (1956)); 103 CONG. REc. 2744-45 (H.R. 11,800 is the predecessor
bill to and similar to Rep. Sullivan's second bill, H.R. 12, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957)).
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health.'95 Yet even as she introduced this bill, she made the
speech from which the foregoing quotations concerning the impact
of inspection on workers' health were taken.'96 The other
legislators' above-cited statements to the same effect were also
made after the reference to worker health had disappeared from the
bills.
In the late 1950s, four large unionized meatpacking firms
(Swift, Armour, Wilson and Cudahy) had largely been organized
by the Amalgamated Meat Cutters." Butchers in urban supermar-
ket chains were also largely unionized. 8 Consequently, labor un-
ions had the ability to play a significant legislative role. After all,
despite substandard conditions and brutal and racist resistance by
some southern processing firms,' the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
purported to represent 30,000 poultry workers in the 1950s' and
to have contracts with 280 of 900 poultry plants in the early
1960s."' Thus, although the union achieved neither broad-scale
organization of the industry nor national collective bargaining as it
had with the red meat companies,' and poultry workers in
plants owned by the large meat producers received much lower
wages than those firms' meat packing workers even where the
poultry operations were much more profitable,"'s several locals
were so successful that by 1959, not only were all seventeen
Delmarva poultry processing plants unionized, but even fourteen of
nineteen in Arkansas were under union contract.' 4 In those areas,
195. See 103 CONG. REc. 2744 (H.R. 5398 is identical to S. 1128, 85th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1957)); 103 CONG. REc. 1645-48 (text of S. 1128).
196. Il.
197. Swift Has Modern Poultry Plant at Sedalia, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May, 1944, at 2;
Jimerson, supra note 174.
198. A & P Now Solid in New York Area, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Nov. 1952, at 2.
199. See, e.g., Denison Poultry Strike Reaches Its 3rd Year, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May
1957, at 14, 15 (describing racist threats made against striking workers); Southern Poultry
Workers Need Help, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Sept. 1959, at 20.
200. A Look at the Poultry Bills Before Congress, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Feb. 1957, at
5, 14 (claiming 30,000 poultry workers were members of the union); Hanna, supra note
176, at 5 (including farm and egg production workers in the union's claim that 30,000 of
300,000 poultry workers were organized).
201. Which Workers Should We Organize? BUTCHER WORKMAN, Aug. 1963, at 23.
202. Telephone Interview with Bill Bums, former Assistant Research Director, Amalgam-
ated Meat Cutters (Apr. 20, 1995).
203. Stephen Coyle, Poultry Industry Reaches Manhood, But Pays Infant Wages, BUTCH-
ER WORKMAN, Apr.-May 1969, at 25.
204. N. HELBACKA Er AL., UNIV. OF MD., AREA COMPARISONS: BROILER PROCESSING
AND MARKETING 147 fig. 20 (Agriculture Experiment Station Misc. Publication No. 442,
1961); see also Jack Birl, Poultry Gains in Delmarva Area, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Mar.
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the union was able to negotiate uniform wage contracts."05 Labor
unions' support of various inspection bills was predicated on the
understanding that they would protect both consumers and poultry
workers. Representatives of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and of
the AFL-CIO, who stressed that the poultry industry consistently
showed the third highest injury frequency rate in United States
manufacturing, adopted this position repeatedly in their
congressional testimony with regard to bills that lacked any express
reference to workers' health and safety."° Leon Schachter, a vice
president of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen,
explained to the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
that the union had "become especially familiar with the dangers
faced by poultry workers when they are forced to work in filthy
surroundings and handle diseased fowls. Rashes, infections, and
sometimes severe illnesses and deaths, haunt workers in sections of
the industry." 2" Moreover, the union was pressing urgently for
mandatory inspection legislation because "the worker has no way
to protect himself against this thing. Organizing itself won't do any
good against poultry illness."2 '
Shirley Barker, Director of the Poultry Department of the
Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, listed the four
major purposes of mandatory poultry inspection as protection of (1)
"the health and purchases of consumers;" (2) "the health of poultry
workers;" (3) "the reputable processors against dangers to his [sic]
business provided by the practices of the shady operators;" and (4)
1952, at 11 (describing union gains in the Delmarva area); cf Eastex Poultry Company
Signs Contract, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Apr. 1955, at 5 (reporting a successful union
strike); Faye Hendrickson, Proud of Fat Chickens, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Apr. 1952, at 5,
6 (noting that union membership in Northwest Arkansas rose from 0 to 600 in two
years); Joseph M. Jacobs, There Are No Unions in Gainesville, BUTCHER WORKMAN, July
1951, at 10 (discussing union's successful organization of Jewell, County in Georgia).
205. Area Poultry Contracts Approach Uniformity, BUrCHER WORKMAN, July-Aug. 1965,
at 38.
206. Poultry Inspection: Hearings, supra note 169, at 144, 210 (statements of Shirley
Barker, Director, Poultry Dept., Amalgamated Meat Cutters, and George Riley, Legislative
Representative, AFL-CIO); Poultry Products Inspection Act: Hearings on S. 313, S. 645,
and S. 1128 Before the Senate Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 124-
25 (1957) [hereinafter Inspection Act Hearings] (statement of Shirley Barker); Compulsory
Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Products: Hearings on S. 3588 and S. 3983 Before the
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Agric. and Forestry, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 99-100
(1956) (statement of Shirley Barker).
207. Mandatory Poultry Inspection, supra note 173, at 52.
208. Id. at 66.
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"the poultry farmers' business." Moreover, Barker characterized
the achievement of "the latter two objectives [as] necessarily de-
pend[enti upon the first and somewhat on the second.""21 Barker
also testified that,
[a]s far as the poultry worker is concerned, ante mortem
inspection and plant sanitation are the two most important
protections provided in the inspection bills.
He depends upon ante mortem inspection to prevent or
minimize the amount of diseased poultry coming on the
processing line and possibly infecting him there.21'
Whereas several bills that the union opposed made ante mortem
inspection discretionary, Senate Bill 1128, supported by the union,
mandated such inspection. However, it left the manner of carrying
out that mandate in the discretion of the Secretary of Agricul-
ture.212 The mandatory language of Senate Bill 1128213 was vir-
tually identical with that of the Poultry Products Inspection Act
(PPIA)214 and its current codified version.215
Even after enactment of the PPIA, which was printed in full in
the Amalgamated Meat Cutters' monthly magazine,216 the union
continued to stress the risks to which its members were exposed.
Under such titles as Don't Be Chicken; Be a Chicken Plucker, it
pointed out that the injury rate in the industry was twenty times
greater than in explosives manufacturing.217 Continuity in the un-
derstanding of the statute as subsidiarily protecting poultry workers
became clear in 1968, when Congress held hearings on amend-
ments to the PPIA.218 At that time, the legislative representative
of the Amalgamated Meat Cutters testified that the union was
persisting in its efforts on behalf of consumer-protective regulations
in part out of "self-interest[.] Our members working in poultry
209. Inspection Act Hearings, supra note 206, at 125.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 128.
212. Id. (statement of Shirley Barker); S. 1128, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a) (Feb. 7,
1957).
213. 103 CONG. REc. at 1646 (text of S. 1128, §5(a)).
214. Pub. L. No. 85-172, § 6(a), 71 Stat. 443 (1957).
215. 21 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1988).
216. Poultry Bill Signed by President; Becomes Law, BUTCHER WoRKMAN, Sept. 1957,
at 10.
217. Don't Be Chicken; Be a Chicken Plucker, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May 1958, at 14.
218. See Amend the Poultry Products Inspection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Livestock and Grains of the House Comm. on Agric., 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 153 (1968).
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plants are protected from illness if the plant is clean and the prod-
uct is wholesome. Federal inspectors can assure this protective
cleanliness and absence of disease far better than can the union
grievance machinery." '219 As a result, the union expected that the
legislation would "drive out of the marketplace any and all poultry
which poses any possible danger to the health of consumers and
poultry workers." 0
IV. THE USDA AND THROUGHPUT UBER ALLES
Modern processing plants are a far cry from grabbing a
chicken by the neck and whacking off its head."
How far the USDA would disappoint Congress's original intent
and labor's expectation would become very clear, very soon. One
of the first consequences of the advent of mandatory inspection
was the modernization of production facilities,' resulting in an
exacerbation of the already realized potential for overproduction
and an effort by firms to induce Americans to double their con-
sumption.' The statutory ban on the processing or sale of
uneviscerated (New York dressed) poultry products in interstate
commerce 4 created a powerful incentive for firms to mecha-
nize.' Since some plants were too outdated to meet new sanitary
requirements, the normal process of moral obsolescence was accel-
erated by the need to meet regulatory deadlines. In the course of
building new plants to comply in timely fashion with the USDA
regulations, firms increased capacity by introducing the latest high-
performance automated processing equipment; within a year to
fourteen months, total processing capacity rose by about one-
third:' "If an automated processing plant, with its high capital
investment, is to make a return, it has to run chickens. Heavy
219. Id. at 154 (statement of Arnold Mayer, Legislative Representative, Amalgamated
Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of North America (AFL-CIO)).
220. Id. at 158.
221. Frantz, supra note 143, at 6.
222. REX CHILDS & ROGER WALTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MONORAIL CONVEYORS
USED IN EVISCERATING POULTRY: AN INTERIM REPORT 3 (Agricultural Marketing Service
290, 1959).
223. Chicken Big, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 30, 1959, at 87, 87.
224. Poultry Products Inspection Act, Pub. L. 85-172, §§ 4(e), 9(a), 71 Stat. 441-42,
445 (1957).
225. FABER, supra note 68, at 16.
226. SAWYER, supra note 59, at 190.
[Vol. 46:33
I GAVE MY EMPLOYER A CHICKEN THAT HAD NO BONE
pressure was on the industry to increase production, and the indus-
try had already been having some serious price problems-with a
finger of blame pointed at overproduction." 7 Thus, mandatory
inspection almost immediately reinforced the forces inherent in
capital accumulation to increase the rate of throughput and to con-
centrate and centralize production in fewer firms.' From 1960 to
1964, the proportion of federally inspected slaughter accounted for
by the four largest firms rose from 12% to 18%.9 Looked at
from a slightly different perspective, if in 1960, the nineteen larg-
est processing finms slaughtered 30% of the total poultry inspected
by the USDA, by 1964 the same share was accounted for by only
nine firms." Much of this increased concentration occurred
through mergers or acquisitions." From 1960 to 1963 alone, the
competitive "attempt to avoid an orgy of overproduction" halved
the number of major firms producing three-fourths of total output
from 100 to 50.2 This concentration of "ownership--or at least
the control over decisions ... beginning in 1959, and rapidly
accelerating in 1961-62,"' promoted by the state's own actions,
made a mockery of the contemporaneous "firm opinion" of the
House Select Committee on Small Business that the "broiler indus-
try is an industry where small business can perform any necessary
function as efficiently as a giant concern.""u4
As the concentration of processing in the largest plants contin-
ued during the latter part of the 1960s,' s the USDA published a
report titled, Efficiency in Poultry Evisceration and Inspection
Operations, which left no doubt that workers' welfare was of no
concern to it: "The purpose of Federal inspection of poultry in
processing plants is to assure a wholesome product. It is to the
advantage of all people concerned-the producer, the processor, the
inspector and the consumer-that Federal poultry inspection be
carried out efficiently and effectively. '' "s In connection with the
227. l.
228. TOBIN & ARTHUR, supra note 129, at 25-26.
229. POULTRY AND EGG, supra note 34, at 16 tbl. 3-4.
230. THE BROILER INDuSTRY, supra note 74, at 8.
231. Id.
232. Western, supra note 101, at 1.
233. TOBIN & ARTHUR, supra note 129, at 101.
234. Problems in the Poultry Industry, supra note 35, at 8.
235. ECONOMIc REsEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MARKETING RESEARCH RE-
PORT No. 971, MARKET STRucruRE OF THE FOOD INDUSTRIES 44 tbl. 28 (1972).
236. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERv., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MARKETING RESEARCH
REPORT No. 813, EFFICIENCY IN POULTRY EVISCERATION AND INSPEC1ION OPERATIONS 1
1995]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
congressional mandate to perform a post mortem inspection of
every bird produced for commerce, including the exterior, the inte-
rior, the body cavity, and the viscera, in a process that The New
York Times called "a pretty stomach-turning affair,"" the USDA
established various maximum inspection rates dependant upon the
configuration of the production line and the number of inspector
stations on the line. Conflating its inspectional duties with its myri-
ad other activities as facilitator of agribusiness welfare, the USDA
immediately began conducting studies designed to help processing
companies increase the speed at which they pushed their workers.
Within two years of the onset of federal inspections, the USDA
had launched its first Tayloristic time-and-motion studies that
showed employers how to reduce labor requirements on the labor-
intensive evisceration line.238 In identifying the most efficient
methods used by average workers, this program was driven by the
absence of information on labor requirements and of "criteria for
crew size and balance in relation to line speed and operating vol-
ume." 9 These time-and-motion studies revealed, for example,
that reducing the time required to "[r]each for [the] next bird"
enabled a worker to remove the oil gland of 36.8 birds per minute
rather than a mere 33.0.2 The USDA also discovered that a slic-
ing cut with a six-inch knife enabled one worker to make an open-
ing cut on 45 birds per minute or 2,700 per hour in contrast with
only 28.7 birds per minute or 1,722 per hour with a stabbing
cut. 4' Indeed, because the longest work cycle on the eviscerating
line was only six seconds and because the workers were so crowd-
ed together that it was difficult to observe their hand movements,
the investigators were forced to use motion picture cameras rather
than stopwatches. 42 Without pausing to relate whether the affect-
ed workers expressed their gratitude for these helpful tips on how
to fill in the "time-pores" of their leisurely working day more
densely,243 the USDA proceeded to a similar analysis of its
(1968) [hereinafter EFFICIENCY IN PouLTRY EvISCERATIoN].
237. N.R. Kleinfield, America Goes Chicken Crazy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1984, § 3, at
1, 9.
238. AGRICuLTuRAL MARKETING SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MARKETING RESEARCH
REPORT No. 549, METHODS AND EQUIPMENT FOR EVISCERATING CHICKENS 4 (1962)
[hereinafter METHODS AND EQUIPMENT].
239. Id. at 5.
240. Id. at 9-10.
241. Id. at 17, 18 tbl. 7.
242. Id. at 53.
243. KARL MARX, ZuR KRMK DER POLMSCHBN OKONOMIE (MANuSKRipT 1861-1863),
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inspectors' activities.24 Such throughput fiber alles guidance fit
comfortably within the pattern set by the Agricultural Experiment
Stations of the southern states. They, too, were so preoccupied with
advising broiler processing plant managers on how to "maximize
labor efficiency" at varying line-speeds that the attention they paid
to the problem of "an excessive rate of ... mutilated, unmarket-
able birds""24 blinded them to the workers who became unmarket-
able.
The investigation culminated in two tables displaying the labor
requirements for evisceration at production levels ranging from 30
to 90 birds per minute.2' The USDA stated that "[tihe plan in
establishing the most economical line speeds for labor utilization is
to arrive at the production level where the most birds possible are
processed properly per man-houi of labor expended."247 Rates per
worker varied from a mere 11.7 birds per minute for gizzard re-
moval to 78.8 birds per minute for removal of necks with a knife
(achieved by a worker snipping simultaneously on two lines).2"
These rates were not even "the maximum that can be achieved by
a worker, but rather the rates that average workers can maintain
throughout a day."'249 "Even an average worker can be expected
to increase his output by 15 to 20% for short periods of time
without decreasing the quality of workmanship." 2  The USDA
did not bother to investigate how much longer than a workday
workers could sustain this pace and the impact it had on their
physical and mental health. Rather, what the USDA deemed crucial
was "[miaximizing labor input through optimum crew balance" and
"[g]earing line speed to methods and equipment yielding the high-
est production rate per worker consistent with good workmanship,
rather than striving for the greatest possible total production."'"
The purpose of the calculations was to determine how close to
these rates workers performing the various functions along the line
could come at varying line-speeds and at what break points it was
profitable to add another worker. The problem that the USDA was
in E1/3.1 GESAMTAUSGABE (MEGA) 307 (1976) (translated by the author).
244. METHODS AND EQUIPMENT, supra note 238, at 22-25.
245. RASKoPF & MLES, supra note 161, at 24, 25.
246. METHODS AND EQUIPMENT, supra note 238, at 41.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 39, 42 tbl. 22.
249. Id. at 44.
250. Id. at 53.
251. METHODS AND EQUIPMENT, supra note 238, at 52.
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seeking to help broiler oligopolists solve was one that is inherent
in all division of labor in which "one worker directly employs ...
the other." This "direct dependence . . . of the workers on one an-
other compels every single one to use only the necessary time for
his function," 2 thus forging a unique level of labor intensity,
which appears as "a technical law of the process of production
itself." 3 Various operations along the production line require
varying amounts of time and thus supply varying quantities of
product during the same time. Thus, if a rigid division of labor
requires the same worker to perform the same operation every day,
then "a fixed mathematical relationship" or proportionality between
groups of detail workers has to be established for a given scale of
production. 4
In time, firms pressured the USDA to acquiesce in their
throughput fdber alles strategy, which also pushed individual
workers' rates to maximum levels. In an industry where
"[e]conomy of scale is everything," 5 the firms' interest was pal-
pable: by the late 1950s, a southern plant could, by increasing the
rate of throughput from 600 birds per hour to 9,600 per hour,
reduce its processing costs from $3.69 to $2.62 per 100 live
pounds, s6 while the corresponding figures for a plant in the
North were $5.13 at 150 birds per hour and $2.64 at 10,000 birds
per hour. 7 By 1964, only thirteen plants in the United States
operated at more than 10,000 birds per hour. 8
By 1968, the USDA undertook, by means of linear program-
ming, to determine the time required to conduct federal poultry in-
spection and the influence of line-speed, bird spacing, and other
factors on the inspectors' productivity in order to help management
attain 100% (and even 110%) inspector and worker "utilization"
and avoid certain production levels inconsistent with those
goals. 9 The USDA took the position that "[e]stablishing a uni-
versal rate of inspection is impractical ... even in plants using
252. MARX, DAS KAPITAL, supra note 25, at 365-66.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 346.
255. Franklin, supra note 22, at C3.
256. See William R. Henry & James A. Seagraves, Economic Aspects of Broiler Pro-
duction Density, 42 J. OF FARM ECON. 1, 6 (1960) (extrapolated data from table).
257. GEORGE ROGERS & EDwIN BARDWELL, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIES OF
SCALE IN CHICKEN PROCESSING 6 tbl. 1 (Agricultural Marketing Service 331, 1959).
258. POULTRY AND EGG, supra note 34, at 20-21 tbl. 3-9.
259. EFFICIENCY IN POULTRY EVISCERATION, supra note 236, at 1, 9.
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similar equipment, because the... [t]ime requirements ... vary
from plant to plant." Nevertheless, it established inspection rates
ranging from 18.5 to 22.7 birds per minute for differently config-
ured lines.'
The support that the USDA was providing poultry firms in the
1960s prompted sharp criticism from the Amalgamated Meat Cut-
ters, which objected to the use of federal tax revenues for "setting
employee production standards."' The union charged that the
USDA, "[a]pparently not content with the.., unbelievable produc-
tion and processing.., speeds," had been experimenting with
poultry automation that eliminated rather than created employ-
ment.2 By the end of the decade, the union was expressing con-
cem about the pace and proliferation of labor-saving automa-
tion.263 In addition to mechanized killing, cutting, deboning, wrap-
ping, packaging, and weighing, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters
appeared, most worried about the advent of automated eviscerating
machinery, which after thirty years of experiments had met USDA
inspection standards and would oust ten workers.'
By the mid-1970s, USDA officials were inspecting on average
23 birds per minute; the 2-inspector configuration thus permitted
slaughter line-speeds of 46 birds per minute.' However,
the development of automated evisceration equipment, as
well as improvements in genetics, nutrition, health, and
flock management, allowed the poultry industry to present
uniform lots of birds to inspectors faster than inspectors
could properly inspect the birds under the traditional in-
spection procedure. Therefore, a new inspection procedure
was developed in 1978 which allowed better utilization of
inspection resources and permitted the poultry industry to
take advantage of these new technologies and production
improvements.'
260. Id. at 8 tbl. 3.
261. Jasper C. Rose, Research O.K.-Work Standards Taboo, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Jan.
1965, at 25.
262. Jasper C. Rose, USDA Pushes Poultry Mechanization, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Feb.
1964, at 24.
263. Jasper C. Rose, Further Automation in Poultry, BUTCHER WORKMAN, May 1968, at
23.
264. Id.
265. Robert L. Brewer et al., U.S. Dep't of Agric., Effect of Poultry Processing
Linespeeds on the Bacteriologic Profile of Broiler Carcasses (1993) (unpublished draft on
file with author).
266. New Line Speed Inspection System for Broilers and Cornish Games Hens, 49 Fed.
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Because interpretations of the "informal guidelines" for inspec-
tion rates varied, inspection rates differed from one region to an-
other. 67 In 1978, the Arkansas Poultry Federation sued the
USDA on the ground that it was enforcing inspection rates
discriminatorily. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas found that the USDA's 1976-77 status quo
order, which froze the various maximum regional inspection rates,
violated both the Poultry Products Inspection Act and the United
States Constitution." 8 The court thus enjoined the USDA from
enforcing disparate rates and ordered the use of nationally uniform
rate standards.269
In response to the court's order, the USDA issued a final rule
on April 13, 1979, entitled, "Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection
Rate Maximums; Mandatory Poultry Products Inspection."270 Even
before the court ordered it to issue a formal rule, the USDA had
been preparing a new system. The previous or so-called traditional
inspection procedure had been "satisfactory to [the agency] and the
poultry industry for many years." '27 Under the old system, one
inspector performed all the inspection tasks on each bird including
any required trimming:
Line speeds for traditional inspection were based on work-
measurement studies and were set at the limit at which an
inspector could carry out the organoleptic examination
[which requires use of at least three senses] and manipula-
tion of each carcass presented for inspection. Also, industry
was not capable of producing birds at a higher speed and
therefore, these line speeds were acceptable. 72
Reg. 42,550, 42,550-51 (1984) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
267. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums, 44 Fed. Reg. 22,047, 22,047
(1979) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
268. Arkansas Poultry Fed'n v. Bergland, No. LR-C-78-395, LEXIS slip op. (E.D. Ark.
Apr. 3, 1979).
269. Id; see also American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d
1153 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (upholding the USDA uniform rate standards against procedural
challenges).
270. 45 Fed. Reg. 10,319, 10,319 (1980) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
271. New Line Speed Inspection System for Broilers and Cornish Game Hens, 49 Fed.
Reg. 42,550, 42,550 (1984).
272. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,639, 35,640 (1994) (to be codified at
9 C.F.R. § 381).
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Presumably, the USDA meant that the speeds were acceptable to
the "industry," by which it has always meant firms' output and
profits. The USDA's admission that it sets the workload of its own
employees "at the limit,"'273 suggests that the USDA never orients
its line-speed decisions towards workers' needs for longer lives,
less plagued by physical pain and disability.
The new regime ushered in by the judicial injunction included
two different responses to the throughput/productivity/profit bottle-
neck imposed on firms by the government's minimal food safety
standards. The USDA first created a national maximum line inspec-
tion rate merely by increasing the traditional inspection system
rates to match those in effect in the Southwest Region, which the
USDA found to "properly ensure adequacy of inspection."'24 By
deeming tibia palpation superfluous,2' 5 the USDA was able to in-
crease the rate of inspection by an additional five percent. 6 De-
pending on the production line configuration-the distance between
birds ranged from six to twenty-four inches and the number of
inspector stations ranged from one to four-the number of birds
per inspector per minute varied from 25 to 15.5.2' As a result of
this change, forty-four plants with 136 lines (or 25% of all chicken
lines nationally) would be required to lower line-speeds if they
continued to operate the same configurations under the traditional
inspection system.278 A total of 122 plants with 379 lines were
then authorized to operate at higher line-speeds. 9
Within weeks of the district court's issuance of the' injunction,
The New York Times published a long article interpreting the litiga-
tion as an expression of an intra-industry struggle between the
ascendant producers in Arkansas, Georgia, and Alabama and the
older Delmarva producers. As the gap in prices between red meat
and broilers widened, "regional scrambling for supremacy in the
booming broiler market" prompted the southern producers to com-
273. Id.
274. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums; Mandatory Poultry Products
Inspection, 45 Fed. Reg. 10,319, 10,319 (1980).
275. Although the inspectors' union, the American Federation of Government Employees
(AFGE), opposed this measure as a health risk to the public, the USDA argued that the
leukosis-related diseases that might go undetected created no health hazard, but merely
made chickens appear "aesthetically unpleasing." Id. at 10,320-21.
276. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums, 44 Fed. Reg. 22,047, 22,047
(1979) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
277. Id. at 22,048 n.l.
278. Id. at 22,049.
279. Id.
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plain that the USDA had been unfairly favoring the Delmarva
firms by permitting them to operate at higher speeds." The
"strong impact on ... profits" that a 300% increase in line-speeds
from 18 to 70 birds per minute could exert was clear when "even
a 1 per cent increase in line speed could net [a firm] $400,000 a
year.'8
Poultry companies filed comments to the USDA rule, character-
izing the newly increased rates as too low, especially since the
USDA had itself acknowledged that some plants were already
operating at higher rates.2 Firms supported this claim by refer-
ence to the inevitable development of new technology that would
render "the present maximum inspection rates ... even more obso-
lete."23
The USDA's response came from Carol Tucker Foreman, the
Assistant Secretary for Food and Consumer Services, who had
executive responsibility for poultry inspection. Her background
pulled her in mutually irreconcilable ways. As a consumer advo-
cate, she was committed to meat safety and low prices. As the
wife of a vice president of the United Food and Commercial
Workers, which organized poultry plant workers, she might have
been thought to have aspired to avoid adopting measures that
would have worsened working conditions. Finally, as a native of
Arkansas, which had just surpassed Georgia as the leading broiler
producer,2"4 the daughter of the head of the Arkansas Democratic
Party, and the sister of the future lieutenant-governor and governor
of the state, she may have felt pressured not to issue regulations
that would reduce the profits of the economically dominant and
politically powerful big poultry corporations such as the Arkansas-
based Tyson Foods. In the event, she announced that the "USDA
recognize[d] the relationship between improved technology and
faster line speeds and also recognize[d] the price benefit which
consumers would realize from an increased poultry supply. USDA
w[ould] make every effort to identify new and improved inspection
techniques which [we]re designed to increase industry productivi-
280. Franklin, supra note 22, at C3.
281. Id.
282. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums; Mandatory Poultry Products
Inspection, 45 Fed. Reg. 10,319, 10,320 (1980). The USDA had solicited these comments
despite the fact that it had amended the poultry inspection regulations by emergency final
rule without waiting for public comment.
283. Id.
284. LASLEY, supra note 112, at 12 tbl. 5.
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ty." Foreman denied the claims of her own employees, the
USDA inspectors, that new higher rates might adversely affect their
health, on the grounds that their workload had in fact dimin-
ished. 6 Finally, as to poultry workers themselves, Foreman later
reported that when a meatpacking union official asked her to do
something about line-speed, she replied, "I'm sorry, honey, but I
don't do collective bargaining."' 7 Even that claim was disingenu-
ous. Since the USDA inspectors were "largely unionized and, as a
third force in the dispute, have tended to resist ... increases in
the speed of the lines," ' they were in effect engaging in surro-
gate bargaining on behalf of the largely unorganized production
workers.
The real innovation of the late 1970s, however, was the second
or modified traditional system, which the USDA unveiled at the
same time in response to the injunction, and which held out the
promise of alleviating production problems for the forty-four plants
that were required to reduce their speeds. The modification in-
volved the introduction of a greater division of labor among in-
spectors. Under the traditional system, inspectors devoted almost
half of their time to positioning the carcass, whereas the alternative
system reduced the number of motions required of an inspector by
dividing the work between two inspectors. 9 One inspector in-
spected only the exterior of a prepositioned carcass, using a mirror
to see surfaces not directly visible.'ro Company employees then
repositioned the carcass and the viscera attached to it for the other
inspector, who examined the interior and viscera.291 By achieving
a maximum inspection rate of seventy birds per minute for three
inspectors, the modified traditional inspection (MTI) was designed
to increase inspection while saving manpower.2" The USDA jus-
tified this innovation by reference to the relentless drive for ever
greater output:
285. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums; Mandatory Poultry Products
Inspection, 45 Fed. Reg. 10,319, 10,320 (1980).
286. Id.
287. Telephone Interview with Carol Tucker Foreman, former Assistant Secretary for
Food and Consumer Services (Dec. 1994).
288. Franklin, supra note 22, at C3.
289. Modified Traditional Poultry Inspection, 44 Fed. Reg. 22,049, 22,049 (1979) (to be
codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 22,050.
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Traditional inspection of a young chicken can be accom-
plished in approximately 3 seconds. Even so, because of
the increased production each year, in some cases, the rate
of our inspection has become the limiting factor in the
speed of a production line. Using the traditional inspection
procedure, the only way to obtain greater speed in produc-
tion lines is to hire more inspectors. Since the Govern-
ment . . . pays for all inspection except overtime and holi-
day work, this becomes increasingly expensive for the
taxpayer. For this reason, USDA has been investigating
alternate inspection methods ... to obtain at least equal
inspection results with greater inspection efficiency in terms
of birds inspected per minute.293
Tests revealed that one inspector examining the exterior could
work at the rate of seventy birds per minute, while two other in-
spectors working-at positions along the line after it split294-at
thirty-five birds per minute could inspect the interior and vis-
cera. 5 The USDA, foreseeing increased consumer demand for
poultry as red meat prices remained high, saw MTI as achieving
"greater productivity from existing facilities to meet this de-
mand." '  In particular, the "[i]ndustry will gain from the in-
creased productivity of their existing production lines. The 70 birds
per minute maximum line speed will be higher than any line speed
currently in effect."'2 Although the innovation would impose
"some costs" on industry in the form of inspection stations and
selectors to aid the inspectors, they "should be quickly recovered
through productivity gains."298
Foreman was, again, a key figure in making possible the in-
creased line-speeds of the late 1970s:
Processors wouldn't have been able to rev up their lines if
the inspection service in 1978 hadn't started allowing com-
panies to wash, instead of tediously trim, contaminated
birds. . .. 'I'm responsible for that little travesty,' says
Ms. Foreman.... 'I never should have approved washing.'
293. Id. at 22,049.
294. Brewer et al., supra note 265.
295. Modified Traditional Poultry Inspection, 44 Fed. Reg. 22,050.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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She says she was misinformed by a government study
involving only 180 birds from one plant that purported to
show that washing worked.2"
Yet a government researcher concluded that washing was futile
since bacteria were found on carcasses even after 40 rinsings. °°
In any event, as Foreman admitted to Congress in 1991, "the real
result of [her bad decision] was to allow lines to run much faster
with no loss of product to the poultry plant."30 '
During the Reagan-Bush period, USDA officials also conceded
that once that procedure had been implemented and "the industry's
current high productivity [wals based on use of this equipment...
a requirement that contaminated tissue be condemned might cost
the firms hundreds of millions of dollars a year in lost output.' 3"'
Of crucial significance is the direct worker-consumer linkage. The
same throughput fiber alles approach that injures workers by forc-
ing them to perform the remaining manual motions to keep up
with automated operations also endangers consumers: high-speed
eviscerating machines often spill feces all over the surface of the
body cavity, which inspectors may fail to detect.3 As a former
USDA meat safety administrator observed, with the lines "running
so fast, they are just unable to produce a clean product."' As
even Time recognized, "[ploor working conditions ... have an
impact on food quality."3 5
By the beginning of the 1980s, firms' increased capacity and
improved processing equipment prompted them to request the
USDA to increase line-speeds again.3" When in 1980 "the indus-
try" submitted comments suggesting that "even higher rates may be
299. Bruce Ingersoll, Faster Slaughter Lines Are Contaminating Much U.S. Poultry,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1990, at Al, A6.
300. Id.
301. Review of U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food Safety and Inspection Service
Workplace Safety Regulations: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Department Operations,
Research, and Foreign Agric. of the House Comm. on Agric., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 47
(1991) (testimony of Carol Tucker Foreman).
302. George Anthan, Untitled, Gannett News Service, Jan. 10, 1989, available in LEXIS,
News Library, GNS File.
303. Tom Devine, The Fox Guarding the House, S. EXPOSURE, Summer 1989, at 39,
40-41.
304. George Anthan, Innovative Procedures Tested as Way to Clean Up U.S. Poultry,
DES MOmNES REG., June 27, 1991, at IE (quoting Rodney Leonard).
305. Richard Behar & Michael Kramer, Something Smells Fowl, TIME, Oct. 17, 1994, at
42, 44.
306. Brewer et al., supra note 265.
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achievable," the USDA gave recognition to "the price benefit
which consumers would realize from an increased poultry supply
and [said it would] make every effort to identify new and im-
proved inspection techniques which [we]re designed to permit
increased industry productivity."3' To that end, the USDA an-
nounced that it would conduct further tests "to determine if a high-
er maximum rate c[ould] be achieved consistent with the public
health.""3 8 At the same time, the USDA acknowledged the height-
ened risk of injury to workers. In order to implement the MTI, the
USDA had issued regulations requiring modifications in the pro-
duction facilities.3" In particular, firms were required to provide
four feet of horizontal line space for each inspector and helper.3"'
In response to firms' comment that less space would be adequate,
the USDA observed that "the inspectors' helpers work with sharp
knives and scissors. If they work too close together, and too close
to the inspector, the possibility of an injury is increased."3 '
In fact, production workers, too, were "[p]acked tightly and
work[ed] quickly with knives and scissors ... often cut[ting]
themselves and others." ' NIOSH ergonomics investigators of
poultry plants commonly uncover this constraint. At the Cargill
plant in Buena Vista, Georgia, for example, investigators deter-
mined that, "[b]ecause the work area [wa]s already cramped, add-
ing workers to the lines without increasing the work area could
result in injuries (i.e. lacerations, amputations) from another em-
ployee."1 At two Perdue plants in North Carolina, NIOSH rec-
ommended as a means of reducing the frequency of highly repeti-
tive movements that the main conveyor belt be slowed down or
that diverging conveyors off the main one be provided "so that
tasks c[ould] be performed at slower rates."314
307. Poultry Products Inspection Regulation; Modified Traditional Poultry Inspection, 45
Fed. Reg. 27,917, 27,918 (1980) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
308. Id.
309. 9 C.F.R. 381.36 (1995).
310. Id. § 381.36(c)(1)(ii).
311. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspector Rate Maximums; Mandatory Poultry Products
Inspection, 45 Fed. Reg. 27,919 (1980).
312. Horwitz, supra note 23, at A8.
313. NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (NIOSH), HETA 89-
251-1997, HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT: CARGILL POULTRY DIVISION, BUENA
VISTA, GEORGIA 19 (1989) [hereinafter NIOSH: CARGILL].
314. NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16, at 18.
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What the USDA failed to make clear was that the "facilities"
and "lines" from which the agency was enabling, entitling, and
even compelling poultry firms to secure greater productivity were
in fact human beings-namely, their employees. Here, a perverse
inversion of one of the original purposes of the Poultry Products
Inspection Act lies hidden. Whereas Congress intended to protect
firms that sought to maintain some hygienic standards against
rogue competitors who operated at speeds and under conditions
guaranteed to depress the welfare of consumers and workers, two
decades later the USDA depressed the entire industry's standard by
imposing nationally uniform but higher line-speeds on all firms.
Indeed, the USDA stated that although it wished to give firms a
choice between the traditional and MTI systems, it arrogated to
itself the power, in certain instances, to "require that procedure
which will result in increased inspection efficiency. 315
The continuity of policy, as between the labor-friendly Carter
administration and the avowedly pro-business Reagan administra-
tion, was revealed in the early 1980s when an appeals court upheld
the new line-speed rules as interim rules, but ordered the USDA to
institute rulemaking procedures for the promulgation of permanent
rules.36 First, the FSIS, which the Food Safety and Quality Ser-
vice was renamed in 1981,3' certified conformity with the cost-
benefit mandate of Executive Order 12291, issued by President
Reagan at the outset of his administration. The FSIS justified the
certification on the ground that the line-speed regulations would not
result in (1) an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or
more, (2) a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, indus-
tries, government agencies, or regions, or (3) significant adverse
effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, inno-
vation, or the ability of U.S. enterprises to compete with foreign
enterprises in U.S. or export markets. Significantly, none of
these rubrics subsumed within it the impact on poultry workers'
health.
315. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums, 44 Fed. Reg. 22,047, 22,050
(1979).
316. American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, AFL-CIO v. Block, 655 F.2d 1153, 1157-58
(D.C. Cir. 1981).
317. USDA, MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION, 1981 REPORT OF THE SECRErARY OF
AGRICULTURE TO THE U.S. CONGRESS 1 (1982).
318. Young Chicken Slaughter Inspection Rate Maximums; Modified Traditional Poultry
Inspection, 47 Fed. Reg. 23,431, 23,432 (1982) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
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In response to renewed "industry" comments urging the USDA
to test methods permitting line-speeds in excess of seventy birds
per minute, the USDA assured companies that it was not only
"making every effort," but had already tested such methods.319 In
rejecting firms' calls for eliminating the requirement that inspectors
be furnished adjustable platforms (rather than adjustable chairs or
stools), the USDA emphasized that the platforms were "required to
minimize inspector's [sic] physical strain (bending or reaching) as
they do their work. Excessive bending or reaching could have
adverse health consequences for inspectors and also increase in-
spector errors due to the added fatigue." '2 Although poultry pro-
duction workers' work is even more strenuous and their ensuing
fatigue can trigger the same increase in safety- and health-endan-
gering errors, OSHA has not required that employers provide them
with facilities to reduce their strain; moreover, inspectors receive
more rest breaks and opportunities for rotation,32' which may re-
duce the risk of repetitive trauma syndrome injuries.
When the Republican party gained control of the Senate and
the Presidency in 1981, the Agriculture Committee was quick to
hold a hearing in Mississippi to provide owners of large southern
chicken processing firms with a forum to complain about allegedly
onerous regulation by the FSIS. Exasperated with "over-inspecting,"
the owner of Sanderson Farms, for example, urged elimination of
the position that inspected the outside of the birds under MTI.3
Companies' statutory obligation" to reimburse the FSIS for
inspectors' overtime (currently $31.80 per hour) formed another
point of contention. That firms chafe under their congressionally
created duty to pay even for overtime-which their own work
procedures are responsible for causing-while the taxpayers finance
the bulk of inspection costs, is ironic in light of the fact that when
Congress initially mandated meat inspection in 1906, numerous
senators insisted that the packing companies finance inspection
319. Id.
320. Id. at 23,433.
321. Id.
322. Impact of Regulations on Production, Processing, and Export of Poultry: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Agric. Production, Marketing, and Stabilization of Prices of the
Senate Comm. on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Poultry: Hearings] (statement of Joe Frank Sanderson, President, Sanderson Farms).
323. 21 U.S.C. § 468 (1988); 9 C.F.R. § 391.3 (1995). But see DAVID GRFFITH,
JONES'S MINIMAL: LOW-WAGE LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES 108 (1993) (stating errone-
ously that poultry companies pay the inspectors).
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entirely: "I look upon it as a proper expense of advertising that
should be charged to that account. These packers do a large
amount of advertising, and certainly they do none that will yield
such a tremendous return as this one of having the Government
stamp on their products."324 Even such a Social Darwinist as Sen-
ator Henry Cabot Lodge agreed: "This tax should be paid by those
who directly benefit by it, and whose business methods have made
severe inspection absolutely necessary."3" Interestingly, when the
Johnson administration sought to impose user fees on the poultry
firms,3" the Amalgamated Meat Cutters joined the companies in
opposing the bill. Whereas the firms' opposition was based on the
expense, 7 however, the union feared that inspectors on the com-
pany payroll would be subject to pressure to approve poultry that
should be condemned.3" Since inspectors would, however, remain
government employees receiving federal paychecks, the union's fear
is most plausibly interpreted as a lack of confidence in the capacity
of the USDA to discharge its statutory obligations impartially.
When Senator Cochran of Mississippi informed the FSIS ad-
ministrator, Dr. Donald Houston, that the owners had complained
about overtime charges for inspectors, the official testified that the
agency had unsuccessfully contested a recent ruling by the Office
of Personnel Management requiring the FSIS to reimburse slaughter
line inspectors for overtime associated with changing clothes at the
beginning of work and cleaning up at the end of the shift.329 Al-
though Houston assured the Senator that the FSIS had already
begun discussing the issue with the National Broiler Council, H.F.
McCarty, President of McCarty-State Pride Farms, irately asked
Houston: "Are you going to permit the labor union-that's what it
amounts to-permit the labor union to dictate that we will have to
pay 15 minutes ... at the beginning of work and at the end of
work for dressing purposes?""33 The kind of dictating that must
have appealed to McCarty was Houston's admission that the
324. 40 Cong. Rec. 8763 (1906) (statement of Sen. Proctor).
325. Id. at 8767.
326. S. 2820, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
327. See 112 Cong. Rec. 3846 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Tydings, Md., in opposition to
the initiative on the ground that it would harm producers in his state).
328. U.S. Should Pay for Poultry Wholesomeness Inspection, BUTCHER WORKMAN, Apr.
1966, at 52.
329. Reimbursement for Preparation and Cleanup Time, 47 Fed. Reg. 19,701, 19,701-03
(1982).
330. Poultry: Hearings, supra note 322, at 40 (testimony of H.F. McCarty).
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industry's "increased linespeeds. . . . [o]bviously . . . have dictated
adaptive change in government inspection activities. 33' And just
in case the agency lacked the Mississippi poultry companies' ani-
mus toward unionization, McCarty's competitor and colleague,
Marshall Durbin, Jr., urged a role for the firms in the USDA's
negotiations with its inspectors' union. 32
By 1984, the USDA fulfilled its promise to the chicken
oligopolists to devise a method for authorizing the broiler line to
run even faster. In that year, the Reagan administration promulgat-
ed the final rule for what it called its New Line Speed (NELS)
inspection system. The USDA justified the innovation by reference
to the re-emergence of a throughput-productivity-profit bottleneck
caused by its own inefficient inspection methods:
Since the implementation of MTI, the poultry industry
has continued to make significant technological advances.
Consequently, many establishments can present uniform lots
of birds to inspectors faster than 70 birds per minute. This
has been made possible by the increased use of further
refinement of automated equipment, and through better
control of the production process. In such cases, the inspec-
tion process has again become a limiting factor in estab-
lishment productivity, and restricts the return investment on
the development and installation of modern, innovative
equipment and facilities. Merely expanding the use of cur-
rent inspection procedures would not alleviate this restraint
given the limits on the line speeds attainable under tradi-
tional or MTI inspection procedures.333
The basis for the breakthrough was devolution of the state's
inspectional duties to the private profit-making firms themselves.
Although some plants had already been engaging in quality control,
in other plants that relied on the USDA to provide such controls,
inspectors had to assume "a burdensome quasi-supervisory role"334
that the agency deemed statutorily inappropriate. By transferring
those responsibilities to the firms, the USDA was able to free up
some of the post-mortem inspectors' time. Under NELS, each one
331. Id. at 57 (testimony of Dr. Donald Houston).
332. Id. at 46.
333. New Line Speed Inspection System for Broilers and Comish Game Hens, 49 Fed.
Reg. 42,550, 42,551 (1984) (emphasis added).
334. Id.
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of the three inspectors on an eviscerating line returned to the tradi-
tional system of inspecting a bird's exterior (with a mirror), interi-
or, and viscera, but now each inspected only every third bird. The
time saving was implemented in the following manner:
After post-mortem inspection is completed .... plant
employees independently perform any necessary trim on all
passed carcasses after the giblets are harvested. Under
traditional and MTI inspection procedures, the inspector is
responsible for identifying those carcasses needing to be
trimmed, directing the establishment employee to trim the
defects, and verifying that the bird has been properly
trimmed. However, the NELS inspection system shifts the
responsibility of performing specified trim to the establish-
ment employees.335
This devolution is predicated on the implementation of a poul-
try carcass on-line quality control program, a statistically based
sampling system, which is supposed to enable a fourth inspector to
monitor and review data, and sample product at critical points on
the eviscerating line. The USDA claimed that individual inspection
rates were no higher under NELS than under the traditional or
MTI systems. 36 Carol Tucker Foreman, the former Assistant Sec-
retary of Agriculture, however, has characterized these tests as
"bullshit."337 In any event, under NELS, the maximum line-speed
has become ninety-one birds per minute.38 The inspector in
charge has the authority to reduce the line-speed when "birds are
not presented properly or the health conditions of a particular flock
dictate" more extended inspection.339 The inspector thus "can
quicken or slow the pace of profits in a plant."' " Yet, he or she
"engages in a perpetual jousting with plant officials looking for
new ways to enhance their profits.""34 When a plant manager
screams at a line inspector who has just pushed the button to slow
down or stop the line that this interference is costing the company
335. Id. For a description of inspectors' tasks, see FOOD SAFETY INSPECTION SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION MANUAL 47 (1990).
336. 49 Fed. Reg. 42,550, 42,551.
337. Telephone Interview with Carol Tucker Foreman, former Assistant Secretary U.S.
Dep't of Agric. (Dec. 1994).
338. 49 Fed Reg. 42,550, 42,551.
339. Id.; see also 9 C.F.R. § 381.67 (1994).
340. 49 Fed. Reg. 42,550, 42,551.
341. WELLFORb, supra note 72, at 47.
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$500 per minute, then, as a former FSIS plant veterinary supervisor
conceded, "you have to take that into account.,
342
The enormous pressure to which inspectors are subject not to
hold up the line has run the gamut from management's deliberately
creating a hostile environment that wears down inspectors to ar-
ranging forcible assaults. 43 Instances in which the FSIS began to
override interventionist inspectors and restored de facto control
over line-speed to management, or yielded to firms' demands that
strict inspectors be transferred, 3" have ultimately hardened into a
perceived policy, which has made it that much more difficult for
any inspectors to assert their independence. 345 Vigilance is espe-
cially undermined by the USDA's practice of stationing inspectors
at one plant for many years. The social-psychological barriers to
maintaining a vigorous adversarial relationship over such long
periods of time are so overwhelming as to have prompted even the
inspectors' union to call on the agency to remove some of its own
members from certain plants for flagging vigilance.3' Historically,
this problem was accentuated in poultry plants because prior to the
introduction of mandatory inspection in 1959, some firms paid the
USDA for voluntary inspections, which they could discontinue at
will.347 The "close relations" fostered by that regime continued
after the transition to compulsory inspection.3
Just how reflexively committed the FSIS has become to
throughput diber alles was later inadvertently revealed by the
Clinton administration:
The driving force behind FSIS's program changes from the
1970s on was the need to keep up with industry's expan-
sion and its productivity gains, including the incorporation
of automation in the slaughter process that increased the
rate at which carcasses could move through the slaughter
facility ( . . "line speed"). Automation has had a particu-
342. Telephone Interview with Dr. Linda Madson, Science and Technology Division,
FSIS (Feb. 16, 1995).
343. 37 Fed. Reg. 9706, 9706 (1972); WELLFORD, supra note 72, at 47.
344. George Anthan, USDA to Alter Poultry Plant Inspections, DES MOINES REG., Apr.
23, 1987, at IA.
345. WELLFORD, supra note 72, at 58-63; George Anthan, Inspectors Cite Drop in Poul-
try Standards, DES MOImES REG., Sept. 6, 1987, at 1J, 2.1.
346. Telephone Interview with David Carney, President of the North Central Council of
Food and Inspection Locals, AFL-CIO (Dec. 1994).
347. WELLFORD, supra note 72, at 57.
348. Id.
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larly great impact on poultry operations, where inspectors
have had to face faster and faster line speeds, which today
can be as high as 91 birds per minute.349
Here, the FSIS almost seems to be charging that firms imposed
these line-speeds on the agency's inspectors, having forgotten that
it itself enforces the speed-ups.
Indirectly, in its responses to comments on the proposed NELS
regulations, the USDA once again shed light on the adverse impact
that the sharply higher line-speed would exert on workers. Re-
sponding to processing finms' protests against the requirement that
they furnish forty-two feet of line space for every three inspection
stations, the USDA observed that this length was necessary because
the workload of the "helpers," company employees, assigned to
work with inspectors,
varies with the disease conditions of the bird. The birds on
the line are continuously moving and when the amount of
work increases, helpers must be able to continue their
functions. If the horizontal line space is restricted, they
may not have sufficient time to carry out these functions
properly.350
Mirror trimmers, company employees who cut off parts of birds as
instructed by inspectors, must perform this hectic operation even on
automated eviscerating lines. In connection with firms' resistance to
providing sixty-inch high inspection stations, considering them ex-
cessive, the USDA noted that "[e]rgonomic measurements made by
industrial engineers revealed specific position requirements needed
for an inspector to perform with a minimum of strain and fatigue.
Since rotation of inspectors is required, the stations must be adjust-
able. 35
l
The impact of increased line-speed on production workers, who
do not receive state mandated ergonomic relief or rotation, is easily
imaginable. When the inspectors themselves pressed the very same
issue on their own behalf, complaining that increased line-speed
would exacerbate fatigue and stress, the USDA's response was
cynical. In addition to asserting that the amount of work would not
349. Pathogen Reduction, Hazard Analysis and Critical Central Point (HACCP) Systems,
60 Fed. Reg. 6774, 6776 (1995).
350. New Line Speed Inspection System for Broilers and Cornish Game Hens, 49 Fed.
Reg. 42,250, 42,552 (1984) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. § 381).
351. Id.
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increase, the USDA claimed that "[j]ob stress is difficult to mea-
sure. It is also difficult to differentiate job stress from stress associ-
ated with other life events including the implementation of changed
methods of inspection. The Department's tests and studies did not
indicate that the NELS inspection system caused inspectors undue
stress., 352 Nevertheless, pressure by the inspectors' union induced
the agency to establish a joint labor management committee to
study the biomechanical demands imposed by the job and means of
alleviating them by redesigning the workplace. 3
Still not satisfied with the speed-ups it had effected, the USDA
returned to the task two years later. In 1986, it announced an
interim emergency rule to be implemented in plants that were
operating under the MTI system. The so-called Streamlined Inspec-
tion System (SIS) required one or two inspectors and a Finished
Product Standards (FPS) program to evaluate the final product. The
USDA expected that the industry would realize productivity gains
"by maintaining optimal line speeds," 354 and even "maximum
speed,"355 as well as savings from reduced costs for inspectors'
overtime stemming from a reduced number of inspectors per line.
This change, however, was depicted as driven by the agency's own
personnel and budgetary shortfalls caused by the Reagan
administration's hiring freeze and cutbacks.356 While the State de-
manded that the agency make do with less, poultry companies
demanded more:
At the same time that the Agency has been confronted
with new budgetary limits, the poultry industry has been
demanding increased inspection service. The operators of
federally inspected poultry processing establishments have
requested inspectional coverage for new production lines
and expanded operations. Many establishments that have
previously operated single-working shifts have expanded to
two shifts or are planning to do so in the near future. The
growth of the poultry products industry is accelerating.
Production in FY 1985 was increased 5.5 percent over
352. Id. at 42,553.
353. Id.
354. Streamlined Inspection System for Broilers and Cornish Game Hens, 51 Fed. Reg.
3569, 3570 (1986).
355. Post-mortem inspection, 9 C.F.R. § 381.76(b)(3)(ii) (1994).
356. Streamlined Inspection System for Broilers and Cornish Game Hens, 51 Fed. Reg.
3569-71.
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production in FY 1984 and is expected to increase by a
similar percentage in FY 1986.... In terms of per capita
consumption, poultry is now second only to beef among all
meat and poultry food products. 7
Fortunately for the poultry companies, since the advent of MTI
and NELS, "top Agency veterinarians and technical specialists
hav[ing] devoted many hours" to the subject, "found that a new
sequence of hand-eye movements would provide the most efficient
and effective inspection procedures."358 Consequently, by the mid-
1980s, the Agency was able to inform the broiler industry of the
"potential availability of one- or two-inspector NELS systems.""3 9
This possibility permitted "increased productivity in the poultry
industry" by enabling plants operating under the older MTI system
to convert to NELS.36° Because the USDA had not yet resolved
several problems relating to uniformity of application, it did not
formally propose the two-inspector NELS system. Instead, the
USDA implemented SIS in MTI plants, which would offer an
incentive to plants operating under the traditional system to in-
crease their output by converting to MTI/SIS.36' In MTI plants,
however, conversion to SIS was not voluntary. According to the
USDA, "[t]he chief difference between SIS and MTI is that under
the new system there is no mirror inspection station. 362 Instead,
one or two inspection stations are placed on the processing line
after the evisceration process. The maximum inspection rate is 70
birds per minute for a two-inspector team.363 The FSIS explains
the speed-up of inspectors' work as resulting from the recommittal
to private firms of responsibility for detecting quality defects, rath-
er than burdening the government with such tasks .36
As of 1994, 263 chicken plants operating 581 processing lines
were subject to USDA inspection."e The SIS system accounted
357. Id. at 3571.
358. Id. at 3572.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Streamlined Inspection System for Broilers and Cornish Game Hens, 51 Fed. Reg.
3569, 3572 (1986).
362. Id.
363. Id. at 3572-73.
364. Telephone Interview with Dr. Isabel Arrington, Staff Officer, FSIS, Slaughter Oper-
ations (Feb. 15, 1995).
365. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,639, 35,647 (1994) (to be codified at
9 C.F.R. § 381).
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for 53% of all plants and 63% of all lines; NELS accounted for
17% of plants and 20% of lines; and the traditional system ac-
counted for 30% of plants and 17% of lines."6 The USDA
claims that its inspectors achieve greater efficiency without mirrors
and inspectors charge that the mirrors are irrelevant since the steam
constantly wafting through a poultry plant renders them useless.367
However, critics suggest that the gains are made with smoke and
mirrors. The president of the inspectors' union observes that be-
cause SIS failed to introduce any physical changes in facilities,
inspectors are merely working faster without being better able to
detect disease.368 As Tom Devine, Legal Director of the Govern-
ment Accountability Project, argues, "[d]amn the public and full
line speeds ahead .... SIS means that instead of examining each
bird, inspectors just glance. In reality, SIS has been the Stream-
lined Infection System." '369
V. THE Poop ON FECAL SOUP
In an industry so tightly management controlled, the
paradox that not even the giant integrators can undo is the
inexorable course of nature once the hatching eggs are
laid. There is no opportunity to vary the rate of flow once
the process is started.37
The state apparatus that fully accepts and implements capital's
position that slowing line-speed is out of the question has,
unsurprisingly, by regulation also authorized firms since 1961 to
sell chicken that has soaked up as much as 8% of its weight in
chilled-tank water,"' which critics call "fecal soup."372 The pur-
366. Id.
367. Telephone Interview with David Carney, President of the North Central Council of
Food and Inspection Locals, AFL-CIO (Dec. 1994).
368. Id.
369. Tom Devine, Tainted Chicken Puts Health at Risk, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 1989, at
8A.
370. Franklin, supra note 22, at C3.
371. Inspection of Poultry and Poultry Products, 26 Fed. Reg. 4453, 4453 (1961) (pro-
posed May 19, 1961); 9 C.F.R. § 381.66(d)(2) (1994). See generally MARKETING RE-
SEARCH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC., WATER ABSORPTION BY EVISCERATED BROILERS
DURING WASHING AND CI-ILLNG (Marketing Research Report No. 438, 1960) (discussing
a study on the effects of chilling broiler chickens).
372. Daniel P. Puzo, Can USDA Bird Bath Clean Up Poultry Problems, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 17, 1994, at 32 ("[Ciritics have dubbed the tank [in which chickens are rinsed]
'fecal soup' because contaminated birds are mingled with those without physical
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pose of the immersion is to lower the temperature of the carcass,
"not to clean it. The poultry carcasses are already washed and
considered ready-to-cook before they enter the chilling system."
The FSIS is constrained to admit that because "carcasses do, how-
ever, carry some bacteria . . . the rinsing action of the water...
eventually would actually become a contaminating influence."'374
By the late 1980s, the FSIS finally released an internal report that
found washing of fecal contamination ineffective. 5 The source of
the contamination is the extraordinary confinement in which chick-
ens are industrially raised. Occupying only one square foot of
space in the broiler house, "'[b]roilers are in six inches of feces by
the time they're six weeks old. They're going to have salmonella
all over."'376
The USDA has approved a process that a government microbi-
ologist has likened to soaking birds in a toilet, merely because the
alternative European method of chilling birds with blasts of cold
air to avoid cross-contamination would frustrate the throughput
speeds on which United States firms insist.3' USDA
veterinarians' acknowledge that air chilling is superior to water
chilling"78 because it "[ilnevitably . . . is less likely to cause
cross-contamination. " " Nevertheless, in the words of an official
of the National Association of Federal Veterinarians, the USDA-
adapted process "'enables the sale of hundreds of thousands of gal-
lons of water at poultry meat prices-a profit the industry is un-
contamination, potentially spreading bacteria throughout the whole lot.").
373. Chiller Water Reserve, 48 Fed. Reg. 41,427, 41,428 (1980).
374. Id.
375. George Anthan, USDA Admits Poultry Rules Ineffective, DES MOINES REG., July 1,
1988, at IA.
376. George Anthan, Contamination Rate Reaches 80% at Some U.S. Poultry Plants,
DES MOINES REG., Apr. 12, 1987, at 1A, 9A (quoting Dr. E.M. Foster, Emeritus Director
of the Food Research Institute, University of Wisconsin).
377. See WJ. STADELMAN Er AL., EGG AND POULTRY-MEAT PROCESSING 135 fig. 7-5
(1988) (showing air blast method takes four times longer than ice water to chill eviscerat-
ed turkeys down to 40 degrees). But see James A. Albert, A History of Attempts by the
Department of Agriculture to Reduce Federal Inspection of Poultry Processing-A Return
to the Jungle, 51 LA. L. REv. 1183, 1227 (1991) (asserting that air chilling "would not
even make procesors slow down their lines").
378. Telephone Interview with Dr. Robert L. Brewer (Jan. 18, 1995); Telephone Inter-
view with Dr. William 0. James (Jan. 18, 1995); see also C.H. Veerkamp, Chilling,
Freezing and Thawing, in PROCESSING OF POULTRY, supra note 37, at 103, 115.
379. G.C. Mead, Hygiene Problems and Control of Process Contamination, in PROCESS-
ING OF POULTRY, supra note 37, at 183, 206.
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willing to forgo.""'3 ° Tyson alone, it is estimated, would lose $40
million if the waterlogging and cross-contamination were eliminated
by sealing carcasses in plastic bags while moving through the
chiller.31' As a gauge of the contempt in which inspectors have
come to hold firms, one USDA veterinarian, when confronted with
the billions of dollars that they would have to spend to produce
uncontaminated chicken, responded, "[b]ut this is only billions of
dollars the industry has stolen from the public. 382
From the other perspective, in the late 1960s, consumers were
estimated to be paying $160 million annually for the extra wa-
ter.3 13 By the mid-1990s, when this sum had exceeded a billion
dollars annually, firms producing red meat, which is deemed adul-
terated when it absorbs the same quantities of water, sued the
USDA for unfairly favoring poultry.34 European food safety
officials' belief that the United States system is "insane" and root-
ed in poultry firms' political influence was confirmed by the
Clinton administration's accommodation of Tyson's opposition to a
program of zero-tolerance for fecal material. 35 As a cheap make-
shift solution, the USDA permits firms to superchlorinate the water
in the chillers.38 6 Although chlorine may produce carcinogenic
chloramines when combined with chicken skin, it is also ineffective
at killing bacteria because the animal protein neutralizes it.3s It
is, however, effective in causing eye and upper respiratory irritation
among production workers.' Ironically, because some European
Union countries permit no use of chlorine at all on poultry prod-
380. Ingersoll, supra note 299, at 300.
381. Behar & Kramer, supra note 305, at 43-44.
382. Anthan, supra note 376, at 9A (quoting Dr. Carl Telleen).
383. WELLFORD, supra note 72, at 137.
384. Kenney v. Espy, No. 4-94CV-10402 (S.D. Iowa filed June 20, 1994); George
Anthan, Consumers Seen Paying Too Much for Poultry, DEs MOINES REG., Mar. 23, 1994
at 1A, 2A; George Anthan, Suit Says Poultry Favored by USDA, DES MOINES REG., Sept.
5, 1994, at IA, 13A; Laura Sands, The $46 Question, BEEF TODAY, June-July 1994, at
16.
385. Behar & Kramer, supra note 305, at 44.
386. NATIONAL INST. FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH (NIOSH), HETA 93-
0230-2405, HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION REPORT: TYSON FOODS, INC. 9 (1993) [herein-
after NIOSH: TYSON].
387. Gene Bruce, Dirty Chicken, ATLANTIC, Nov. 1990, at 32, 38.
388. NIOSH: TYSON, supra note 386, at 9 (stating that "elevated and variable chlorine
levels in these water sprays could partially explain why workers are periodically experi-
encing eye and upper respiratory irritation").
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ucts,' 9 the FSIS has proposed exempting products for export
from its new requirements for antimicrobial treatment.
3 9°
A major source of the fecal cross-contamination in the chill
tank is precisely the high-speed automated evisceration facilities
introduced during the 1970s. As the National Research Council, in
a report commissioned by the FSIS, concluded, "[tihe new equip-
ment often malfunctions ... and the gastrointestinal tracts are
frequently broken so that feces ... contaminate the surface of the
birds.... Decreased line speeds might eliminate many of these
shortcomings, but such speeds would have to be substantially slow-
er than those used in traditional inspection." The obsession of the
FSIS with Tayloristic studies of "the effects of accelerated line
speed on inspection" in order to decrease the duration of a bird
inspection to less than a second39' augured poorly for a line
slow-down merely to reduce contamination.
Fecal soup also plays a role earlier in the process. According
to Dr. Edward Menning, head of the National Association of Fed-
eral Veterinarians and former Chief Veterinarian of the United
States Air Force, the scald tank, which is positioned between kill-
ing and eviscerating to facilitate feather removal,3" is a site of
contamination "because many birds enter it still alive and expelling
waste."393 Since firms' ability to increase throughput by the use
of such equipment and processes would be jeopardized, they might
lose hundreds of millions of dollars annually if the FSIS required
such contaminated tissue be condemned.39
389. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems,
60 Fed. Reg. 6774, 6795 (1995) (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 308, 310, 318, 320, 325,
326, 327, 380).
390. 60 Fed. Reg. 6844-45 (to be codified at 9 C.F.R. §§ 381.69(b)(1) & (c)).
391. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, POULTRY INSPECTON: THE BASIS FOR A RISK-
ASSESSmNT APPROACH 146-47 (1987).
392. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH SERV., USDA, GUIDELNES FOR ESTABUSHING AND
OPERATING BROILER PROCESSING PLANTs 24-25, 31-32 (1982).
393. George Anthan, USDA to Look at Dubious Poultry Policy, DES MOINES REG., Jan.
11, 1989, at lA, 7A.
394. Id.
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VI. NEW DEMOCRATS ARE ALSO CHICKEN
"The poultry industry is the greatest example of the free-
enterprise system on earth. We should be applauded for
our economics. 
395
The Clinton administration's policy reveals continuity with that
of the Reagan and Bush administrations in that the USDA has
continued to promote "deregulation of poultry processing" by depu-
tizing profit-making chicken companies as self-inspectors.3 6 The
Clinton administration FSIS has adopted an ambiguous attitude
toward its predecessors' deregulatory programs. On the one hand, it
characterized SIS as driven by the agency's belief that "[s]ince an
increasing amount of the poultry ... supply was being produced
under brand names, . . . establishments would be motivated to
protect the reputation of their products by performing systematic
quality control for visible, unpalatable defects."3' On the other
hand, the current FSIS concedes that "[c]onsumers often cannot
trace a transitory illness to any particular food or even be certain it
was caused by food .... This lack of marketplace accountability
for foodborne illness means that meat and poultry producers and
processors have little incentive to incur extra costs for more than
minimal pathogen controls."'398 Consequently, the FSIS has con-
cluded that this "market failure" and the accompanying hundreds of
deaths and millions of cases of illness caused annually by meat
and poultry-related pathogens continue to justify government inter-
vention.'"
To be sure, the Clinton administration has not insisted on for-
mally debasing standards as did several Reagan-era abortive con-
gressional bills that would have abolished mandatory inspection in
the name of economy, efficiency, and flexibility.' Nor has the
395. Behar, supra note 160, at 52-54 (quoting James Hudson, Chairman of Hudson
Foods).
396. Scott Bronstein, Chicken: How Safe?, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., May 26, 1991, at
Cl.
397. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems,
60 Fed. Reg. 6774, 6777 (1995).
398. Id. at 6831.
399. Id. at 6781 tbl. 2, 6831; Chickens: Ain't Nobody Here But Us, ECONOMIST, July
27, 1991, at 27.
400. See, e.g., S. 2622, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 4 (1986); H.R. 5105, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. § 4 (1986).
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USDA yet resurrected its plans-withdrawn in 1989-for discre-
tionary inspection driven by the agency's self-proclaimed but im-
plausible speculation as to whether its traditional inspectional "in-
tensity ... exceeds that which is necessary."'" Although the Pro-
cessed Products Inspection Improvement Act of 1986, which af-
forded the USDA some inspectional discretion with regard to meat
for six years, did not expressly apply to the PPIA, the USDA took
the position that the PPIA itself empowered it to exercise the same
degree of discretion.'
Nevertheless, the Clinton administration's new proposal foresees
an across-the-board replacement of all existing methods of post-
mortem inspection with a single system consisting of two USDA
officials without mandating a reduction in maximum line-speeds
while enabling some plants operating under the traditional inspec-
tion system to increase their production rates in the extreme case
from 25 to 70 birds per minute. 3 Under this new Poultry En-
hancement Program, which critics regard as "'a corporate honor
system,"'" the company workers who would sort carcasses for
the inspector would assume even greater responsibility than the
helpers currently bear because they would play a greater part in
detecting disease and abnormality. °5 The president of the North
Central Council of Food Inspection Locals characterizes this pro-
posal as "'nothing more than a gift to the poultry industry"' pre-
cisely because company employees "'are not going to condemn
meat' if their supervisors tell them not to."' Even the FSIS has
401. Experimentation With Procedures for Determining the Intensity of Inspection Cover-
age in Processing Establishments; Waivers of Provisions of the Regulations, 52 Fed. Reg.
10,028 (1987).
402. Pub. L. No. 99-641, § 403, 100 Stat. 3567 (1986); USDA's "Discretionary Inspec-
tion" Plan for Meat and Poultry Processing Plants: Hearing Before the Human Resources
and Intergovernmental Relations Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Implementation of Improved Processing Inspection, 53 Fed.
Reg. 44,818, 44,818 (1988); Donald L. Houston, Meat and Poultry Inspection in the Year
2000, 43 FOOD DRUG COMM. LJ. 369 (1988); Bruce Ingersoll, Agriculture Agency Drops
Plan to End Daily Inspections at Meat, Poultry Plants, WALL ST. J., May 22, 1989, at
A5. See generally Albert, supra note 377, at 1193-224 (providing an in-depth account of
this episode).
403. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,639, 35,649-51 (1994).
404. Patricia Mitchell, Can USDA Inspectors Do More With Less? WASH. POST, Jan. 9,
1991, at El, E9 (quoting Thomas Devine, legal director of Government Accountability
Project).
405. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,639, 35,642.
406. Susan Steel, Proposed Changes Would Hurt Poultry Inspections, Official Says,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 12, 1994, at 2H (quoting Dave Camey).
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been constrained to concede that it will have to consider extending
"whistleblower" protection to such workers.' USDA inspectors
argue that devolution of government responsibility to firms would
generate an inescapable conflict between making money and ensur-
ing safety and health. The same inspectors complain publicly that
in the two seconds or less which they have at their disposal before
the next bird passes by they cannot carry out their mandate."5
Thus, it is clear that the USDA long ago implanted that contradic-
tion in the government inspection program.
Under the more recent Hazard Analysis and Critical Control
Point systems,4°9 not only would company self-policing be ex-
tended further, but the de-emphasis of organoleptic inspection and
the heightened importance attached to detection of pathogenic mi-
croorganisms may eventually trigger yet another wave of line-speed
increases. Sounding more like a lawyer than a veterinarian, the
assistant deputy administrator of the FSIS during the Reagan ad-
ministration insisted that even at 180 birds per minute,410 the
agency would comply with its statutory obligation to inspect each
bird: "'The inspector will in fact be looking at each bird, but much
quicker than ever before."'' 411
Interestingly, whereas the meat oligopolies have opposed the
USDA's deregulatory program on the ground that withdrawal of
governmental inspection would lower public confidence and sales,
chicken firms have strongly supported the Department's march
toward deregulation. "[L]ulled by continuing increases in sales," the
poultry industry continues to exalt throughput fiber alles.4" Rec-
407. Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems,
60 Fed. Reg. 6774, 6830 (1995).
408. Jane Fullerton, Consumers Have Bone to Pick on Product Safety, ARK. DEMOCRAT,
Apr. 21, 1991, at IA.
409. 60 Fed. Reg. 6774 (1995). For a somewhat critical view of HACCP, see Modern
Technology and Food Inspection: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Envi-
ronment, and Aviation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 103rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 80-108 (May 5, 1994) [hereinafter Food Inspection: Hearings] (statement
of Carol Tucker Foreman).
410. Review of U.S. Department of Agric.'s Meat and Poultry Inspection Programs:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Livestock, Dairy, and Poultry of the House Comm. on
Agric., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 325-26, 517 (1987) (statement of Rep. Neal Smith) (stating
that USDA was considering regulations that would allow line-speeds of up to 180 birds
per minute); Jane Fullerton, Risky Business: Arkansas Poultry Empire, Part 2: Risk to
Health, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 22, 1991, at IA (stating that USDA was considering regu-
lations that would allow line-speeds of up to 182 birds per minute).
411. Anthan, supra note 1, at 10A (quoting Dr. John Prucha).
412. George Anthan, Untitled, Gannett News Service, Feb. 5, 1989, available in LEXIS,
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ognizing that the enactment of more sweeping, across-the-board
deregulatory legislation by a right-wing Republican Congress offers
the opportunity for even more favorable treatment under which
benefits to firms will programmatically become more important, the
industry has supported postponement of the new microbial testing
system.4"3
The USDA acknowledges that an alternative method would also
achieve its objectives of greater food safety. Under this scenario,
existing procedures and techniques would be retained, but an in-
spector would work at the end of the line after the viscera have
been removed from the carcass to identify fecal contamination.
What speaks against this alternative, according to the agency, is the
possibility that, given the federal government's disinclination to
incur additional personnel costs for additional inspectors, "produc-
tion rates could be reduced by 30 to 50 percent if the inspectors
tasks remained identical, but fewer inspectors were used to perform
those functions." '414 With fewer inspectors, the production rates
would necessarily be reduced "because of limits on the number of
birds per minute the final inspector could examine." '415 The cost
of lower production or slowed line-speeds "could reach $5.2 billion
per year for chickens and turkeys."4"6
In light of the USDA's long history as an agency that has been
captured by the firms it is supposed to regulate, it is anticlimactic
to hear that it judges these costs to be "unacceptable." 417 After
all, the USDA's Poultry Enhancement Project Team that developed
the proposal "understands that any option chosen is subject to
the ... constraint: There should be no reduction in production line
speeds."4 '' The possibility that plants operating under the NELS
or SIS systems might "have to operate their lines at less than
optimal speeds ... because the post-viscera-harvest inspector can-
not effectively inspect more than 35 birds per minute" meant that
News Library, GNS File.
413. Marian Burros, Congress Moving to Revamp Rules on Food Safety, N.Y. TIMES,
July 3, 1995, at 1; Compromise Reached on USDA's HACCP Rule, BNA WASH. INSIDER,
July 20, 1995, at d14; Mike McGraw, Meat 'Mega Reg' Unlikely to End Debate, KAN.
CITY STAR, July 17, 1995, at Al.
414. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,639, 35,650 (1994).
415. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 57,023, 57,024 (1994).
416. Id.
417. Enhanced Poultry Inspection, 59 Fed. Reg. 35,639, 35,650.
418. U.S. Food Safety and Inspection Service, Preliminary Impact Assessment: Poultry
Enhancement Options 1 (May 1994) [hereinafter Preliminary Impact Assessment] (unpub-
lished memorandum made available by FSIS).
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the agency had to reject the alternative procedure under which the
NELS lines would have to run at only 70 rather than 90 birds per
minute, while the SIS line-speed would decline from 70 to 35
birds per minute.419 At "such slow rates [sic] ... there could be
a negative effect on productivity of $5.2 billion ... during the
first year of operation. ' 420 Making such "substantial demands on
the regulated industry" is unthinkable to the regulator, which re-
gards as "severe" an impact that might act as "inducement for the
industry to install additional poultry slaughter lines" to maintain
output.42
The agency's entire analysis and cost calculations, which, re-
vealingly, it took the initiative to estimate without any prompting
or input from the regulatees,4' underscore the profoundly pro-
capital bias that has always defined the USDA's approach. The
agency characterizes "optimal" speeds as those that increase firms'
profits, whereas speeds as "slow" as 1.2 birds per second, which
might reduce somewhat the incidence of repetitive trauma syn-
drome among the 220,000 very low-paid and largely female and
minority' workers whose shortened work-lives form the basis of
the poultry corporations' profitability and the federal government's
cheap food policy, are automatically rejected as "unacceptable."
Thus, when USDA food safety officials observe that "'[w]e just
don't want to be the cap on productivity,"' the subtext is that "'an
extra bird-per-minute or two can mean a difference of hundreds of
thousands, or even millions (for the largest plants) of dollars in
profits.' ' 42
4
419. Id. at 10.
420. Id. at 12.
421. Id.
422. Telephone Interview with Chuck Williams, U.S. FSIS (Jan. 10, 1995).
423. See, e.g., NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16, at tbl. 4 (listing the large number of
female minority employees who are exposed to these working conditions).
424. Kathy Sawyer, On the Chicken Line: Trying to Catch the Bad Ones, Quickly,
WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1979, at Al (quoting Dr. Donald Houston); see also William
Dubbert, The New Look of Meat and Poultry Inspection, J. OF THE AM. VETERNARY
MED. ASS'N 266, 268 (1984) ("In order to overcome the justifiable criticism that we were
a 'cap' on industry productivity, we chose the one realistic option: more efficient poultry
inspection procedures.").
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VII. PRO-CAPITAL REGULATORY BIAs
[R]educing cumulative trauma disorders alone would never
generate enough savings to pay for the paperwork required
by OSHA's proposed regulation. Liberty Mutual Group, the
nation's largest workers' compensation insurer, estimates
that cumulative trauma disorder claims cost less than $1
billion a year.425
The FSIS's biased regulatory approach does have two virtues:
openness and consistency. The agency's spokespersons do not have
to be coaxed into conceding that the FSIS does not now consider
and has never taken into account costs associated with the adverse
impact of its authorized increase in line-speeds on the health and
safety of "the industry's" workers.'s Yet, even Time reports that
the incidence of repetitive motion disorders will not be significantly
reduced "until the work pace is slowed down."'427 This malignant
neglect conforms to employers' interests in an industry in which
labor is the main cost component, which firms were able to com-
press from 62% in 1955 to about 50% in the early 1980s (46% in
the South).4'
The course of the USDA's regulation of chicken processing is
the history of an agency's self-identification with the self-valoriza-
tion requirements of the regulated firms' capital. One of the most
spectacular illustrations of the USDA's status as a captured regula-
tor occurred in 1970 when it recruited and shipped strikebreakers
to northern Alabama to insure the continued flow of chicken-bear-
ing profit. The strikebreakers replaced inspectors who were honor-
ing a picket line at Pillsbury's and Ralston Purina's processing
plants that had been organized by chicken farmers expressing dis-
satisfaction with their contracts.429 The agency's systemic pro-firm
bias was highlighted, albeit in convolutedly embarrassed language,
425. Janet Novack, Ergpolitics 101, FORBES, Oct. 24, 1994, at 216, 218.
426. Telephone Interview with Dr. Isabel Arrington, Staff Officer, FSIS, Slaughter Oper-
ations Staff (Dec. 15, 1994); Telephone Interview with Judy Riggins, assistant to Michael
Taylor, Administrator, FSIS (Dec. 22, 1994).
427. Behar, supra note 160, at 53.
428. LASIEY ET AL., supra note 112, at 44, 46; VEREL W. BENSON & THOMAS J.
,VITZIG, THE CHICKEN BROILER INDUSTRY: STRUCruRE, PRAcncEs AND COSTS, 24 tbl. 17
(U.S. Dep't of Agric. Economic Research Service Agricultural Economic Report No. 381,
1977) (indicating that labor is the main cost in the broiler industry).
429. WELLFoRD, supra note 72, at 119, 120.
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by the National Research Council, which the FSIS hired in the
1980s to evaluate its inspection program. The Council emphasized
"the peer group with which FSIS is most closely associated" as an
"obstacle to analysis":
Many federal agencies have strong relationships with their
industrial and business constituencies. It is a measure of a
democratic government that it be accountable to all the
people and groups it affects. For meat and poultry inspec-
tion, the relationship to industry is particularly close--of
necessity. Honest or dishonest, good compliance record or
bad ... every operator of an establishment is subject to
federal oversight every working day. The potential for
conflict is always present.
The close relationship with the industry FSIS has had
to develop sensitizes program officials to the effects of
their program upon the manufacturers. This is not to sug-
gest that FSIS ignores the public interest . . . or that it
makes decisions that are inevitably industrially orient-
ed. . . . Nor has the agency sponsored or encouraged active
debate on the shape of its program. FSIS seldom describes
to a scientific or broader public policy audience the under-
lying rationale for its decisions. In some cases, this low
level of communication with communities outside industry
can lead to inappropriate decisions that may affect public
health.43
Even when the USDA purports to take measures that redound
to the benefit of processing plant workers, that outcome is always
instrumentally dictated by exactly the same profitability consider-
ations that the regulated firms adopt. It seems never to have oc-
curred to the agency that measures should be taken to reduce inju-
ries without any quid pro quo. In connection with its regulatory
duty to approve construction plans for poultry plants, the USDA
has issued Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Broiler Pro-
cessing Plants:
Employee Comfort Facilities.-In recent years greater con-
cern has been shown to providing workers with more com-
fortable personal facilities, with the expectation that worker
productivity would increase, workmanship improve, morale
430. MEAT AND POULTRY INSPECTION, supra note 45, at 160.
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could be maintained at acceptable levels, and lower worker
turnover would result.... Providing for the safety of plant
workers is essential to planning a satisfactory layout. Acci-
dents are costly not only in lost productive time but also in
benefits to be paid during the worker's recovery and the
possibility of increased insurance premiums.43
In the meantime, the USDA has been constrained to acknowl-
edge that its own inspectors are exposed to considerable risk of
cumulative trauma disorders as well as lacerations, contusions, and
back strains.432 Such a concession is hardly surprising given the
fact that inspectors may perform as many as 15,750 highly repeti-
tive motions per day on a thirty-five bird per minute per inspector
SIS line433 while the FSIS's own "Wellness Training Program"
labels tasks that yield as few as 840 or more repetitions per 7-hour
shift "highly repetitive."434 If ergonomists define "high repetitive
jobs" as those with a cycle time of less than 30 seconds,435 then
even turkey plant workers, who make 15,120 cuts per shift where
the line moves less quickly than in chicken plants, belong to the
group of workers most vulnerable to cumulative trauma disor-
ders.436 Chicken processors may repeat motions up to 30,000
times during an 8-hour shift."'
In the abstract, the USDA's authorization of increased line-
speeds of seventy or ninety-one birds per minute, while creating,
through the forces of competition, nationally uniform rates of
throughput for all firms, does not necessarily mean that individual
workers' workloads must rise commensurately. Staffing and config-
uration of the production line and of the work flow are mediating
factors that can moderate or exacerbate the effects of general in-
431. BRANT ET AL., supra note 23, at 14, 18.
432. State Panel Examines Hazards Facing Workers in Food Processing Industries, 19
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 2168, 2169 (1990) (according to Ronald Prucha,
Associate Administrator, FSIS); Telephone Interview with Joseph Powers, Designated
Agency Safety and Health Official, FSIS (Dec. 27, 1994).
433. Letter from David Carney, President, North Central Council of Food Inspection
Locals, American Federation of Government Employees, to Terry Medley, Acting Adminis-
trator, FSIS (Mar. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
434. U.S. FSIS, WELLNEss TRAINING PRoGRAM 13 (n.d.).
435. Barbara Silverstein et al., Hand Wrist Cumulative Trauma Disorders in Industry, 43
BRr. J. OF DMUS. MED. 779, 780 (1986).
436. Thomas Armstrong et al., Investigation of Cumulative Trauma Disorders in a Poul-
try Processing Plant, AM. INDUS. HYGIENE ASS'N J., Feb. 1982, at 103, 103.
437. Cathy Cash, Perdue Workers Request Assembly Line Slow Down, UPI, Feb. 25,
1990, available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
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creases in line-speed, which become the "outer limit" for firms.438
This relationship is manifest for the unionized USDA inspectors:
whereas the three inspectors on the faster ninety-one bird per min-
ute line inspect thirty and one-third birds per minute, the two in-
spectors on the slower seventy bird per minute line inspect thirty-
five birds per minute.439 Similarly, in a plant with a very strong
local union-such as the Foster Farms plant in Livingston, Califor-
nia, organized by the UFCW-workers are able to persuade the
management to equalize working conditions on the faster and slow-
er lines through increased staffing, reconfiguration, or rotation.' 4
For the seventy-five to eighty percent of poultry workers who have
no union, however, firms are much more likely to use the opportu-
nity created by USDA-authorized line-speed increases to intensify
individual workers' loads as well. Workers who once sliced every
fourth bird soon find themselves cutting every other bird." In-
deed, Congress has heard testimony from former poultry line work-
ers that companies frequently use the occasion of a line-speed
increase to reduce the number of workers."2 Union claims that
increased line-speeds are accompanied by reductions in line staffing
are made plausible by the view of the OSHA ergonomist during
the Bush administration, who confirmed that the repetitive stress
syndrome that is caused "'by just pushing workers harder and
harder and harder"' could in large part be eliminated by slowing
down production lines." 3
Several statistical indicators underscore the key role that the
USDA's line-speed policy has played in strengthening poultry
management's position vis-A-vis its work force. Once the significant
productivity gains stemming from the wave of labor-saving automa-
tion-in killing, defeathering, evisceration, and deboning-had been
realized by the end of the 1970s,' the trend in the bias away
438. Telephone Interview with David Wylie, Attorney for Perdue Farms (Jan. 26, 1995).
439. Letter from David Carney, President, North Central Carolina of Food Inspection
Locals, American Federation of Government Employees, to Terry Medley, Acting Adminis-
ter, FSIS (Mar. 13, 1994) (on file with author).
440. Telephone Interviews with Deborah Berkowitz, Director of Health and Safety De-
partment, United Food and Commercial Workers (Dec. 1994 and Jan. 1995).
441. Goldoftas, supra note 21, at 26.
442. See Poultry Safety: Consumers at Risk: Hearings on S. 1324 Before the Senate
Comm. on Lab. and Human Resources, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1991) (statement of
Donna Bazemore, Center for Women's Economic Alternatives, Ahoskie, North Carolina,
and former employee of Perdue Farms, Inc.).
443. Fullerton, supra note 160 (quoting Dave Cochran).
444. Ahmed & Sieling, supra note 36, at 36-37.
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from labor-saving and toward labor-using technological change
since 1980 became associated"' with productivity increases that
"were achieved without extensive investments in technical innova-
tions. In fact, the poultry industry's capital expenditures on new
and used equipment per employee averaged 45% below the per
employee average for all manufacturing workers throughout the
1980's."' In 1987, for example, the average new capital expen-
diture for machinery and equipment in poultry slaughtering and
processing amounted to $2,195 per production worker or 41% of
the $5,369 per production worker in all manufacturing indus-
tries. 7 In 1991, poultry firms invested $2,461 in new machinery
and equipment per production worker, but this figure amounted to
only 34% of the $7,299 invested by all industries.' Taking into
account all new capital expenditures including buildings and struc-
tures, the poultry processing industry's investment per production
worker has, as recorded by the Census of Manufacturers in 1977,
1982, 1987, and 1992, amounted to $1,650, $2,176, $2,942, and
$2,692 respectively; these figures reached only 48%, 36%, 46%,
and 30% respectively of the aggregate manufacturing level."9 To
be sure, the chicken producing oligopolies' "[i]ncentives to invest
in technical innovations are lessened by the comparatively low
average hourly earnings in poultry.""45
By 1983, the USDA's Economic Research Service was warning
that "productivity gains may come more slowly than in the
past... in production.... [M]achines and energy have become
more costly substitutes for labor; major economies of scale have
already been realized, as have the economies from coordination of
the production-marketing functions." '451 It was precisely this tem-
445. David Lambert, Technological Change in Meat and Poultry-Packing and Process-
ing, 26 J. OF AGRICULTURAL AND APPLIED ECON. 591, 596 (1994).
446. Ron Hetrick, Why Did Employment Expand in Poultry Processing Plants?, MONTH-
LY LAB. REV., June 1994, at 31, 32.
447. Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1988 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
MANUFACTURES: STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRY GROUPS AND INDUSTRIES 1-11 tbl. 2, 1-45 to
1-46 tbl. 5 (1990).
448. Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1991 ANNUAL SURVEY OF
MANUFACTURES: STATISTICS FOR INDUSTRY GROUPS AND INDUSTRIES 1-10 tbl. 2, 1-45 to
1-46 tbl. 5 (1992).
449. Calculated according to U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF MANUFAC-
TURES: PRELIMNARY REPORT:. INDUSTRY SERIES: MEAT PRODUCTS 20A-1 tbl. 1 (1994);
U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1992 CENSUS OF MANUFACTURES: PRELInNARY REP.:
SUMMARY SERIES 4 tbl. 2 (1994).
450. Hetrick, supra note 446, at 32.
451. FLOYD LASKEY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, THE U.S. POULTRY INDUSTRY:
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porary lag in labor-saving mechanization and automa-
tion-interrupted, for example, by the introduction of a mechanical
system for handling live poultry that enabled five rather than six or
seven live hangers to shackle 7,200 chickens per hour45 2-that
presumably prompted the oligopolies to pressure the USDA during
the 1980s to devise methods for further increasing line-speeds.
Thus, productivity in the industry, aided, abetted, and enforced by
the USDA's "streamlined" inspection procedures, could, for the
time being at least, continue to rise merely by making workers
with few alternatives work faster within a minute division of labor
requiring an above-average proportion of unskilled labor 453-until
they are disabled and replaced by fresh recruits in an industry that
repels its workers so quickly that annual turnover rates as high as
500%414 cause managers to give precedence to recruitment over
retention." "To keep pace on poultry production lines moving
twice as fast as a decade ago, the human components of the highly
automated poultry processing machinery ... must move their arms
in quick staccato fashion to slice, wrap, cut, and ... rip apart raw
chicken with their hands. 456
It is this link between productivity, profits, and wages on the
one hand and the USDA's compliant inspection and line-speed
policies on the other that has enabled the large firms to record
phenomenal growth rates while crippling thousands of impoverished
workers. Chicken capital "can be most proud of this track re-
cord, 457 which includes a 38% increase in broilers processed
(through the chiller line) per worker hour alone between 1985 and
CHANGING ECONOMICS AND STRUCTURE 23 (Agricultural Economic Report No. 502,
1983).
452. A.D. SHACKELFORD & V. WILSON LEE, A MECHANICAL SYSTEM FOR HANDLING
LIVE POULTRY 19 (USDA Science & Education Administration, AAT-S-15, 1980); see
also A.D. SHACKELFORD & V. WILSON LEE, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC. LOADING LIVE POUL-
TRY: A TIME AND MOTION STUDY OF LOADING BROILER CHICKENS BY HAND, FORKLIFT
TRUCK, AND SQUEEE-LIFr TRUCK (Science & Education Administration AAT-S-22, 1981)
(discussing mechanical means for handling poultry).
453. Ahmed & Sieling, supra note 36, at 35-36 (describing the poultry-processing labor
force as comprised mostly of "manual and semi-skilled occupations").
454. Horwitz, supra note 23, at AS; Expert Cites Successful Programs to Curb Injuries
in Poultry Plants, 20 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1716, 1716 (1991) [herein-
after Programs to Curb Injuries] (according to Travis Arterbury, Ergonomics Consultant to
Tyson Foods, Inc.).
455. PRESIDENT'S TRIENNIAL REPORT ON IMMIGRATION, supra note 47, at 131.
456. Bronstein, Chicken, supra note 23, at Cl.
457. G. Thomas Martin, Jr., Specialization Continues Net Yield Improvements, in WATr
POULTRY YEARBOOK 1993, at 24, 24-26 (1993).
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1992 to an industry-wide average of 182.45" "The high rate of
occupational injury in poultry processing derives most directly from
the constant pressures to increase or maintain high line speeds. ....
This pressure underlies not only high injury rates but also creates
an environment in which control over workers' time and movement
is central to production."'459 What is particularly ironic about the
nationally uniform line-speeds imposed by the USDA is that, given
the negligible levels of imports,' the state could just as easily
set lower speeds without exposing the firms to disruptive competi-
tion from low-wage countries.
This pattern of inverted regulation does not accord with Theo-
dore Lowi's influential theory of regulatory liberalism. According
to Lowi, a "loan of governmental sovereignty" was necessary in
the agricultural sector because it "was so decentralized and dis-
persed that private, voluntary agreements to manipulate markets
were obviously too difficult to reach and impossible to sustain." To
this end, "[a]dministrative agencies were created to facilitate agree-
ments."'" In poultry processing, as in meat packing, industrial-
strength concentration should make the kind of "self-government"
Lowi has in mind superfluous for the oligopolists. Lowi also views
the DOL as a "clientele department ... legally obliged to develop
and maintain an orientation toward the interests that comprise this
sector." 2 Unlike the USDA, however, the DOL as a mere "feed-
back" agency is "simply not to be entrusted by anyone with signif-
icant direct powers over persons and property." 43 Although this
agentlessly formulated dictum may correctly reflect the position of
the owners of the property to be regulated, bizarrely, Lowi charac-
terizes the "national consensus standards" that Congress authorized
OSHA to adopt' "as almost pristine examples of interest-group-
liberal resolutions of the problem of balancing power and interest
against policy choice."'  Yet these standards were generated al-
458. G. Thomas Martin, Jr., The Squeeze Is On, in WATT POULTRY YEARBOOK 1994-
95, at 10 & tbl. Labor Efficiency (1994).
459. GRIFFrrH, supra note 323, at 176-77.
460. See Ahmed & Sieling, supra note 36, at 35; see also INT'L TRADE ADMIN., U.S.
DEP'T OF COM., 1990 U.S. INDUSTRIAL OUTLOOK 34 (1990) (noting that U.S. imports of
poultry and related products accounted for a mere .2% of domestic production).
461. THEODORE LowI, Tm END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNIT-
ED STATES 71 (2d ed. 1979).
462. Id. at 77.
463. Id. at 78, 80.
464. 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(9), 655(a) (1988).
465. Lowi, supra note 461, at 117.
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most exclusively by trade associations without any worker or union
input.' If labor is the client, OSHA has never been a captured
agency.
VIII. A LATTER-DAY IMMACULATE CONCEPTION
[No one ever died of ergonomics.'
In a news article that resembled free advertising for Tyson
Foods, U.S. News & World Report recently gave the firm's chair-
man of the board a stage from which to proclaim his solidarity
with his employees (except that "[a]nyone who refers to their
54,000 co-workers as 'employees' instead of 'people' is fined a
quarter" 8):
Don Tyson has never forgotten his humble origins. "This
has always been tough work. I remember back in the '60s
how hard it was taking out that chicken's [innards]," he
says, twisting his fingers into an imaginary bird. "By the
end of the day, you couldn't move your hands anymore."
Of course, the modem chicken processing plant is now
almost fully automated, with 210 live birds a minute going
in one end and fully cooked fried chicken pieces coming
out the other. 9
The magazine's characterization of today's plant is about as realis-
tic as "the myth that the wealthy Mr. Tyson lives simply.""47
The worst and most grueling job is held by live-hangers. These
workers shackle by the legs twenty-five birds per minute, while the
chickens, which "eat one another's germ-laden excrement and
spread it on their feathers and skin" while stuffed in cages en route
to the plant,47' in turn "scratch, peck and defecate all over
them."4 2 While workers back up malfunctioning machines on au-
tomated lines, workers on less modem lines continue to slit birds
466. NOBLE, supra note 29, at 43-47.
467. 141 CONG. REc. H3252 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cass
Ballenger, chairman of the Subcommittee on Work Force Protection of the House Com-
mittee on Economic and Educational Opportunities).
468. Frantz, supra note 143, at 1.
469. McGraw, supra note 98, at 42.
470. Frantz, supra note 143, at 6.
471. David Bjerklie, The Dangers of Foul Fowl: As Poultry's Popularity Grows, the
Scourge of Salmonella Spreads, TIME, Nov. 26, 1990, at 136, 136.
472. Horwitz, supra note 23, at A8.
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open and remove innards manually.473 On the eviscerating line at
the ConAgra plant in Athens, Alabama, for example, an automatic
venting machine was introduced in 1978, but it was not until 1991
that the firm even alleged that its "associates only back up the
machine"; the automatic drawing machines introduced in 1975 did
not permit a merely back-up role for "associates" until 1993.' 74
Although automation has reduced many of the workers on the
eviscerating line to feeding or positioning the carcasses for the
machine and to back-up positions monitoring and correcting errors
of ever faster machine operations, those errors are so frequent that
two workers backing up a 70 bird per minute eviscerating machine
may be working at a furious pace; when, as not uncommonly
occurs, the machine breaks down altogether, management expects
the workers to maintain the machine-forced rate of throughput.47
Even those who work as a "'back up killer"' whacking the necks
of the chickens the 300 bird per minute circular saw misses suffer
from repetitive stress syndrome.476 Those managerial expectations
are reinforced, according to the USDA's Guidelines for Establish-
ing and Operating Broiler Processing Plants, by the deployment of
"a chief supervisor and two or three line supervisors ... to assure
a constant flow of product at a maximum line speed."4'
By around 1990, new technology for automating broiler pro-
duction became available or at least began to be introduced by the
larger firms. One reason adduced for the renewed onset of automa-
tion is an increase in competition as the industry moved toward
more expensive specialties such as boneless chicken breast, the
retail price of which is much closer to sale-priced steak than is the
case for standard processed chicken. From 1962 to the mid-1990s
whole birds as a share of total processed broilers declined from
around 87% to 12%." Tyson, for example, which owns 18 of
473. Taft Wireback-, Chicken Industry Under Fire for Sanitation, Worker Complaints,
GREENSBORO NEws & REc., Dec. 17, 1989, at Al; Interview with Kelly Otto, Attorney
with Clark & Scott, P.C., in Iowa City, IA (Feb. 24, 1995) (the firm defending Gold
Kist, Inc. in workers' compensation claims in Alabama).
474. ERGONOMICS JOuRNAL AND ACnON PLAN FoRM: CoNAGRA ATHENS 14-16 (n.d.).
475. Telephone Interview with Margo Michaels, UFCW Safety & Health Department
(Feb. 15, 1995) (describing conditions in ConAgra plant in Athens, Alabama); Telephone
Interview with Deborah Berkowitz, Safety and Health Director, UFCW (Mar. 6, 1995); see
also BRANT Er AL., supra note 23, at 26.
476. Behar, supra note 160, at 54 (quoting Chris Turic, a Tyson poultry worker).
477. BRANT Er AL., supra note 23, at 26.
478. PERDuE & CHICKEN, supra note 62, at 15 (discussing the 12% figure); Perez et
al., supra note 117, at 28 tbl. A-i (providing figures through 1989).
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the 73 further processing plants in the United States, sold almost
95% of its broiler output in cut-up form by 1995, 4"' and reputed-
ly held 55% of the processed chicken market share in 1987." °
This specialization, which Tyson initiated in the 1970s when it
became clear that profit margins were triple those associated with
the sale of whole broilers,"' is, to be sure, linked to the success
of the firms' strategy to export the parts such as feet, drumsticks,
and dark meat that "yuppies" do not buy, to Asia and Europe."2
Whereas ten to fifteen years ago the eviscerating line was uni-
formly crowded with workers performing one or two motions,
today on the most highly automated lines fewer purely manual
operations remain. These operations are performed by inspection
helpers or mirror trimmers, but are primarily performed by
rehangers, who rehang birds that are unhung as a buffer measure to
coordinate the kill line, which may run as fast as 300 birds per
minute, with the evisceration line, which is not supposed to operate
at more than 91 birds per minute."
Despite automation on the slaughter and evisceration lines,
overall poultry processing employment has continued to rise as a
result of the expansion of the so-called further processing line,
which has been less intensely mechanized. A 1989 NIOSH study
of a large Perdue plant in North Carolina, for example, revealed
that whereas 182 day-shift workers were employed on the slaughter
and evisceration lines, 470 worked in cut-up and deboning; at a
smaller Perdue plant, the predominance of the latter group was
somewhat less marked. 4 The shift of workers from evisceration
479. Thornton, supra note 145, at 29-30; U.S. Broiler Companies, supra note 149, at 58
tbl. 5.
480. C. Itoh Plans to Import Mexican Chicken Products, JAPAN ECON. J., Oct. 15,
1988, at 18, 18.
481. Tyson Foods: Putting Its Brand on High-Margin Poultry Products, BUS. WK., Aug.
20, 1979, at 48, 48.
482. INTERNATIONAL TRADE ADMIN., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, U.S. INDUSTRI-
AL OUTLOOK '92, at 32-6 tbl. 9 (1992); VERHEIEN & KOK, supra note 153, at 51;
George Anthan, Ag Officials See 'Golden Era' in Export Trade, DES MOINES REG., Feb.
19, 1995, at 1A; John Hall, Got It Down Cold, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar. 20,
1994, at Fl; Poultry Exports Expected to Rise, DES MoiNEs REG., Feb. 4, 1990, at 3W.
483. W. DALEY Er AL., Robotics and the Poultry Processing Industry, in ROBOTICS IN
MEAT, FISH AND POULTRY PROCESSING 48, 50 (K. Khodabandehloo ed., 1993); Telephone
Interview with Jim McCauley, Health and Safety Director, Perdue Farms, Maryland (Jan.
27, 1995); Telephone Interview with Jackie Nowell, Safety and Health Department, UFCW
(Jan. 27, 1995); Telephone Interview with William Roenigk, Vice-President, National Boil-
er Council (Feb 3, 1995).
484. NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16, at 27 tbl. 1, 29 tbl. 7.
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to such operations as cut-up and deboning, which also exist in
more and less labor-intensive and automated versions,"5 reflects
the shift in output to premium-priced and higher-profit products,
which as early as 1985 accounted for more than 55% of Tyson's
products. 6 When Don Tyson asserts that with such products his
firm is "really selling time,"' 7 he means that he is selling (with
the "mark-up" that makes his firm so profitable) the labor time that
his oligopsonistic labor market provides at very low cost. Higher
profits are driven by the lower level of competition, which is en-
forced by the higher costs of establishing such further processing
facilities. 8
IX. CHEAP FOOD AND CHEAP EMPLOYERS: CLASS-BIASED CosT-
BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
It is possible to establish performance based standards to
prevent repetitive motion traumas. I will establish one right
now: Don't work, don't type, don't do any heavy lifting,
never strain yourself, and try to avoid breaking out in a
sweat. The solution is somewhere between having a work
place where no one works and a work place where some-
thing gets done. Unfortunately, neither Barbara nor anyone
else knows where that point lies."9
The USDA steadfastly denies that it has any legal responsibility
for the safety and health of poultry production workers.4" Al-
though the legislative history of the PPIA shows that Congress
regarded worker safety as a subsidiary objective of the Act, the
USDA argued in the aftermath of the 1991 fire that killed twenty-
485. NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16, at 2; Bill Saporito, ConAgra's Profits Aren't
Chicken Feed, FORTUNE, Oct. 27, 1986, at 70, 71, 74, 80; cf. Neil Murray, Automaton:
Plukon's Chicken Plant Is the Most Modern in Europe, Neil Murray Discovers, FROZEN
AND CHni FOODS, Aug. 1991, at 18, 18-19 (describing an almost completely automat-
ed chicken processing plant).
486. Arthur Buckler, Tyson Foods Isn't Chicken-Hearted About Expansion, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 18, 1994, at B4; Jim Hurlock, Profits Are Plump for Chicken Farmers, Bus. WK.,
Oct. 28, 1985, at 40.
487. Frantz, supra note 143, at 1.
488. BAKER & BRUCE, supra note 59, at 252.
489. 141 CONG. REC. H3252 (statement of Rep. Hefley, referring to Barbara Silverstein,
chief drafter of OSHA's ergonomics standard).
490. Telephone Interview with Dr. Isabel Arrington, Staff Officer, FSIS, Slaughter Oper-
ations Staff (Dec. 15, 1994); Telephone Interview with Judy Riggins, assistant to Michael
Taylor, FSIS Administrator (Dec. 22, 1994).
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five workers at the Imperial Food Product's poultry plant in Ham-
let, North Carolina, that the inspectors, as quasi-guests on private
property, lacked the authority even to override management's deci-
sion to lock exit doors in order to prevent theft of chickens.49'
Yet the FSIS requires firms, when seeking agency approval of their
construction plans, to provide numerous "welfare facilities for plant
employees" including some as mundane as lockers with sloping
tops.492 As Foreman, the former Assistant Secretary of Agricul-
ture, explained to Congress,
[The USDA imposes a large number of requirements on
plants, many of them complex and many of them not di-
rectly related to safe food....
For example, FSIS requires that stairs in plants be "of
impervious material and have solid treads, closed risers and
side curbs 6 inches high measured at the front of the
steps;" . . . drinking fountains must be provided and, "if
placed adjoining a lavatory must be located high enough to
avoid splash from the lavatory." Those all seem like good
ideas and seem to evidence primarily a concern for the
safety of plant and inspection personnel, rather than an
obvious and direct impact on the wholesomeness of the
product produced in the plant. Yet they have been on the
books and vigorously enforced for years.
FSIS has even found the time and energy to fret about
and take on responsibility for improving the "poor public
image of the packing industry." Inspection instructions for
"Outside Premises" state, "The public as well as visitors
and workers commonly prejudge the inside of a plant by
its exterior appearance. This often neglected area of plant
sanitation is an important reason for the poor public image
of the packing industry .... The image of the packing
plant as a food processing establishment certainly is not
enhanced if the outsider sees it as a junk yard or public
dump....
Perhaps FSIS should give some thought to the public's
opinion of a government agency that cares more about
491. Fire Victims Died Trying Shut Exits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991 at A9.
492. FOOD SAFETY INSPECTION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., AGRICULTURE HANDBOOK
570, U.S. INSPECTED MEAT AND POULTRY PACKING PLANTS: A GUIDE TO CONSTRUCTION
AND LAYOUT 32 (1986).
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clutter than the lives of its inspectors and plant employ-
ees.
493
Just as the USDA disclaims all responsibility for worker safety,
with alacrity firms avail themselves of the USDA's norm-setting as
a defense in litigation. When employees-or, rather, "associates,"
since the firm "dropped the term 'employee' years ago"494-- at
Perdue Farms plants in North Carolina, where as many as 36% of
workers suffered from cumulative trauma disorders, requested that
the state OSHA, to which federal OSHA has devolved its authority,
order the company to slow down the production lines, Perdue's
lawyer defended on the ground that, "[o]ur approach is as long as
the USDA allows these speeds, we'll stick to that."495
A federal government that seems to find it so difficult to pro-
tect poultry workers has, however, found ways to classify such
billion-dollar enterprises as Tyson or Perdue as family farms
(namely, as agriculture-related firms at least half of whose stock is
controlled by 3 or fewer family members) eligible for tax defer-
ments.4' That the Clinton administration has continued pro-capital
(and in particular pro-Tyson) policies is hardly surprising in light
of the fact that Clinton, as governor of the largest broiler-producing
state, "shower[ed] the largest chicken producer, Tyson Foods, with
millions of dollars in tax breaks."4' Similarly unsurprising is that
the person he chose as Secretary of Agriculture, a department that
boasts of the $50 million that it and state agencies contribute annu-
ally to poultry research,493 was not only from Mississippi, another
leading broiler producing state,4" but also was forced to resign
493. Food Inspection: Hearings, supra note 409, at 44, 79 (statement of Carol Fore-
man).
494. PERDUE FARMS INC., BIOGRAPHY OF JIM PERDUE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 2
(1994).
495. Cash, supra note 437 (quoting David Wylie).
496. Jane Fullerton, Risky Business: Arkansas' Poultry Empire: Day 5: Risk to Taxpay-
ers, ARK. DEMOCRAT, Apr. 25, 1991, at IA, 9A; see also TYSON FOODS, INc., 1994
ANNUAL REPORT 37 (1994) (relating how the tax laws affect revenue).
497. Behar, supra note 160, at 52; see also John T. Holleman, In Arkansas Which
Comes First, the Chicken or the Environment?, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 22-27 (1992)
(arguing that while the Arkansas poultry industry has been a boon to the state's economy,
it has gradually destroyed Arkansas's natural environment).
498. U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., PROGRAM AiD No. 1348, U.S. POULTRY INDUSTRY: BUILD-
ING A BETTER BIRD 1 (1984).
499. Robert Greene, Poultry Standards Have Special Clout, Espy Critics Say, Wis. ST.
J., Mar. 21, 1994, at 3A.
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under allegations of having accepted bribes from the self-same
Tyson."°
The foregoing evidence demonstrates that the USDA, in setting
production line-speeds, has, in addition to pursuing-albeit with
questionable success-its statutory goal of insuring that poultry
products will not make consumers sick, devoted itself exclusively
to the financial health of the poultry oligopolies. At the same time,
the USDA's practice of neglecting the costs that its regulations
impose on workers in the form of increased incidence of injuries
and shortened work lives has contributed a new chapter to the
federal government's cheap food policy by reinforcing a chicken
pricing strategy that fails to reflect this major component of the
cost of production. Yet, Congress did not authorize the USDA, in
the course of carrying out the USDA's food safety mandate, to
seek to enrich poultry companies at the expense of poultry
workers' health. This skew is, even from the standpoint of the
agency's own statutory mandate, dysfunctional since "excessive line
speeds often cause workers to accidentally rupture the intestinal
sacks and other internal organs of birds, increasing the rate of
salmonella contamination." '' A question therefore arises as to the
lawfulness of the USDA's regulatory actions.
To be sure, the House Agriculture Committee report accompa-
nying H.R. 6814, which eventually became the PPIA, stated that,
in connection with the requirement that the USDA examine each
carcass, as was the procedure in the then voluntary inspection
program, it was directing that the Secretary of Agriculture "shall at
all times provide sufficient inspectors and employ such procedures
as will not slow down processing operations in the plants being
inspected. ' s"" The conference report reiterated this interpreta-
tion. 3 This injunction should, however, be interpreted to mean
both that processing operations were not to be slowed down for
lack of inspectors and that Congress itself was signaling its com-
mitment to fund inspections at the appropriate levels-not that
Congress intended to deprive the USDA of the power to reduce
500. Bruce Ingersoll & Jeffrey H. Birnbaum, Agriculture Secretary Espy Resigns Under
Pressure from the White House, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1994, at A3.
501. State Panel Examines Hazards Facing Workers in Food Processing Industry, supra
note 432, at 2169 (quoting testimony of Keith R. Mestrich, Director of Special Services,
AFL-CIO Food and Allied Service Trades, before New York State Assembly).
502. H.R. REP. No. 465, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957).
503. H.R. REP. No. 1170, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1957).
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line-speeds for any reason. Indeed, the FSIS's own regulations
prescribe that "[a]ll eviscerating of poultry and further processing
shall be done with reasonable speed, considering the official
establishment's facilities."504
During the 1980s, the period when the USDA was most inten-
sively concerned with maximizing rates of throughput, the agency,
like all other federal agencies, was subject to President Reagan's
Executive Order 12,291 of February 17, 1981, which was designed,
inter alia, "to reduce the burdens of existing and future regula-
tions."' ' In pursuance of the Reagan administration's deregulatory
program, the Executive Order required that,
In promulgating new regulations, reviewing existing
regulations, and developing legislative proposals concerning
regulation, all agencies ... shall adhere to the following
requirements:
(b) Regulatory action shall not be taken unless the
potential benefits to society for the regulation outweigh the
potential costs to society;
(c) Regulatory objectives shall be chosen to maximize
the net benefits to society;
(d) Among alternative approaches to any given regula-
tory objective, the alternative involving the least net cost to
society shall be chosen; and
(e) Agencies shall set regulatory priorities with the aim
of maximizing the aggregate net benefits to society, taking
into account the condition of the particular industries affect-
ed by regulations, the condition of the national econo-
my ....506
That even market-knows-besters intended the scope of the
Executive Order's mandatory cost-benefit analysis to encompass
costs and benefits to affected workers was made unambiguously,
albeit maliciously, clear by a remarkable step taken by the Office
of Management and Budget (0MB) during the Bush administration.
The Acting Administrator and Deputy Administrator, Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs, wrote a letter to the DOL in
1992, informing it that a proposed OSHA air contaminants standard
504. Schedule of Operations, 9 C.F.R. § 381.37(a) (1994).
505. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1989).
506. Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 128 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1989).
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rule that OMB had recently received was not ripe for review under
Executive Order 12,291." OSHA's regulatory impact analysis
was deficient because it "omit[ted] consideration of the rule's com-
pliance costs on workers. The analysis [was] limited to a descrip-
tion of the effects of compliance on firms' sales and profits.""5 8
In this particular case, OMB was seeking to make the extraordinary
claim that OSHA had failed to take into account that the absence
of health and safety measures makes it possible for employers to
pay workers higher wages, which in turn enable the latter to live
longer (if they are not killed at work). However, the interpretive
principle entailed that what is regulatory sauce for the OSHA
goose is regulatory sauce for the USDA gander."°
At the end of the Bush administration, the Director of OMB,
Richard Darman, hardened the point by issuing guidelines that
agencies were required to follow in providing estimates to OMB in
compliance with Executive Order 12,291. In defining the scope of
"[s]ocial benefits and costs," Darman emphasized that they
can differ from private benefits and costs as measured in
the marketplace because of imperfections arising from:
(i) External economies or diseconomies where actions
by one party impose benefits or costs on other groups that
are not compensated in the marketplace;
(ii) Monopoly power that distorts the relationship be-
tween marginal costs and market prices....
Both intangible and tangible benefits and costs should
be recognized."
Significantly, even the anti-regulatory Risk Assessment and Cost-
Benefit Act of 1995, proposed by the market-knows-best 104th
Congress, expressly defined "costs" to include "the direct and indi-
rect costs to ... wage earners. 51'
The USDA line-speed regulations impose precisely the kind of
social costs on chicken processing workers in the form of an in-
creased incidence of injuries, that the Executive Order and OMB
507. Letter from OMB to Lab. Dep't Suspending Review of OSHA's Proposed Standard
on Air Contaminants [Dated March 10, 1995], 21 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
REP. 1408, 1408-1410 (1992).
508. Id.
509. Id. at 1408-10.
510. Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs; Guidelines and Discounts, 57 Fed. Reg.
53,519, 53,521 (1992).
511. H.R. 1022, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(l) (1995).
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guidelines require regulators to take into account. These external
diseconomies, including the "pain and suffering due to... work-
related musculoskeletal disorders of the lower back, upper
extremity and lower extremity,"' are frequently or perhaps even
typically not captured or recorded by the marketplace. These costs
are not reflected in wages or passed onto consumers because the
poultry oligopolies, which are simultaneously labor market labor
oligopsonists confronting a seemingly inexhaustible rural reservoir
of atomized unskilled workers with few alternatives, are well-posi-
tioned to extract labor without having to indemnify their employees
for impairments of the value of their labor power. As the United
States International Trade Commission's chief analyst of the
poultry industry observed, firms have in large part been able to
sustain their competitiveness by means of locating their plants in
low-wage southern "one-horse towns." 3
Although an agency's failure to conduct a proper cost-benefit
analysis may not in itself be privately actionable,"4 the systemi-
cally and blatantly discriminatory manner in which the USDA
regulated line-speed is so arbitrary and capricious that it under-
mines the validity of the FSIS regulations under the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA)."' Moreover, if broiler firms have standing
under the APA to sue the Federal Labor Relations Council for
failing to consider the increased overtime costs to them in its deci-
sion that shift starting times are subject to negotiation between the
USDA and the inspectors' union,1 6 then surely chicken process-
ing workers have standing to challenge the USDA's line-speed
regulations.
512. Ergonomics Protection Standard, 59 Fed. Reg. 57,141 (1994) (asserting that imple-
menting an Ergonomic Protection Standard would result in fewer of these disorders).
513. Telephone Interview with Douglas Newman, Animal and Forest Products Branch,
U.S. International Trade Commission (Jan. 27, 1995).
514. Executive Order 12,291 "is intended only to improve the internal management of
the Federal government, and is not intended to create any right or benefit. . . enforce-
able at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers or any other
person." Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(1994).
515. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994).
516. See National Broiler Council, Inc. v. Federal Lab. Relations Council, 382 F. Supp.
322 (E.D. Va. 1974).
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X. OSHA's BELATED AND FECKLESS EFFORTS TO REGULATE LINE-
SPEEDS
"It is true that we do not know for every tissue, for every
human being, under what circumstances that tissue is going
to blow out .... But that doesn't mean we don't know
enough to take some sort of a performance-based approach
to reducing exposure to those things that we know increase
your risk of musculoskeletal disorders."'517
It is now clear how and with what disastrous consequences the
USDA has come to regulate line-speeds for human beings in the chick-
en processing industry. The question still remains, however, as to
why OSHA has not also intervened into this crucial determinant of
workplace health and safety, which would seem singularly to be-
long to its jurisdiction. In a very few instances, OSHA has sought
to regulate line-speed by issuing citations"8 to employers for vio-
lations of the so-called general duty clause of the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, which provides that "[e]ach employer shall
furnish to each of his employees employment and a place of em-
ployment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his em-
ployees." '519 Thus far, the Secretary of Labor has failed to secure
any adjudicator's authority for an order to slow down production
lines as a means of abating a hazard.
In a rare, if not unique, case involving agricultural employ-
ment, for example, OSHA inspected a California spinach farm in
1988, and cited the owner for requiring workers to pull weeds by
hand. Evidence showed that working from a bent position exerts
extraordinary pressure on the lumbar discs, which can eventually
cause disc degeneration and arthritis. More interesting than the
basis for the decision dismissing the citation was the road not
taken by OSHA. The administrative law judge (ALJ) found that the
use of a long-handled hoe was not a feasible means of abatement
because the DOL had failed to show that its use would materially
reduce stooped work, which would continue to be required for
517. Novack, supra note 425, at 220 (quoting Barbara Silverstein, OSHA ergonomist in
charge of writing ergonomics standards).
518. 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1988) (providing the statutory authority to OSHA to issue
citations).
519. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1988).
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removing the weeds from the field by hand. As one of the DOL's
witnesses had testified, however, weeds could also be removed
after the harvest as the crop is transported on a conveyor belt in
the field or cannery. Testifying for the farmer, a field manager em-
ployed by the company for which the farmer grew the spinach
testified that because "the product moves so quickly, 20 to 30
miles per hour on the harvesting conveyor and 20 tons per hour in
the processing plant... it is virtually impossible to remove any
significant amounts of weeds."'52 Although it may well be impos-
sible to weed objects hurtling by at those speeds, the DOL appar-
ently did not even suggest that the line-speed be reduced to a level
at which weeding would have been feasible. That this particular
method of abatement might have increased costs somewhat-some
or all of which may be passed on to consumers-would not invali-
date it, if it is calculated to abate the potentially crippling injuries
caused by stoop labor.52'
If insufficient familiarity with ergonomic issues explains the
inadequate handling of this farm worker case,522 other obstacles
emerged in a case involving citations for ergonomic hazards
brought against Perdue Farms by the North Carolina agency, to
which OSHA devolved its powers.5z While the fines that the
agency had imposed against the company were under review by
the state review board, workers at the plants intervened5 24 and re-
quested interim relief in the form of a reduction in line-speeds.
The A.J and the North Carolina Safety and Health Review Board
both ultimately ruled that they lacked a legal basis to order an
interim reduction in line-speed until a court determined that the
company was violating work safety standards."as This outcome,
520. John Gill Ranch, OSHRC Docket No. 88-2679, 1989 OSAHRC LEXIS 193, at *5-
6 (Oct. 24, 1989).
521. Six years later, in its unofficial and then abandoned draft ergonomics standard,
OSHA still failed to address the issue of hand-weeding, merely prohibiting the use of any
tool with a handle less than four inches long where the employer has reduced employee
exposure to workplace risk factors to the lowest feasible level, which nevertheless remains
above a checklist score of five. OSHA's Draft Ergonomics Standard, DAILY LAB. REP.,
Mar. 13, 1995, at § (f)(vii), available in LEXIS, Labor Library, Daily Labor Report File.
522. Telephone Interview with Ann Glenn, Solicitor's Office, Dep't of Lab., Philadelphia
(Jan. 23, 1995).
523. See 29 U.S.C. § 667 (1988).
524. In order to participate in proceedings before the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission (OSHRC), affected workers must file a notice that "the period of
time fixed in the citation for the abatement of the violation is unreasonable." 29 U.S.C. §
659(c) (1988).
525. Judge Rejects Workers' Request for Slower Lines at Perdue, UPI, Mar. 16, 1990,
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foreshadowing the legal strategy that employers would soon pursue,
was at least in part generated by the plaintiffs' inability to specify
a line-speed at which the ergonomic hazards would be abated."2
Although NIOSH, based on its health hazard evaluation of the
Perdue plants at Lewiston and Robersonville, recommended slowing
down the main conveyor to reduce highly repetitive movements, or
"diverging conveyors off the main one so that tasks can be per-
formed at slower rates," 27 the final settlement of the case did not
involve such measures." 8 Nevertheless, the initial costliness of
resolution of the matter induced Perdue to break ranks with the
other chicken oligopolists and to embark upon an ergonomic pro-
gram. Under the "Ergonomic Agreement," into which Perdue en-
tered with the North Carolina Commissioner of Labor in 1991, the
company was obligated within thirty days
to adopt a comprehensive policy . . .concerning ergonom-
ics and to provide each employee with a statement from
top management setting forth such policy and commitment
to ergonomically sound work environment and practices
including ... [a]n expressed and implemented policy
which places safety and health at a level of importance
equal to that of production and which requires management
to integrate production processes with safety and health
"5129protection....
Within 180 days, Perdue became obligated to "institute feasible
engineering controls in an effort to make the job fit the person."
The company agreed "to explore ... engineering solutions" such
as automated processes "to eliminate excessive exertion and awk-
ward postures and to reduce repetitive motion." Perdue also agreed
to investigate "feasible" administrative controls designed "to reduce
the duration, frequency and severity of exposures to ergonomics
stressors." The North Carolina OSHA entrusted to Perdue's discre-
tion the choice of such controls including rest pauses, increasing
the number of workers assigned to a task, job rotation, and job
available in LEXIS, News Library, UPI File.
526. Telephone Interview with David Wylie, Attorney for Perdue Farms (Jan. 26, 1995).
527. NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16, at 18.
528. See Michael Bums, Perdue Settles N.C. Injury Case: Motion Disorders Will Be
Monitored, BALT. SUN, Feb. 8, 1991, at 1lC.
529. Brooks v. Perdue Farms, Inc., OSHANC No. 89-1659, slip op. at 2 (Safety and
Health Review Board of North Carolina, 1991) (setting forth Ergonomic Agreement be-
tween the parties).
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"enlargement.""53 Despite outsiders' positive comments about the
program, Perdue workers still insist that "the most effective way to
reduce repetitive motion injuries would be to slow down the lines
or add more people.""53
Perdue has not only become the industry's ergonomic leader,
but also supports issuance of some kind of ergonomic standard.
The firm's safety and health director has stated that Perdue has
been able to finance the costs of the program through reduced
costs incurred in workers' compensation claims, which amounted to
70%;532 reduced turnover and enhanced productivity of healthier
employees represent additional savings. The director believes that
other firms have failed to join the ergonomics movement because
they have been misadvised by short-sighted production-oriented
managers to seek to extract the most from their employees for the
least. Perdue advocates an ergonomic standard because it wants its
competitors to be required to undertake the same expensive chang-
es that it has. Why Perdue would want them to introduce reforms
that will soon enough increase their profitability is, to be sure,
puzzling5 3
3
One reason why firms may not be impelled to reduce their
workers' compensation costs is that they may have intimidated
workers, perhaps unaware of their rights in nonunion plants, so that
their fear of reprisal and loss of income induces them not to file or
pursue claims.534 Far from striving to eliminate the conditions that
cause repetitive trauma syndrome, some firms appear to focus on
frustrating employees' efforts even to secure workers' compensation
benefits for injuries already sustained. Thus, Bo Pilgrim, the owner
of Pilgrim's Pride, the fifth largest poultry processor in the United
States, who complains that "[w]orkers' comp eats up half of our
company's profits,' 5 35 was more partial to non-workplace-related
530. Id. at 6-8.
531. Martha Quillin, Coping with Pain, GREENSBORO NEws & OBSERVER, Sept. 26,
1993, at Bus..
532. Official Attributes Decreased Costs at Perdue Plants to Ergonomics Program, 23
OCcUPATiONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1426, 1426 (1994) (statement by Angela Wal-
doff, Assistant Deputy Commissioner, Occupational Safety and Health Administration,
North Carolina).
533. Telephone Interview with Deborah Berkowitz, Director of Health and Safety De-
partment, United Food and Commercial Workers (Jan. 1995); Telephone Interview with
Jim McCauley, Health and Safety Director, Perdue Farms (Jan. 27, 1995).
534. Joe Fahy, All Pain, No Gain, 17 S. EXPOSURE 35, 37 (1989).
535. Gary Cartwright, The Baron of Texas Agriculture: Bo Pilgrim, TEX. MONTHLY,
Sept. 1994, at 161, 161.
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methods of lowering such costs. On the one hand, he brazenly
handed out $10,000 checks on the floor of the Texas Senate to
induce (successfully) members to vote in favor of a pro-employer
reform of the state workers' compensation system; on the other
hand, his company has been charged with intimidating employees
into not filing compensation claims.536 In 1994, Don Tyson could
boast that his workers' compensation costs in Arkansas, his firm's
principal location, are only one-third of the level elsewhere, 37 in
part because his state legislature had just rewritten its workers'
compensation statute to favor employers. Two changes in particular
helped reduce costs for chicken processing firms. Under a new
rule, compensation is denied to any worker who fails to establish
that work was the "major cause" of her repetitive motion disabili-
ty.538 Thus, a poultry processing worker who is an "avid fisher-
man or gardener" may be unable to satisfy the statutory require-
ment of proof. 39 Perhaps even more beneficial to Tyson and oth-
er broiler oligopolists in Arkansas is that the amended law excludes
complaints of pain from repetitive trauma disorders from being
considered in evaluating the extent of workers' impairment."4
Punishment of workers who complain about work-related inju-
ries also has been rife at Tyson and Perdue where preventive medi-
cine and rehabilitation have consisted of daily dispensing of ban-
dages, Bengay, and aspirin by company nurses.5 4' Whereas the
profit-driven need to avoid the adverse impact on meat quality
associated with stresses on chickens induces firms to implement
elaborate engineering and behavioral controls to calm the
birds-such as having "[c]aretakers ... announce their arrival by
gently knocking on the door or whistling before entering the broil-
536. Id.; see also Carol Countryman, Bo Pilgrim's Hands, TEX. OBSERVER, Aug. 5,
1994, at 6, 6.
537. Mark Lee, Oklahoma Officials Eye New Tyson Plant, TULSA WORLD, June 19,
1994, at Bl.
538. ARK. CODE ANN. § 11-9-102(5)(E)(ii) (Michie Supp. 1993).
539. John Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum
Swing Too Far?, 47 ARK. L. REV. 1, 14 (1994).
540. See ARK. CODE ANN., § 11-9-102(16) (Michie Supp. 1993) (establishing that pain
is not an objectively determinable indicator of compensable injury).
541. Alberty v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 92-7047, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 34723, at *2
(10th Cir. Dec. 30, 1992); Behar, supra note 160, at 54; Judy Mann, Hard Times at
Perdue's Plant, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1989, at B3; see also Brantley v. Tyson Foods,
Inc., 887 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Ark. Ct. App. 1994) (describing Tyson's therapy program for
employees experiencing pain).
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er house" 42-- ibuprofen is Perdue's intervention of choice for
"new hires" during their probationary period. 43
Despite this tradition of malignant neglect, the National Broiler
Council, the companies' advocacy association, touchingly asserts
that firms "are not going to abuse employees because they need
them. They're part of the family."5' That "family" at Tyson,
which boasts of having spent "literally thousands of dollars to
improve working conditions," apparently includes more and less
privileged members. Because the company purports not to be able
to afford to let all 43,000 employees participate in the ten hour
ergonomics education program reserved for managers, the workers
learn about it through an "osmotic approach ... one bite at a
time." 45 The paternalistic contempt that oozes from such an ap-
proach illustrates how unbridgeably wide the gap is between cur-
rent employer health and safety practices and even the beginnings
of a democratization process in which workers at the very least
have a say in determining their working conditions.
OSHA's most prominent attempt to lower line-speed, however,
was directed at the now defunct Downingtown, Pennsylvania cook-
ie factory of Pepperidge Farm, a subsidiary of the huge food pro-
ducer, Campbell Soup Corporation. Some of the women at the
plant slapped the tops onto the bottoms of cookies as they came
out of the oven and along a conveyor belt at 1,500 per minute;5"
others picked up the finished cookies and put them into little paper
cups. Among these cappers and cuppers, "an epidemic of carpal
tunnel syndrome" raged: of the sixty-nine who suffered cumulative
trauma disorders, thirty-three required surgery. The incidence of
carpal tunnel syndrome, 7% of full-time cookie-line workers, was
forty-one times higher than among the general population. Despite
the relatively high wages, the working conditions bore a certain
resemblance to those prevailing in the broiler plants. The $11 per
hour wage level exceeded the average in the locality for unskilled
work because the workers felt "'the work was so bad high pay was
542. BRANT ET AL., supra note 23, at 30.
543. NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16, at 17.
544. Fullerton, supra note 23, at 8A (quoting Dr. Ken May, former head of Holly
Farms' chicken division and consultant to the National Broiler Council).
545. Programs to Curb Injuries, supra note 455, at 1716 (quoting Travis Arterbury,
Ergonomics Consultant to Tyson Foods, Inc.).
546. BJ. Phillips, The Judge Rules, The Pain Persists, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 2, 1993,
at B1.
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the only way they could get anybody to do it."' 547 Most of the
women on the production line were single parents, who worked the
night owl shift in order to be at home when their children go to
school in the morning and when they return in the afternoon."l
"Among working women who cannot afford to hire illegal aliens
as nannies, this is called child care. It's paid for with numbing
work at awful hours on little sleep." '49 Interestingly, the Universi-
ty of Arkansas Cooperative Extension Service includes, among the
characteristics of the representative modem broiler processing plant,
two shifts operating from 10 p.m. to 7 a.m. and 7 a.m. to 4 p.m.,
allowing "working mothers to be home when school children are
home."55
0
Pepperidge Farm' illustrates how defendant-employers' use
of the multiple possibilities of due process can delay state interven-
tion so inordinately that the original cohort of workers exposed to
the hazard may long since have left the place of employment. In
this case, seven years after the first worker complaint about carpal
tunnel syndrome triggered an OSHA investigation in 1988,"52 the
OSHRC still has not reviewed the AL's decision handed down
after the longest trial in the history of OSHA. Whichever side loses
will definitely appeal the Review Commission's ruling to the cir-
cuit court of appeal. Since the case is one of first impression with
vast implications for much of U.S. industry, the losing party in that
appeal may well request the U.S. Supreme Court to grant review
of the case. In that event, a decade or more may have elapsed
until final legal disposition of the issue. If OSHA were then the
prevailing party, still more time would pass before ultimate imple-
mentation of OSHA's abatement order.
The nub of the AL's decision was that the DOL had failed to
demonstrate that a reduction in line-speed was a feasible means of
abating the hazard of carpal tunnel syndrome and other repetitive
trauma disorders. The ALJ ruled that OSHA had carried its burden
of showing the other three elements of a general duty clause
case-that (1) Pepperidge had failed to free the workplace of a
547. Id. (quoting Irene Anderson, a former Pepperidge Farm worker).
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. WESTERLuND, supra note 63, at 4.
551. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., OSHRC No. 89-0265, OSAHRC LEXIS 220 (Mar. 25,
1993).
552. Id. at *1.
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hazard; (2) the hazard was recognized by the employer or the
industry; and (3) that the hazard was causing or likely to cause
serious physical harm 5 3 The fourth element, feasibility, though
not stated expressly by Congress, was first enunciated by the D.C.
Circuit of Appeals soon after the statute had gone into effect. 54
Judge Skelly Wright derived the feasibility standard from the no-
tion that Congress intended to require employers to eliminate only
preventable hazards."' 5 In the context of preventing misconduct by
employees, the court characterized unpreventable conduct as that
which would require methods "so expensive that safety experts
would substantially concur in thinking the methods infeasible."556
The OSHRC then adopted the feasibility element,5 7 which was
merely used by the D.C. Circuit to clarify the meaning of the
statutory phrase, "free from ... hazards," but the DOL has never
contested its use.5 8
The ALJ was impressed that Barbara Silverstein, one of the
government's chief expert witnesses and a "renowned epidemiolo-
gist"--who, as Special Assistant for Ergonomic Programs in
OSHA, later became the official responsible for writing an ergo-
nomics standard under the Clinton administration--could not quan-
tify the amount of repetition that would cause carpal tunnel syn-
drome or the threshold below which the disease would not occur.
Apparently, the ALJ was distinctly less impressed by Silverstein's
testimony that the incidence of carpal syndrome among the workers
on the cookie line was forty-one times greater than that among
women in the general population.5 9 More significant, in the
ALJ's view, was that "not one expert could testify at what speed
the problem would be abated nor how many employees would
have to be added to a line in order to abate or materially reduce
the hazard."Sw
553. Id. at *449-50.
554. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
555. Id. at 1266.
556. Id.
557. See, e.g., John Gill Ranch, OSHRC No. 88-2679, 1989 OSAHRC LEXIS 193, at
*5-6 (Oct. 24, 1989) (requiring proof that a workplace hazard can be avoided by feasible
means).
558. OccUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAw 116-17 (Stephen Bokat & Horace
Thompson, eds., 1988).
559. Pepperidge Farm, Inc., OSHRC No. 89-0265 at *417, *422.
560. Id. at *450.
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The ALJ held, without being able to cite any supporting prece-
dent, that, "[t]o force an employer to experiment in order to bring
about abatement requires a standard. Under 5(a)(1) [the general
duty clause], an employer cannot be forced to experiment." 6 Not
wholly obtuse to the irony of the employer's intensive use of due
process to delay implementation of any abatement, the AD recog-
nized "of course that the very employers who are bitterly attacking
5(a)(1) and are arguing for the promulgation of a standard are the
very industries that will come in and fight the creation of the stan-
dard and promulgation thereof, to the utmost. At least that has
been the usual course." '562 Again, ironically, the ALJ faulted the
DOL's proposal to rotate workers between more and less stressful
jobs for overlooking that "there do not appear to be sufficient jobs
with less stress."563 Similarly, with regard to increasing the num-
ber of workers on the cookie line, the AD stated, "[i]f the Sec-
retary could prove to my satisfaction that certain jobs took a defi-
nite number of movements and that a definite increase in workers
was economically feasible, and physically feasible, then ... the
Secretary may have met her burden." But in the absence of proof
on these points, all the ALJ could offer the Secretary of Labor was
advice to issue a standard, under which she could order the em-
ployer to experiment without having "to prove definitively and
exactly what the feasible means of abatement had to be."5' The
ALJ also characterized as "purely speculative" the DOL's argument
that employees could be questioned as to their level of discomfort
at reduced line-speeds: "I agree with the Secretary of Labor that a
more compassionate employer would have experimented along the
lines the Secretary discusses, but I also find that a standard could
force a less compassionate employer such as this to experi-
ment.""'
As a federal appeals court promptly glossed the AL's decision,
the case does not prohibit OSHA from seeking to enforce ergo-
nomics under the general duty clause; rather, it merely held that
OSHA had failed to provide sufficient evidence of the feasibility of
abatement." Soon thereafter, however, another Aid granted
561. Id. at *451.
562. Id. at *453-54.
563. Id. at *456.
564. Id. at *456-57.
565. Id. at *455.
566. In re the Establishment Inspection of the Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 13 F.3d 1160,
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(without opinion) a motion for partial summary judgment that
OSHA lacked the authority to use the general duty clause to pro-
tect workers from ergonomic hazards.567 Perhaps more trenchant
than any learned jurisprudential critique of the AL's decision was
the reaction by one of the affected workers: "He seemed to say we
had (the injuries), but that there was no means to prevent
them.... Well, they could've slowed down the lines or hired
more girls. But that costs money, so that's not a means."
568
In his petition appealing the ALJ's decision to the OSHRC,
Secretary of Labor Reich argued that DOL had the power, under
the general duty clause and even without having promulgated spe-
cific ergonomic standards, to issue citations to employers who
failed to implement proposed feasible abatement measures to reduce
ergonomic hazards. 69 If the ALJ's ruling, that the DOL had to
prove the extent to which the measures would be successful, was
upheld, he stated, the agency's efforts to combat ergonomic hazards
would face "an insurmountable barrier."'57 Reich asserted that typ-
ically tribunals have permitted OSHA to meet the feasibility re-
quirement by showing that health and safety experts familiar with
the particular industry recognize the proposed abatement measure as
feasible.57' No adjudicator, on the other hand, has ever held
OSHA to the much higher standard of demonstrating precisely how
many injuries would be prevented by a proposed abatement meth-
od.5
Even where OSHA is subjectively willed to achieve its statuto-
ry objectives, it is severely hampered by the realities of work in a
non-union plant managed in a manner hostile to unions. " Secur-
ing workers' cooperation is often difficult when they justifiably
fear discrimination and retaliation for filing complaints,574 espe-
1167 n3 (7th Cir. 1994).
567. Secretary of Lab. v. Dayton Tire, OSHRC No. 93-3327, 1995 OSAHRC LEXIS
(Jan. 5, 1995).
568. Phillips, supra note 546, at B1.
569. Labor Department Appeals ALl Decision Dismissing 175 Violations at Pepperidge
Farm, DAILY LAB. REP., Sept. 13, 1993, at d16.
570. Id.
571. Id
572. lId
573. See Cromer, supra note 23, at 18-23 (discussing attempt by Cargill workers to
unionize); Ken Lawrence & Anne Braden, The Long Struggle, S. ExposuRE, Nov.-Dec.
1983, at 85.
574. Industry Attorney Cites Risks, Burdens; Union Official Says Law As Is Does Not
Work, 21 OCCUPATIoNAL SAFmY & HEALTH REP. 1088, 1088 (1992) (according to
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cially since the National Labor Relations Board began undermining
the protections that the National Labor Relations Act affords indi-
vidual nonunion workers protesting working conditions that are
governed by other statutes.' Although the Occupational Safety
and Health Act prohibits such discrimination,76 years of blacklist-
ing and unemployment might elapse before the Secretary of Labor,
shielded by a grant of prosecutorial discretion, succeeds in persuad-
ing a series of federal courts to vindicate a worker's right to com-
plain in the form of reinstatement with back pay.
In many instances where firms have settled with OSHA rather
than risk expensive litigation contesting citations for violations,"
OSHA has diluted the agreed-upon ergonomics plan by permitting
firmns to begin with job rotation instead of proceeding to the more
effective measure of engineering controls that directly restructure
the work itself. Instead of providing a rest for workers' hands, job
rotation may actually lead to a greater incidence of cumulative
trauma disorders in poultry plants in which all jobs are similar and
require 10,000 to 20,000 cuts per day.578
Federal OSHA has, for example, entered into settlement agree-
ments with other poultry processors similar to that in the Perdue
case. Based on the aforementioned Health Hazard Evaluation car-
ried out at Cargill's plant in Buena Vista, Georgia, OSHA in 1991
fined the firm $400,000 and required it to "acknowledge that cu-
mulative trauma disorders ... are an occupational illness in the
poultry processing industry .... ,,5.. The agreement was notable
Deborah Berkowitz, Director, United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW)).
575. Meyers Industries, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493 (1984).
576. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1988).
577. See Roger Freeman, Standards Are Largely Undefined for Repetitive-Motion Inju-
ries, NAT'L LJ., July 29, 1991, at 28, 28 (expressing that uncertainty regarding the extent
of OSHA's authority to impose fines and abatement measures has led employers to settle
with OSHA, usually agreeing to undergo ergonomic assessments, to provide CTD training
to employees, and to develop medical management programs).
578. ConAgra to Pay $425,000, Implement Program at 21 Facilities Under Settlement
with OSHA, 21 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 1208, 1208 (Feb. 5, 1992); C. Stuart-Buttle, A Dis-
comfort Study in a Poultry Processing Plant, APPLIED ERGONOMICS, Feb. 1994, at 47;
UFCW Calls for 'Concerted Effort' by OSHA to Train Inspectors to Recognize
'Gimmicks', DAILY LAB. REP., July 15, 1991, at A-3.
579. Secretary of Lab. v. Cargill, Inc., OSHRC No. 89-3426 & No. 90-1257 (citing
Cargill, Inc. Ergonomic and Recordkeeping Agreement I, at 1); see also OSHA Proposes
$242,000 in Penalties Against Cargill Inc.'s Buena Vista, Ga. Poultry Processing Plant,
PR Newswire, Oct. 23, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (describing
OSHA's response to Cargill's alleged violations of safety and health standards); Secretary
of Lab. v. Marshall Durbin Cos., OSHRC Docket No. 94-1195 (Occupational Safety and
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for the candor with which it faced the proposed solutions of job
rotation and job "enlargement": "Caution shall be used in deciding
which jobs are used because different jobs may appear to have
different stressors, but actually pose the same physical demands as
the previous job.""58 In other words, assigning workers seriatim to
a number of body-numbing and mind-rotting operations rather than
just to one may not contribute to alleviation of any ergonomic
problems. A model of rotational variety in this industry is illustrat-
ed by the strategy of the strong union of schochtim, the Jewish
ritual slaughterers in New York City in the 1930s. Finishing their
work at noon, and thus having
much time on their hands ... they in turn joined up with
Jewish hospitals for the purpose of performing a Jewish
rite on males. They had such luck in forming their
schochtem union for killing chickens that they formed a
union known as mohels [circumcisers]. [T]hey were finally
invited to become a local of the International Association
of Meat Cutters.58'
In 1991, while Pepperidge Farm was pending, a coalition of
thirty-one labor unions led by the United Food and Commercial
Workers, which organizes poultry processing workers, petitioned
the Secretary of Labor to issue an emergency temporary standard
on ergonomic hazards to protect workers from cumulative trauma
disorders.582 Although the Secretary of Labor has statutory author-
ity to issue such regulations "if he determines (A) that employees
are exposed to grave danger from ... new hazards, and (B) that
such emergency standard is necessary to protect employees from
such danger," '583 Secretary of Labor Martin denied the petition on
the ground that the epidemic of crippling cumulative trauma disor-
ders did not meet OSHA's traditional guideline that "'only condi-
tions that pose life-threatening, incurable, or fatal injury or
Health Review Commission, Jan. 9, 1995).
580. Martin v. Cargill, Inc., OSHRC Docket No. 89-3426 I & HIi (Occupational Safe-
ty and Health Review Commission, July 23, 1991).
581. Investigation of Concentration of Economic Power: Hearings Before the Temporary
National Economic Committee, Part 7: Milk Industry-Poultry Industry, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2870 (1939).
582. Unions Petition OSHA for Emergency Rule to Prevent Cumulative Trauma Disor-
ders, DAILY LAB. REP., Aug. 1, 1991, at A4.
583. 29 U.S.C. § 655(c)(1) (1988).
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illnesses'-such as cancer or irreversible kidney damage-'are
grave dangers warranting'" an emergency temporary standard.8 4
After placing the item on its semi-annual regulatory agenda in
1991,"' the DOL in August 1992 finally published an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking requesting comments and informa-
tion. Spurred by United States Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)
data showing that repetitive trauma disorders had tripled during the
previous eight years, the DOL announced that it was "considering"
a standard to address ergonomic hazards. Whereas in 1981 and
1984, repetitive trauma disorders accounted for 18% and 28%,
respectively, of all recordable occupational illnesses reported to
OSHA, by 1989 the 147,000 new cases represented 52% of the
total. Studies of individual industries conducted by NIOSH suggest
that the BLS data are underestimates. NIOSH found the following
high incidence rates of ergonomic disorders: 50% among super-
market cashiers; 41% for meatpackers; 30% for specialty glass
workers; and 20% among poultry workers.586 Especially pertinent
is OSHA's recognition that "[m]ost ergonomic hazards and related
disorders . . . appear to be due to changes in production processes
and technologies, resulting in more specialized tasks with increased
repetitions and higher assembly line speeds. In many cases these
changes have not concomitantly included integration of ergonomic
technologies." '587 The absence of a standard means that employers
are in the first instance effectively free to inflict pace-based repeti-
tive trauma injuries on their employees. Only after the fact, then, is
OSHA even theoretically in a position to cite employers for violat-
ing the general duty clause-until now, to be sure, without success.
Progress toward state intervention may be blocked for the time
being by the advent of a Republican majority in the 104th Con-
gress. Senator Nancy Kassebaum, the Chair of the Senate Labor
and Human Resources Committee, unabashedly promoting a pro-
business agenda, stated unequivocally that she would oppose any
effort by OSHA to promulgate an ergonomics standard because the
financial imposition on employers would be too great. 88 Never-
584. Secretary of Labor Denies Petition from Unions for Emergency Temporary Stand-
ard, 21 OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH REP. 1529, 1529 (1992) (quoting Lynn Mar-
tin, Secretary of Lab.).
585. See Ergonomic Safety and Health Standards, 56 Fed. Reg. 53,592 (1991) (detailing
the semi-annual agenda of regulations selected for review or development).
586. Ergonomic Safety and Health Management, 57 Fed. Reg. 34,192, 34,193 (1992).
587. Id. at 34,192 (emphasis added).
588. Court Gifford, Labor Law: Sen. Kassebaum: A Moderator Reformer Charts New
[Vol. 46:33
I GAVE MY EMPLOYER A CHICKEN THAT HAD NO BONE
theless, the DOL, noting that by 1991 the number of reported
repetitive trauma disorders had risen to 224,000 cases, accounting
for 60% of all new workplace illnesses, continued to include an
Ergonomic Protection Standard on its semi-annual regulatory agen-
da, even after the Democratic party had lost its congressional ma-
jority.589 When Silverstein, the OSHA official, stated that the
agency would issue a proposal after a congressionally imposed
moratorium expired, the House of Representatives, eager to "force
OSHA to cease its activities on the promulgation of an ergonomics
standard that is paternalistic in concept,"'  voted to punish the
agency by allowing more of its current fiscal year budget to be
subject to rescission.59' In response, apparently, OSHA released
an unofficial draft standard, not for citation or quotation," which
was "far less demanding on employers" than a previous outline.593
Ultimately, the Clinton administration, bowing to pressure from
Congress and powerful business groups like the National Federation
of Independent Business and National Association of Manufactur-
ers, decided that it "will not spend scarce political capital on the
OSHA rules."594 If, in the absence of an ergonomics standard, the
OSHRC and the courts uphold the ALJ's ruling in Pepperidge
Farm that OSHA must prove that slower line-speeds will reduce
the incidence of repetitive trauma syndrome rather than impose
experiments on employers, then poultry plant workers may be left
without legal protection against further overreaching by employers
in collusion with the USDA.
Increasing line-speed may not be the only factor that increases
the number of repetitions performed by workers, but it has a three-
fold crucial impact on the incidence of cumulative trauma disorder.
The faster pace "almost inevitably" creates more repetitions. 95
Speed can also affect muscular tension in two ways. The more
rapid motions associated with higher speed can require greater
Course for Labor Committee, DAILY LAB. REP., Jan. 10, 1995, at 6; Frank Swoboda,
Kassebaum Hits Labor Initiatives, WASH. PosT, Dec. 1, 1994, at A36.
589. Ergonomic Protection Standard, 59 Fed. Reg. 57,141 (1994).
590. 141 CONG. REc. H-3250 (daily ed. Mar. 15, 1995) (statement of Rep. DeLay).
591. Id. at H-3254-55.
592. OSHA, Draft: Proposed Ergonomic Protection Standard, 24 O.S.H. Rep. (BNA) 42
(Mar. 22, 1995).
593. Labor Dept. Relents on Repetitive Strain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1995, at D19.
594. Steve Lohr, Administration Balks at New Job Standards on Repetitive Strain, N.Y.
TIMES, June 12, 1995, at Dl.
595. Willis Goldsmith, Workplace Ergonomics: A Safety and Health Issue for the '90s,
15 EMPLOYEE REL. LJ. 291, 291 (1989).
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accelerations and decelerations, thus producing larger peaks of
muscular activity. Also, increased pace can contribute to the "rest-
ing level of muscular tension" and thus to "higher overall levels of
muscular activity. 596 In one study, a 10% increase in speed pro-
duced a 38% increase in the worker's pinch force; a 17% increase
almost doubled it." The fact that ruthlessly fast disassembly
lines undermine workers' mental and physical health and safety in
ways also unrelated to repetitive stress disorders explains why
groups such as Poultry Workers in Action have demanded slower
line-speeds as a central element of their struggle against exploita-
tion. 98
Although the complexities of the interaction of the various
factors that bring about the onset of repetitive trauma syndrome in
an individual worker may render it impossible to quantify precisely
the threshold of repetitions below which no worker will be injured,
ergonomists can state emphatically that fewer rather than more
repetitions, less rather than more forceful motions, and less rather
than more uncomfortable postures will reduce the incidence of
cumulative trauma disorders. The AL's decision in Pepperidge
Farm, penalizing the DOL and affected workers for the agency's
failure to issue a standard, neglected the fact that Congress intend-
ed the general duty clause to enable the DOL to protect employees
who are working under circumstances for which the DOL has not
yet promulgated a standard. Since employers are not subject to any
penalties for violating the general duty clause until OSHA has
investigated and cited them, and they have refused to correct the
violation,5 firms cannot complain of unfair surprise. Moreover,
formulation of usefully precise standards for line-speeds in indus-
tries in which heterogeneous commodities are produced in widely
varying processes and configurations may be very difficult.'
Other industries may lend themselves more readily to such stand-
ardization, but the diminishing resources at OSHA's disposal ren-
596. Robert Arndt, Work Pace, Stress, and Cumulative Trauma Disorders, 12 J. OF
HAND SURGERY 866, 868 (1987).
597. Asa Kilbom, Repetitive Work of the Upper Extremity: Part I-Guidelines for the
Practitioner, 14 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ERGONOMICs 51, 53 (1994).
598. POULTRY WORKERS IN ACTION, NC ERGONOMICS CENTER PREDICTED A FLOP 1
(n.d.) (on file with author).
599. S. REP. NO. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5177, 5185-86.
600. Telephone Interview with Barbara Silverstein, Special Assistant for Ergonomic Pro-
grams, OSHA (Jan. 25, 1995).
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ders it infeasible for the agency to promulgate hundreds of such
standards°---especially when firms and industries further exhaust
those resources by challenging the validity of the standards.
The chicken processing industry may, to be sure, be an excep-
tion because the USDA has already set the line-speed at a rate that
clearly contributes to the repetitive traumatization of the workforce.
After all, reflecting the received ergonomic wisdom, OSHA's unof-
ficial Draft Ergonomic Protection Standard singles out as a signal
risk factor the "[p]erformance of the same motions or motion pat-
tern every few seconds for more than two hours at a time."'
Guidelines based on the most recent overview of the international
ergonomic literature go even further in characterizing work cycles
of less than thirty seconds repeated for more than an hour as
"strongly related to disorders of the forearm and wrist."'  The
combination of uniform line-speed, extreme division of labor that
reduces workers to the performance of one motion in less than a
second, and the absence of breaks, stamps chicken processing as an
industry deserving of special and prompt attention. This conclusion
is hardened by the fact that NIOSH has carried out Health Hazard
Evaluations in several chicken plants that have underscored how
rife repetitive trauma disorders are.' Unsurprisingly, legal coun-
sel for Perdue and other affected firms characterizes NIOSH as "a
bunch of nuts."' 5
The chicken oligopolies' probable objection to the use of the
general duty clause (and of a standard) to regulate line-speed on
the ground that it is economically infeasible would not conform to
judicial interpretation of the Occupational Safety and Health Act.
To be sure, the D.C. Circuit stated in a footnote that although
expense alone did not render a safety measure infeasible, "if adop-
tion of the precaution would clearly threaten the economic viability
of the employer, the Secretary should propose the precaution by
way of promul[glated regulations, subject to advance industry com-
ment, rather than through adventurous enforcement of the general
601. Telephone Interview with Ann Glenn, Attorney, U.S. Dep't of Lab., Solicitor's
Office (Jan. 23, 1995).
602. Memorandum from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration Ergonomics
Team, Summary of Key Provisions Draft Ergonomic Protection Standard (Sept. 22, 1994)
(on file with author).
603. Kilbom, supra note 20, at 52.
604. See, e.g., NIOSH: PERDUE, supra note 16; NIOSH: CARGILL, supra note 313.
605. Telephone Interview with David Wylie, Attorney for Perdue Farms, Inc. (Jan. 26,
1995).
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duty clause."' Yet the next year the court offered a much more
precise and expansive conceptualization of the economic burdens
that Congress contemplated imposing on employers:
There can be no question that OSHA represents a deci-
sion to require safeguards for the health of employees even
if such measures substantially increase production
costs ....
... Congress does not appear to have intended to
protect employees by putting their employers out of busi-
ness-either by requiring protective devices unavailable
under existing technology or by making financial viability
generally impossible.
This qualification is not intended to provide a route by
which recalcitrant employers or industries may avoid the
reforms contemplated by the Act. Standards may be eco-
nomically feasible even though, from the standpoint of
employers, they are financially burdensome and affect profit
margins adversely. Nor does the concept of economic feasi-
bility necessarily guarantee the continued existence of indi-
vidual employers. It would appear to be consistent with the
purposes of the Act to envisage the economic demise of an
employer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry in
protecting the health and safety of employees and is conse-
quently financially unable to comply with new standards as
quickly as other employers. As the effect becomes more
widespread within an industry, the problem of economic
feasibility becomes more pressing. . . . [I]f the competitive
structure or posture of the industry would be otherwise
adversely affected-perhaps rendered unable to compete
with imports or with substitute products-the Secretary
could properly consider that factor.'
In determining whether the cost of compliance with the general
duty clause would jeopardize a fir's long-term profitability and
competitiveness, the OSHRC has adduced as a relevant consider-
ation "whether the employer can pass the costs on to the custom-
er. '6 8 Because chicken imports are negligible and the gap be-
606. National Realty & Constr. Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n,
489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
607. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir.
1974) (footnote omitted).
608. Secretary of Lab. v. Waldon Healthcare Center, 16 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1052, 1067
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tween the price of chicken and its principal substitute, red meat, is
so large, the costs of doing business associated with preventing
injuries can be passed on to consumers by profitable firms in a
"recalcitrant" industry that has thus far avoided the reforms Con-
gress intended to impose on employers. The only logically consis-
tent refutation of this position would argue that the federal
government's longstanding "cheap food policy" is designed to
vindicate Engel's law-that food as a proportion of a family's
budget (or macroeconomically: of a society's income) declines as
income rises-in large part by having racial and ethnic minority
workers such as migrant farm workers and, more recently, female
chicken processors' subsidize the food expenditures of consum-
ers at large in the form of low wages and uncompensated injuries.
As one of the members of the Commission on Agricultural Work-
ers explained,
[A] vital point that has been inherent in the agricultural
industry in this country for the last 50 years ... is a clear
congressional intent in the subsidy programs and other
means that food prices in this country will be kept as low
as they can so that food is affordable. When you compare
the food costs in this country to other countries throughout
the world, it is clear that our food costs are substantially
lower."'
Rather than hiding behind what they laud as the advances in pro-
ductivity achieved by the poultry industry and redounding to the
benefit of the country as a whole, the USDA, OSHA, the judiciary,
Congress, and the President would at least create clear lines for
struggle if they admitted that a group of workers has been singled
out to bear these costs.
However, if employers' "'relentless opposition"' results in the
suppression of an ergonomics standard,1 and OSHA's efforts to
(1993) (citing Secretary of Lab. v. Walker Towing Corp., 14 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2072,
2077 n.9 (1991)).
609. Many of these workers cut up chickens in a factory as an extension of their tradi-
tional roles at home. J. Matthew Kessler, The Reproduction of Sexism in a Peripheral
Industry, 3 SocioLoGicAL VmwPoiNTs 23, 34 (1987).
610. APPENDIX II: HEARINGS AND WORKSHOPS BEFORE THE COMMISSION ON AGRICUL-
TuRAL WORKERs 1989-1993 To AcCOMPANY THE REPORT OF THE COMMISSION 884
(1994) (statement of Commissioner Clarence Martin).
611. Ergonomics Standard, [149 Analysis, News & Background Information] Lab. Rel.
Rep. (BNA) 286 (June 26, 1995) (quoting speech by Secretary of Lab., Robert Reich, on
June 15, 1995).
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abate ergonomic hazards through the general duty clause are sty-
mied by administrative tribunals and the circuit courts, the lack of
pressure from a strong labor movement for significant improve-
ments in occupational safety and health will relegate workers to the
vagaries of market forces. The United States International Trade
Commission's poultry expert also believes that workers' compensa-
tion costs may eventually come to haunt an industry that would
have automated even faster had it felt the spur of high wages.612
Although Perdue's Safety and Health Director does not share the
hope of some technocrats that further automation will eliminate the
source of repetitive trauma syndrome613 and thus abate the need
for ergonomics programs, he admits that, absent vigorous enforce-
ment by OSHA, other firms will continue to perceive little finan-
cial incentive to adopt such programs.614
XI. POWER AND THE DIVISION OF LABOR: I GAVE MY LOVE A
CHERRY THAT HAD No STONE, I GAVE MY LOVE A CHICKEN
THAT HAD No BONE
[Dlistribute the earth as you will, the principal ques-
tion remains inexorable-Who is to dig it? Which of
us ... is to do the hard and dirty work for the rest, and
for what pay? Who is to do the pleasant and clean work,
and for what pay? Who is to do no work, and for what
pay? . . .How far is it lawful to suck a portion of the soul
out of a great many persons, in order to put the abstracted
psychical quantities together and make one very beautiful
or ideal soul?615
An important albeit positivistic truth inheres in the claim that
"[tihe prevalence of repetitive tasks in the modem workplace is the
natural consequence of advanced industrial technology. Increasing
specialization in the production process requires that each worker
perform an ever-decreasing range of tasks more and more of-
ten." '616 But this claim also obscures the possibility that produc-
612. Telephone Interview with Douglas Newman, Animal and Forest Products Branch,
U.S. Industry & Trade Comm'n (Jan. 27, 1995).
613. DALEY ET AL., supra note 483, at 50.
614. Telephone Interview with Jim McCauley, Health and Safety Director, Perdue Farms,
Maryland (Jan. 27, 1995).
615. JOHN RUSKIN, Sesame and Lillies, in 18 THE WoRKs OF JOHN RUSKIN 53, 107
(E.T. Cook & Alexander Wedderburn eds., 1905) (1865).
616. David J. Kolesar, Cumulative Trauma Disorders: OSHA's General Duty Clause and
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tion and consumption can be organized and coordinated differently
to make work life less hazardous and tedious. Even apart from
claims that cast doubt on the superiority of "[miass [p]roduction as
[d]estiny" and propose a resurgence of craft-based flexible special-
ization,617 plant managers and pro-capitalist sociologists of work
have reported for decades that "a law of diminishing returns ap-
plies to the subdivision of jobs and that a recombination of certain
fractured parts has increased efficiency.
'618
Chicken processing plants display the chief characteristics of
mass production: mechanical pacing of work, repetitiveness, mini-
mum skill requirement, predetermined use of tools and techniques,
minute subdivision of labor, and surface mental attention. Indeed,
the tiny shards and slivers of autonomy that the classical mass
production workers, such as those in automobile manufacturing, can
carve out by building "banks" of product and thus varying work
place within limits, 619 are largely precluded for chicken proces-
sors. The owner of one of the large integrated broiler firms has
defended these extreme conditions by reference to an even worse
fate. Responding to a description of one of his processing plants
that had appeared in The Wall Street Journal, the President and
CEO of B.C. Rogers Poultry argued that,
processing chickens is an inherently unpleasant task....
Chicken is not grown pre-cut in the plastic bags found at
the local grocer. Short of total plant automation, the tech-
nology for which does not presently exist, and implementa-
tion of which would result in displacement of thousands of
employees, we know of no alternate method of providing
the world with a steady supply of clean, healthy, low fat
chicken.6
Even assuming that chicken has been a low-fat, protein-rich,
positive contribution to nutritional standards of broad strata of the
population,62" ' this industry apologia leaves two questions unex-
the Need for an Ergonomics Standard, 90 MICH. L. REV. 2079, 2079 (1992).
617. See, e.g., MICHAEL PIORE & CHARLES SABEL, THE SECOND INDUSTRiAL DIVIDE:
PoSSIBnrIs FOR PROSPERTY 19-48 (1984).
618. CHARLES R. WALKER & ROBERT H. GUEST, THE MAN ON THE ASSEMBLY LINE
151 (1952).
619. Id. at 12, 146.
620. Letter from John M. Rogers, Sr., President and CEO, B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., to
Editor, Wall Street Journal 2 (Dec. 12, 1994) (unpublished) (on file with author).
621. Roy Gyles, Technological Options for Improving the Nutritional Value of Poultry
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plored. First, would consumers have conferred so much effective
demand on this seemingly cheap commodity had its price reflected
the lifetime impairment of the value of the producers' labor power
in the form of the physical and mental pain and suffering that the
largely atomized worker-producers have been unable to project into
their wages? And second, could society have achieved the same
nutritional outcome by production methods less destructive of the
physical and emotional health of the direct producers? Apart from
the issue of whether alternative sources of amino acids such as
legumes would have been and remain a superior nutritional compo-
nent and would reduce the loss of usable energy by rendering
unnecessary the addition of an animal trophic level to the food
chain,6" the answer might be that it would indeed have been im-
possible to achieve the same high level of output at the same low
prices by any more humane production methods. "Ironically," as
The Wall Street Journal recently noted, it is precisely
the public's growing concern for its own health and safety
that has helped fuel growth of some of the nation's harsh-
est jobs. Poultry workers, for instance ... feed Americans'
burgeoning appetite for lean and easy-to-cook meat by
trimming away fat, bone and skin-and succumbing to
rates of injury and illness that afflict almost one out of
four workers annually.6"
The chief cause of the extremely debilitating work in the poultry
industry is the speed to which workers are driven to perform high-
ly repetitive motions in order to keep pace with a partially auto-
mated production process.624 If a fully automated process is
viewed as the end goal, in which physical stresses will be replaced
by boredom--"[e]ven the lightening of labor becomes a means of
torture inasmuch as the machine does not free the worker from
work, but rather his work from content' ' 6 -it is not clear how
this state of affairs could have been achieved in ways radically
Products, in DESIGNING FOODS: ANIMAL PRODUCT OPTIONS IN THE MARKETPLACE 297,
298-99 (1988).
622. FRANCES M. LAPPA, DIET FOR A SMALL PLANET 176-77 (20th anniv. ed. 1991); G.
TYLER MILLER, JR., LIVING IN THE ENVIRONMENT: AN INTRODUCTION TO ENVIRONMEN-
TAL SCIENCE 62-63, 259, 265 (6th ed. 1990).
623. Horwitz, supra note 23, at Al.
624. Saporito, supra note 485, at 74 ("Poultry processing is a mixed bag of machine
and hand operations.").
625. 1 MARX, DAS KAPrrAL, supra note 25, at 445-46.
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different from those actually used. Even strong labor unions would
have found it difficult to pressure (nonexistent) firms to delay the
start-up of a broiler industry until automation technology was avail-
able. Even if this implausible scenario had been imaginable, how
could any profit-seeking entity have justified such long-term invest-
ments designed to result in a one-time enormous explosion of
output without having gradually built up a guaranteed demand for
the product?
It is, in other words, possible that only the ruthlessly minute
division of labor-B.C. Rogers Poultry, for example, boasts of
"designated knife sharpeners whose sole task is to sharpen
knives"6--and relentless driving of workers at ever faster speeds
can deliver the enormous volume of throughput within such a
relatively short period of time. If indeed the slaughtering and evis-
cerating processes could be automated, perhaps the industry should
confine itself to mass producing the whole chickens that are the
end-products of those operations. The further processing lines,
which now constitute the central source of repetitive trauma disor-
ders, produce the most profitable commodities at the greatest cost
to deboners and other workers. Consumers buy deboned chicken
because it is cheap-just as some hire others to do other kinds of
dirty work such as "picking up dog shit" when they "d[o]n't have
the time do it '627 because that labor comes cheap. If house clean-
ers were expensive, few people could afford to slough off this
work on to them. So, too, perhaps products such as boneless chick-
en breasts should be converted into luxuries by paying deboners as
much as plumbers or lawyers, or by slowing down the line to a
leisurely pace that enables workers to chat and take frequent
breaks.
The mass production of deboned chicken breasts presents an
interesting variation on Joseph Schumpeter's view of "the capitalist
engine [as] production for the masses, whereas climbing upward in
the scale of individual incomes, we find that an increasing propor-
tion is being spent on personal services. ;'6 To verify this claim,
Schumpeter adduced the example of Louis XIV:
626. Letter from R. Jackson Rogers, General Counsel, B.C. Rogers Poultry, to Anthony
Horwitz, Wall Street Journal (Nov. 15, 1994) (on file with author).
627. Susan Cheever, The Nanny Track NEw YORKER, Mar. 6, 1995, at 84, 94.
628. JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPrrALISM, SOCIAIUSM AND DEMOCRACY 67 (2d ed. 1966).
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[A] budget on that level had little that really mattered to
gain from capitalist achievement. . . . Electric lighting is no
great boon to anyone who has money enough to buy a
sufficient number of candles and to pay servants to attend
to them. It is the cheap cloth, the cheap cotton and rayon
fabric, boots, motorcars and so on that are the typical
achievements of capitalist production. . . . The capitalist
achievement does not typically consist in providing more
silk stockings for queens but in bringing them within the
reach of factory girls in return for steadily decreasing
amounts of effort.629
Boneless chicken breasts, however, represent neither a new
product nor one-such as an automobile-that no normal consumer
could produce and that even the mechanically-inclined could not
create without heroic efforts. The ability to buy cheap boneless
chicken breasts is merely tantamount to converting consumers into
little Louis XIVs with enough money to pay remote servants to
perform tasks that suddenly become beneath their dignity. Or, in
the ideological reformulation favored by The Wall Street Journal in
the mid-1950s, "[t]he men who process poultry" are engaged in an
act of "chivalry" by "doing more and more of the housewife's
work for her."63 The prevalence of such low-paid jobs in the
United States, whether taking place in the home or externalized to
factories, underscores how underdeveloped the welfare state is. For
one major impact of advanced welfare states such as Sweden "is
that people will increasingly have to provide common labor servic-
es for themselves: wages will have risen too high, because the
level of minimum state provision is high, to permit a large servant
class.""63 The point is not to abolish the division of labor or to
forgo its benefits, but to encourage all people to perform as much
of the unpleasant but unskilled work that virtually all non-handi-
capped people are capable of doing, rather than using their fman-
cial power to induce those whose meager assets force them to
accept low reservation wages to devote their whole lives to harmful
and unchallenging tasks.
629. Id.
630. Winston Fournier, Poultry Eating Gains with Pre-Cooked Pies and Oven-Ready
Birds, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1954, at 1.
631. NATHAN GLAzER, THE LmiTs OF SOCIAL POLICY 127 (1988).
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An example that illustrates the possibilities of organized work-
er-consumer cooperation involves the same union that organizes
chicken processors. After UFCW members who work as checkers
in St. Louis supermarkets complained about repetitive strain inju-
ries, a NIOSH study found that reaching and unloading heavy
items from carts caused extra strain. The local union then used
those results to negotiate a change in working conditions so that
customers now unload for themselves, as is the case in most super-
markets.632 As a NIOSH official observed, "It's important for the
public to realize that they're doing a real service to the cash-
iers .... Customer unloading takes a lot of stress off check-
ers."
633
More than two centuries ago, Adam Smith, who considered the
industrial division of labor one of the underpinnings of civiliza-
tion," recognized some of the grave dangers to which a worker
was exposed when his entire life was confined to the performance
of one or two "very simple operations"; having
no occasion to exert his understanding, or to exercise his
invention in finding out expedients for removing difficulties
which never occur[, h]e naturally loses ... the habit of
such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and igno-
rant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The
torpor of his mind renders him ... incapable of relishing
or bearing a part in any rational conversation .... Of the
great and extensive interests of his country he is altogether
incapable of judging .... It even corrupts the activity of
his body, and renders him incapable of exerting his
strength with vigour and perseverance, in any other em-
ployment .... His dexterity at his own particular trade
seems ... to be acquired at the expence of his intellectual
[and] social . . . values.635
Although socialists later agreed with Smith that the extreme
division of labor characteristic of subordination to machines was
"pure boredom" and an unsurpassed "method of stupidifica-
632. Redesigned Checkstands Will Help Reduce Cashier Injuries, UNtrED FOOD & COM.
WORKERS ACnON, Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 23.
633. Id.
634. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 3-21 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776).
635. Id. at 734-35.
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tion, 6 36 they also believed that such a crippling system sup-
pressed a "world of productive instincts and capacities, as one in
the states of La Plata butchers a whole animal in order to seize its
hide or tallow." '637 In turn, Smith agreed with his later critics that
the workers' potential was being destroyed: "By nature a philoso-
pher is not in genius and disposition half so different from a street
porter, as a mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a
spaniel, or this last from a shepherd's dog." 3s
The absence of a working class movement in the United States
has made workers more blind than elsewhere to the consequences
of their consumption choices for other workers at their places of
production and employment. This blindness is promoted by the
anarchy of capitalist relations of production, the ideology of con-
sumer sovereignty as a sacrosanct value of American civilization,
and the strict but superficial separation of economics from politics.
Where even the progressive consumer movement is detached from
the labor movement, workers have access to little or no systematic
flow of information or education and are therefore not accustomed
to think about the physical and mental costs that other workers
bear in producing the commodities that they want to con-
sume-despite the fact that millions of consumers are individually
conscious of the process as put-upon producers of other workers'
commodities of choice. To the extent that workers remain atom-
ized, they lend support to the extreme individualism that underlies
the prevailing image of consumers as making decisions without
regard to larger societal considerations.
Only in such a rigidly fissured capitalist society as the United
States could the following dichotomous analysis, offered by Daniel
Bell in the mid-1950s, have found such resonance:
[H]ere is a "value" problem for the human-relations engi-
neers. Which "variable" should one seek to maximize, the
satisfactions of the immediate work group or the productiv-
636. Friedrich Engels, Die Lage der Arbeitenden Klasse in England, in KARL MARX &
FRiDRICH ENGELS, 2 WERKE 225, 397-98 (1957) (1845); see also FRmDRICH ENGELS,
Conditions of the Working Class in England, in KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, 4
COLLECrED WoRKs 466, 466 (1975).
637. 1 MARX, DAS KAPITAL, supra note 25, at 381. For insightful and evasive compari-
son respectively of Smith and Marx, see Nathan Rosenberg, Adam Smith on the Division
of Labor: Two Views or One? ECONOMICA, May 1965, at 127, and E.G. West, The Polit-
ical Economy of Alienation: Karl Marx and Adam Smith, OXFoRD ECON. PAPERS, Mar.
1969, at 1.
638. SMrrH, supra note 634, at 16.
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ity of the company? ... Should work be organized so as
to increase output and decrease costs . . . so that there is a
larger product for society? Or should work be organized so
as to benefit the individuals on the job? ... [W]ho shall
bear the costs, the consumer or the worker?
Historically, the answer of the market society has been
that the consumer should benefit. This underlies our con-
cept of efficiency. In a competitive economy, how can any
single company take on the burden of increased costs un-
less all competitors do likewise? ... Short of pressure
from the workers themselves, there is no action which
would force modem enterprise to reorder the flow of
work.639
An instructive counterpoint to this throughput fiber alles frame-
work stems, unsurprisingly, from two self-consciously unorthodox
capitalists. Because the novelties produced by Ben & Jerry's
Homemade, Inc., such as super-fatted, high calorie ice
cream-which, as one of ten foods that the Center for Science in
the Public Interest suggests "you should never eat,"'  may, to be
sure, be less healthful than mass-produced chicken-involve many
hand operations, its workers incurred repetitive strain wrist injuries.
After redesigning machinery and processes and partial automation
failed to eliminate the problem,"' the firm "closed down the
Brownie Bar line ... due in part to concerns about ergonomic
stresses inherent in the manufacturing process." 2 Although cus-
tomers protested "about the disappearance of the 'brownie ice
cream sandwich,'. . . according to Mr. Cohen, until there is a
machine to replace the repetitive motion that threatens to injure
operators' arms, continuing production is 'not an option.'''643
639. DANIEL BELL, Work and Its Discontents: The Cult of Efficiency in America, in
THE END OF IDEOLOGY: ON THE EXHAUSTION OF POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE FIFrMS 222,
254-55 (1960).
640. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE, INC., 1993 ANNUAL REPORT 25 (1994).
641. Edward Felsenthal, An Epidemic or a Fad? The Debates Heats Up Over Repetitive
Stress, WALL ST. J., July 14, 1994, at Al; Robert Manor, Ben & Jerry's Puts a Cherry
on Top of Profit-Making, ST. LOIS POST-DISPATCH, June 30, 1994, at 13B, available in
Westlaw, St. Louis Post-Dispatch database; Paul Rogers, Breaking All the Rules, DAILY
FOODS MAG., Sept. 1992, at 59, available in LEXIS, News Library, Mags File.
642. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE, INC., supra note 640, at 20.
643. Roger Trapp, Peace, Love and Ice Cream, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 3, 1994, at 15,
available in Westlaw, United Kingdom database.
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Lest it be thought that Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield are
socialists in disguise, it is noteworthy that their version of "Caring
Capitalism" has been joined with threats to summon the police
when the left-wing United Electrical Workers tried to leaflet one of
their plants.' Moreover, not only did Cohen, according to one
insider's account, demand "that the ice cream be packed in a way
that was brutally tiring and repetitive for his early employees,
while accusing Big Business of exploiting workers,"'  but his
employees continue to be exposed to a high injury rate in gener-
al "-in part because "the Company's need to manufacture more
product through existing lines has pushed aside a long-term com-
mitment to a risk management program."" 7 By the same token,
however, the very fact that even an extraordinary exemplar of
capital with a semi-human face had to enforce its decision in the
teeth of consumer resistance suggests how unlikely voluntary emu-
lation by a self-professed "customer-driven business" such as
Perdue6 would be.
If those responsible for requesting and designing conveyor-belt
machinery were also required to work under its command for lon-
ger periods of time, working conditions would presumably improve
significantly."9 A more direct approach, based on self-direction
rather than Schadenfreude, would enable the workers themselves to
initiate the request for the design and implementation of production
engineering and process decisions. A reduction in the length of the
working day of poultry processors is even more urgently needed
than for the working class as a whole. Nevertheless, a redistribu-
tion of labor, which would modify if not abolish the caste-like
relegation of millions of workers to a lifelong attachment to a
single operation, devoid of possibilities for individual self-develop-
ment,650 though even further removed from public debate in the
644. Robert Sullivan, Jr., Just Desserts: Can Ben and Jerry Make a Company as Good
as Their Ice Cream?, ROLLING STONE, July 9-23, 1992, at 77.
645. Diana B. Henriques, The Emperors of Ice Cream: The Unlikely Success Story of
the Hippie Capitalists Ben and Jerry, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, § 7, at 12 (reviewing
FRED LAGER, BEN & JERRY'S: THE INSIDE SCOOP (1994)).
646. Claudia Dreifus, Passing the Scoop: Ben & Jerry, N.Y TIMES, Dec. 18, 1994, § 6
(Magazine), at 38.
647. BEN & JERRY'S HOMEMADE, INC., supra note 640, at 20.
648. PERDUE & CHICKEN, supra note 62, at 27.
649. RUDOLF BAHRO, DIE ALTERNATIVE: ZUR KRITIK DES REAL ExISTIERENDEN
SOzIALISMUs 332 (1977).
650. I MARX, DAS KAPITAL, supra note 25, at 359-60.
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United States, is as necessary as a redistribution of income, wealth,
and power. Although partial and symbolic sharing of dirty work
may suffice to break the link between it and the disrespect associ-
ated with it,"' a thoroughgoing transformation of social relations
would require more.
It is a telling commentary on the power of capitalism to colo-
nize the mind and efface the imagination of a different world that
the mainstream public policy universe is exhausted by the dual
notions that ever greater throughput in the service of lower prices
is the supreme goal of economic life and that the best fate for a
poultry worker is the destruction of her job and livelihood by
automation and her consignment to some similarly debilitating and
mentally unchallenging labor.652 Only by demanding an end to a
mode of production that ruthlessly subordinates all human develop-
ment to the sole criterion of profitability can workers begin creat-
ing an alternative future in which the division of labor will cease
to enslave the many and enrich the few.
651. MIcHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALI-
TY 174-75 (1983).
652. See W'ireback, supra note 473 (discussing the problems inherent in the automation
of the chicken industry).
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